Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

27. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Washington, August 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Emergence of New Situation in Taiwan Straits

During the past week the Chinese Communists have deployed advanced-type jet aircraft (probably MIG 17’s) to certain coastal airfields opposite Taiwan which they had not previously used operationally. Photographic reconnaissance has revealed the presence of 36 aircraft at Chenghai airfield (near Swatow) and at least 29 aircraft at Lungchi airfield (near Amoy), only 40 miles from Quemoy. Stationing of aircraft at Liencheng (further inland in Fukien province) has been reported but not confirmed, and indications have been observed of Chinese Communist intent to occupy a fourth field, Lungtien (south of Foochow). No evidence has been received of any corresponding moves to build up Chinese Communist ground and naval strength in the coastal area facing Taiwan. The first indication of the increased Chinese Communist air strength in the area was a clash on July 29 in which two GRC F–84s were shot down near Swatow while on a routine patrol flight over the Straits. Both Taipei and Peiping reported an encounter between a patrol of GRC Sabrejets and Communist jets in the Amoy–Quemoy area yesterday.

The Chinese Communist move to occupy and use the coastal airfields involves at a minimum their determination henceforth to defend their airspace against GRC incursions. GRC reconnaissance and other aerial operations will be seriously impeded if not virtually prevented. It is highly possible that in addition Peiping’s move represents the first of a series of probing actions designed to test GRC and, more importantly, United States reactions. After gradually occupying all or most of the coastal airfields the probable next step would be to attempt to assert air control of the Taiwan Straits. Rather than launch a full-scale military attack on the Quemoy or Matsu island groups with the attendant risk of involving the United States, their probable strategy would then be to interdict the islands with the objective of causing the GRC forces there to wither on the vine or of forcing their evacuation. There is also a possibility that Peiping might seek to provoke a crisis over the off shore islands for the purpose of creating demands for their participation in “a conference of the heads of government of the big powers” (Mao–Khrushchev communiqué of August 3),¹

There are clearly serious dangers inherent in the new situation that has emerged. The GRC will certainly resist Peiping’s efforts to gain air control over the Taiwan Straits and thus interdict the offshore islands. The large-scale aerial warfare that could be expected to result from an increasingly aggressive Communist posture in the Straits could spread to Taiwan or lead to GRC bombing of mainland airfields. If the Chinese Communists were successful in interdicting the offshore islands, the consequences would be grave in view of the concentration of a third of GRC forces and equipment there and the GRC’s determination to fight to the bitter end to defend them. We would be faced with a situation in which we would either have to stand by and watch the islands wither on the vine or take military action to preserve the GRC’s position in the area. Failure on our part to come to their support would severely damage GRC morale and gravely strain United States-GRC relations. It could also be expected to have a serious impact upon United States allies in the Far East, especially Korea and Vietnam, which are exposed to the threat of Communist aggression.

Reports from Ambassador Drumright and Admiral Smoot state that the GRC leaders have evidenced extreme concern over the new situation in the coastal area. At a two-hour meeting with them on August 4 President Chiang, with his top officials present, expressed the view that the most important topic of discussion at the Khrushchev–Mao conference was the Far East and stated that military action against Taiwan should not be ruled out. The President asked that certain specific steps be taken by the United States for the purpose of reassuring the GRC armed forces and population: the delivery of Sidewinder missiles (air to air, non-nuclear), expediting of delivery of F–86s, permanent deployment of at least one group of United States F–100s on Taiwan, and a show of force by the Seventh Fleet in the area. Following JCS consideration of the situation, action has been taken on an urgent basis to provide a supply of Sidewinders and to ship 20 F–86–Fs. A carrier group has been ordered to the area and instructed to conduct a routine Air Defense Exercise. The stationing of USAF F–100 Units in Taiwan on a permanent basis is regarded by the military as impracticable because of maintenance considerations, but arrangements have been made to carry out rotation deployments of such aircraft to Taiwan on a more regular basis and in larger numbers.

In addition Admiral Smoot was asked by the GRC Defense Minister on August 5 to transmit a message requesting President Eisenhower to issue a public statement to the effect that he would consider an “attack on Kinmen (Quemoy) or Matsu at this time to be a threat to Taiwan.”² On advice from Ambassador Drumright, Admiral Smoot informed the Defense Minister that such a request should come formally through the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the President.³ No approach has been made to the Ambassador on the subject, but he has requested guidance from the Department in the event it is raised with him formally or informally. A more recent message states that in a private conversation with the Ambassador on August 7 George Yeh suggested that a generally worded United States statement to the effect that “a Communist attack on the offshore islands would be disturbing to the peace of Asia” would be extremely beneficial.⁴

The GRC has declared a full alert of its armed forces, taken emergency precautionary measures in the offshore islands, and taken some preliminary steps with respect to civil air preparedness. However, Ambassador Drumright reports that the mood of the GRC officials has become calmer during the past few days, in part because of our military moves, and expresses the view that the GRC is acting with restraint.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Nationalist China. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins. The documents cited in footnotes 2–5 below are in the Supplement.
1. For text of the communiqué issued in Peking, see Peking Review, August 12, 1958, p. 6.
2. Drumright reported the conversation in telegram 134 from Taipei, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–558)
3. Drumright reported this in telegram 139 from Taipei, August 6. (Ibid., 793.00/8–658)
4. Telegram 158 from Taipei, August 8. (Ibid., 601.9311/8–858)
5. In telegram 150 from Taipei, August 7. (Ibid., 793.00/8–758)