26. Editorial Note
At the 375th meeting of the National Security Council on August 7, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. A brief discussion followed:
“The Director of Central Intelligence said the situation in the Taiwan Straits was ‘heating up’. He then displayed a map showing the movement of the Chinese Communist air forces into hitherto unoccupied bases on the mainland opposite Quemoy. Only fighter planes—no bombers—were believed to be involved in this deployment, which might be designed to distract attention from other parts of the world or might be part of a build-up for military action. The significant thing about this deployment was not the numbers involved, but the fact that Chinese Communist air forces were now located in these bases for the first time. One result of the Chinese Communist deployment had been an increase in air combat over the Straits. No Chinese-Communist ground build-up or movement of naval forces from the Shanghai base had been detected. In Mr. Dulles’ opinion, the Chinese Communists would not attempt an invasion of the offshore islands without a prior ground forces build-up on the mainland opposite.
“Mr. Dulles said the problem for the future was control of the air over the Taiwan Straits. The possibility must be considered that the Chinese Communists, while refraining from invasion, would seek to starve out the offshore islands by an air blockade, perhaps reinforced by a naval blockade. The offshore islands, being dependent on shipment of provisions and ammunition from Taiwan, are vulnerable to such a blockade. The Chinese Communist planes in the area were mostly MIG–17’s, which were superior, plane for plane, to the Chinese Nationalists’ F–84’s and F–86’s. General White agreed with this estimate of MIG–17 capabilities.
“Mr. Dulles then said the Chinese Nationalists had reacted strongly to the new situation in the Taiwan Straits and had, in fact, overplayed [Page 43] and over-dramatized the situation for their own purposes. U.S. military observers saw no immediate threat of invasion.
“Secretary Herter said that the attitude of Chiang was a significant aspect of the situation. It was to be hoped that Chiang, who was becoming very ‘edgy’, would not impulsively start hostilities on his own initiative.
“General White felt there was a strong possibility that the Chinese Communists could, if they desired, establish an air blockade of the offshore islands, which could not be supplied by an airlift because of their lack of airfields.
“Secretary Herter asked whether such a blockade would not be an overt act.
“Mr. Dulles said the Chinese Nationalists, by their well-advertised attacks on Chinese Communist junks, had supplied the Chinese Communists with a precedent for air attacks on shipping. The Chinese Communists would say they were merely engaging in reprisals in kind.
“The President said that even with the Formosa Resolution there would be no excuse for U.S. intervention in the situation unless we concluded that Chinese Communist air activity was merely the preliminary to an attack on Formosa. We had no warrant to defend the offshore islands unless an attack on them was a prelude to an attack on Formosa.
“Mr. Dulles then reported that Khrushchev’s visit to Peiping was obviously a sudden decision. Mr. Dulles believed the Chinese Communists were disturbed over Khrushchev’s acceptance of a Middle East discussion in the UN Security Council, and thought it possible that Mao did not like Khrushchev’s tendency to espouse Nehru as the spokesman of the East in connection with the proposed Summit meeting. There might now be an opportunity to develop jealousy between Mao and Nehru. Mr. Dulles thought these affairs had damaged Khrushchev’s prestige among his colleagues, as well as internationally.” (Memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, Director of the NSC Secretariat, August 8; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)