Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

165. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 7, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Offshore Island Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
• Mr. Shao-Chang Hsu, Minister, Chinese Embassy
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Mr. Robertson told Ambassador Yeh that he had asked him to come in for a chat about the situation resulting from the Chinese Communist announcement of a temporary cease-fire. Mr. Robertson said that if the Communists succeeded in causing a misunderstanding between the United States and the GRC then they would have succeeded in one of their objectives. He thought that the Chinese Communist cease-fire move represented a plus for our side. It gave the GRC an opportunity to replenish supplies on Quemoy, to repair bomb damage, to remove wounded, etc.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the United States had begun convoying GRC supply operations because of the Communist attack. There was no purpose in continuing to convoy when the attacks stopped. There was no further military reason for it. Moreover, the U.S. had been working for a cease-fire and now that the Communists had stopped their attacks, the U.S. should not give them any excuses for resuming them. United States public opinion would not understand any failure of the U.S. Government to respond to the cease-fire.

Ambassador Yeh felt that the psychological object of the Communists’ cease-fire would be to soften American public opinion. The Communists could see that U.S. public opinion did not support the U.S. Government’s policy 100%. They could also see a slight difference between the U.S. and the GRC on this matter. He mentioned Secretary Dulles’ press conference and the Secretary’s use of the word “foolish”.¹

Mr. Robertson explained that what the Secretary had in mind was simply that it was militarily unwise for the GRC to station so many troops on the offshore islands. The Secretary had been very much upset by the interpretations which the newspapers had given to his remarks— that there had been a change in U.S. policy. Of course, the public didn’t know that the U.S. had tried to get a reduction of GRC forces on Quemoy. But this was “old hat” to Mr. Dulles; he did not think of it in terms of something that would be regarded as new. Some newspapers would twist anything that was said because they were against the Government’s policy.

Ambassador Yeh expressed the fear of his government that the Chinese Communists’ offer of cease-fire would so impress U.S. public opinion, that if the Communists were to press new demands as a condition for continuing the cease-fire, there would be public pressure here to consider such demands. Another worry of his government was that the Chinese Communists simply needed a week to build themselves up and then they would renew their attacks. GRC acquisition of 8" howitzers might have required the Communists to shift their gun positions. According to GRC intelligence, the Communists were feverishly supplying their forward positions. Possibly they were getting ready to issue a military ultimatum.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Communist bombardment of GRC positions had been far heavier than GRC bombardment of Communist positions. It didn’t seem as though the Communists would need a cease-fire to resupply their positions. In any case, stopping U.S. convoys would not in any way help the Communists resupply their positions. The circumstances under which the decision to convoy was made no longer existed. The cease-fire, on the other hand, gives our side an opportunity to repair the damage and resupply the offshore islands. Therefore, it seemed to be a sign of weakness on the side of the Communists. We would gain in terms of world opinion by allowing the cease-fire to take place. We should take advantage of it.

Ambassador Yeh mentioned the statement by the Government spokesman which had been put out in Taipei and which had included the assertion that the GRC had not initiated firing and would not do so in the future. This had been inserted on his recommendation.

Mr. Robertson said it would be advantageous for the U.S. to issue an announcement that we had stopped convoying since there was no longer a military necessity for it. In response to Ambassador Yeh’s question whether we would include in such an announcement the statement that if firing recommenced we would begin convoying again, Mr. Robertson replied that of course we would; there has been no change in our policy. He asked Ambassador Yeh to assure the Generalissimo that there has been no change.

Ambassador Yeh said that President Chiang had accepted almost everything he had recommended. Yeh had emphasized in his messages to Taipei that the GRC could not afford to go against world and U.S. public opinion, especially Congressional opinion. However, the Generalissimo’s personal pride had been hurt by some of the expressions used in recent public statements such as Mr. Herter’s use of the word “pathological” and Mr. Dulles’ use of the word “foolish”. Ambassador Yeh said that his government could not accept the Communist declaration but would go along with the de facto cease-fire.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that we would be in a much stronger position with the American people if we responded to the cease-fire. If the Communists then started firing again, we would be in a stronger position to support GRC defense. Ambassador Yeh felt that the public would want the GRC to retreat a step if the Communists started firing again. Mr. Robertson said we were trying to rally public opinion and that Congressional opinion was especially important.

Ambassador Yeh asked if we would not issue a public statement on convoying. Mr. Robertson stressed that it would be helpful if we did issue such a statement. We would explain that we had convoyed because of the bombardment and that if it stopped convoys would no longer be necessary. However, if firing resumed, we would resume convoys. Ambassador Yeh wondered whether the statement issued yesterday did not go far enough. Mr. Robertson suggested that Ambassador Yeh tell the Generalissimo that such a statement (re convoys) would be helpful in rallying public opinion here. There was great pressure for such an announcement and it would be helpful to make it. He assured Ambassador Yeh that we would include in such an announcement the statement that renewal of firing by the Communists would mean we would start escorting again. Ambassador Yeh could tell the Generalissimo this.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–758. Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 13 and initialed by Robertson.
1. Reference is to the Secretary’s September 30 press conference; see Document 143.
2. For text of a statement issued by the Department of State on October 8, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p. 1174.