143. Editorial Note
Secretary of State Dulles commented extensively on the Taiwan Strait crisis at a news conference on September 30, 1958. In response to a question whether the United States expected the Nationalists to return someday to the mainland either by force or otherwise, he replied that this was “a highly hypothetical matter.” He did not think that “just by their own steam they are going to get there” but he did not want to exclude the possibility of unrest and revolt on the mainland like the 1956 revolt in Hungary.
When asked whether the United States had agreed to the buildup of Nationalist forces on the offshore islands, he replied that the United States “did not feel that it was sound” to make such a major commitment of forces to those areas but that it had acquiesced and had not attempted to veto it. In response to a question of whether it would be sound to work out some arrangement for the withdrawal of Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu, he answered:
“It all depends upon the circumstances under which they would be withdrawn. I think to withdraw as a retreat under fire would not be a wise step to take because of the probable impact of that upon other peoples, other countries, and upon the morale, indeed, on Formosa itself.”
To a follow-up question as to the circumstances under which such a withdrawal might be possible, he replied:
“If there were a cease-fire in the area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep these large forces on these islands. We thought that it was rather foolish to put them there, and, as I say, if there were a cease-fire it would be our judgment, military judgment even, that it would not be wise or prudent to keep them there.”
Later he was asked whether a cease-fire could be a de facto one with no written agreement. He answered, “I think it could be de facto.” For the complete transcript of the news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1958, pages 597–604.