Office of the Historian

24. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)0

Taipei, August 4, 1958, 5:40 p.m.

040940Z. Prolonged conferences with President, Minister of Defense and General Wang this date emphasizes importance attached to growing development in Communist China. Seriousness of situation demonstrates need for immediate attention at highest levels. Briefly I analyze as follows:

The issue is strategic control of Taiwan Straits and tactical threat to offshore islands. Chinese consider the former lost and the latter imminent. Paramount politico-military implication is positive affirmation of US support which Chinese officials honestly feel is luke warm. In 2 hour conference with President his views dramatically and rather excitedly given to me and US Ambassador which he requests be transmitted to CINCPAC in essence as follows.

President attaches gravest significance to Krushchev Mao Tse-tung conference in Peiping.1 Considers conference dominated by Soviet Minister of Defense. Is convinced Chinese Communists are prepared and have the capability to attack Taiwan. That they will do so with all out conclusive effect. That they are willing to take risk of retaliation and that now is most timely and propitious time. President points out that our urging calmness and restraint issuing from points 5 to 8,000 miles away do not recognize the imminence and nearness of the real threat to GRC. He did however assure us that he has always and will in the future continue to honor treaty agreements. Action required which he most urgently emphasized [Page 40] was positive demonstration of US recognition of the seriousness of the situation and to this end urges the most rapid action on acquiring sidewinder speedup of F–86 program as show of force by 7th Fleet in the area and “the permanent stationing of a group of F–100’s on Taiwan.” The latter in spite of careful explanation of impracticability and other implication.

I am not being stampeded in this my 1st conference but am firmly convinced urging calmness has worn thin. In view of all of the foregoing I believe the situation so strained as to require me to have early information to pass to GRC in the form of definite plans and promises to show the united backing of the American military and US Government particularly in regard to providing sidewinders a show of force by the Seventh Fleet and a speedup in the F–86 program. Strictly political implications being transmitted separately by US Ambassador.2

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Sec. 37. Secret; Priority. Received by CNO at 6:16 p.m. Repeated to CINCPACFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT; repeated from CINCPAC to CNO and from CNO to State, OSD/ISA, Air Force, JCS, Army, and CIA.↩
  2. July 31–August 3.↩
  3. Telegram 127 from Taipei, August 4, contains Drumright’s report of the conversation with his comments. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–458; see Supplement)↩