166. Memorandum From President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles 0
You will recall that from Newport I telephoned you concerning an idea that had to do with the offshore islands in the Formosa Straits.1 My thought was that Chiang might be sold on the proposition that he would be in a better position to realize his purpose of retaining a capability for return to the mainland in the event of internal disorder, if he should acquire from the United States a strong amphibious lift and simultaneously remove all or nearly all his garrison from the offshore islands. Of course this would have to be a plan voluntarily adopted by him, during a period when there was no hostile action. Otherwise he would be acting under duress and this would be, of course, unacceptable.
I mentioned this same idea to George Yeh when he called on me recently. The Ambassador seemed to be receptive to the idea but, we agreed, it would be necessary to have a cease fire so that the Nationalists would not seem to be retreating under fire.
Now it occurs to me that the current cease fire might give an opportunity during which this idea could be skillfully presented to Chiang, preferably by one of his own people—possibly Ambassador Yeh.
As I suggested to you, this would restore a great mobility and flexibility to Chiang’s force. It would remove the danger of getting involved in a severe battle under unfavorable conditions near the Chinese coastline. It would much improve Chiang’s opportunity for intervention on the mainland if and when such a situation should arise. Furthermore, it would certainly give him and ourselves a better position before world opinion. Consequently our defensive alliance would be the stronger because of a unified public opinion at home.
Incidentally, I believe that we have a sufficient amount of unused amphibious equipment, including some escort vessels, that the transfer to Chiang of a number of them would have no harmful effects on our own position. Of course nothing formal can be suggested, but I do think [Page 347] it is the kind of thing that might appeal to Chiang, and if it did, it would offer great advantages to both of us.
I have no reason, naturally, for believing that Chiang would now be more receptive to this idea than he has been to similar ones suggested to him during recent years. However, it is possible that he may feel that conditions are changed and that if he had an amphibious capability that could lift in one load fifteen or twenty thousand troops, that he could sell both himself and his people on the proposition that by this action he would have increased his strength and his position in the area.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–758. Personal and Confidential. Attached to the source text are copies of an October 7 memorandum from Robertson to Dulles concerning steps which had been or might be taken to increase the mobility of Nationalist forces and an October 8 memorandum from Greene to Robertson transmitting a copy of the President’s memorandum with a request for thorough study of the idea. The signed copies are ibid., 793.5/10–758; see Supplement.↩
- Reference is apparently to a conversation of September 16; see Document 94. The President also mentioned the idea in telephone conversations with Dulles on September 22 and October 2, both of which are recorded in notes by Phyllis Bernau. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) The September 22 note is in the Supplement.↩