Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China⁰

Washington, October 1, 1958, 10:04 p.m.

290. Personal for Ambassador from Secretary. I have your October 1 message with reference to my press conference of yesterday.¹

Let me say first of all that there is no conscious change in my position. From the beginning of this affair both the President and I have made clear that we were not willing to retreat in the face of force, that we demanded a cessation of the Communist attack, and that if this occurred we would be willing to consider, without prejudice to the rights of our allies, the possibility of preventing the offshore islands being a source of irritation to the peace.

The press, much to my distress, has played up the press conference of yesterday as indicative of a significant change. That is primarily because most of the reporters want to see a change. The fact is that the overwhelming majority of correspondents at Washington dealing with this problem are strongly hostile to our support of the Republic of China and the fact that we are on this account in danger of what could be a major war and great disaster.

I am conscious of the fact that the Generalissimo does not want to appear before his people as a “puppet” of the US. I quite understand and take no offense whatever at his statements designed to assert independence.

He should equally realize that we are up against the charge that we are being dragged into a world war by Chiang, that we have put the destinies of the American people at his disposal, and that we have no flexibility in our position because Chiang is stubborn and will not agree because he feels that his only real hope is to precipitate world war.

We cannot continue our policy of close and sympathetic understanding and support of GRC unless we have some flexibility to dissipate this impression created by much of the press and shared by a considerable part of Congress, both Democratic and to some extent Republican, and also by most of our allies.

I do not go one inch further in this matter than seems to be necessary in order to prevent our whole China policy from being swept overboard. I would hope that as much attention could be given in Taiwan to such a speech as I made in New York on September 25² as to isolated remarks drawn out by inquiries by press correspondents who are trying to ask most awkward questions in order to embarrass the Administration in its China policy.

You may, if you wish, discreetly convey my above views to high officials.

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved by Dulles and cleared by Robertson and with S/S.
1. Telegram 520 from Taipei, October 1, transmitted a message from Drumright to Dulles that his remarks at his press conference the day before (see Document 143) were causing “uncertainty, uneasiness, and unsettlement” in Taipei. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–158; see Supplement)
2. See footnote 4, Document 127.