Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

25. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, August 7, 1958, 11 a.m.

147. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embassy’s 127¹ and 133² to Department, repeated CINCPAC unnumbered. Believe President Chiang’s warning of possible Chinese Communist action against Taiwan should be evaluated in light of following consideration:

1. Communists must realize direct attack on Taiwan makes US involvement certain, posing clear risk of unacceptable US retaliation, and greatly strengthening GRC morale and confidence, thus rendering prospects for “liberation” of Taiwan even more remote. See little reason to believe Communists have abandoned “peaceful liberation” (i.e. capture by psychological means) as major hope for ultimate seizure Taiwan.

2. Communist action which would probably place heaviest psychological strain on GRC would be seizure of control of air over Taiwan Strait, exertion of maximum degree of interdiction and other pressures against Offshore Islands that is possible without risking US counteraction. Communists would thereby create situation which would offer them several favorable possibilities. If interdiction succeeded, Offshore Islands would eventually wither on vine with serious consequences for GRC military strength and morale and for GRC–US relations if we failed to go to rescue. If interdiction provoked violent GRC counter-action, Commies could either (A) seize pretext for all out assault against islands with even sharper psychological impact on GRC morale than loss through interdiction or (B) launch propaganda and diplomatic offensive against GRC in UN and elsewhere designed to damage GRC’s international position. Whatever course Commies pursue following assertion of air superiority over Strait, GRC confidence in its own future and in US as ally could be greatly undermined.

3. Possibility exists that Commies, in occupying coastal airfields and in stiffening attitude toward patrols and overflights, are to some extent reacting to indications of GRC intention to step up guerilla and other unconventional activities against mainland. Recent propaganda has stressed activities of “Chiang’s [garble] agents”, and claims that some of graduates of GRC jump training program have been captured by Commies. We can hardly expect Commies to remain wholly passive while GRC carries out type of anti-mainland operations contemplated under this program.

4. I believe Chiang is probably more deeply concerned about possibility of Commie action such as described under (2) above, than about possibility of direct attack on Taiwan. Chiang’s stress on direct threat to Taiwan may be partly designed to strengthen case for inclusion Offshore Islands in treaty area, or for US intervention under “Formosa resolution”,³ in event of Communist military action against Offshore Islands. He is also obviously making a strong case for modernization and strengthening of his forces.

Since main current threat to Taiwan probably lies in psychological field, a public show of continuing firmness toward Chinese Reds coupled with an unwavering attitude of support of and confidence in our GRC allies, is regarded as of the highest importance.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–758. Secret. Received at 3:20 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC.
1. See footnote 2, Document 24.
2. Drumright commented in telegram 133 from Taipei, August 5, that the Communists were probably testing Nationalist and U.S. reactions by the occupation of the coastal air fields and that the second step was likely to be an attempt to assert air control of the Taiwan Strait. He urged strong support of the Nationalists. (Department of State, Central Files 793.00/8–558; see Supplement)
3. Congressional Joint Resolution approved January 29, 1955 (Public Law 4); 69 Stat. 7. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. II, p. 162.