Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, September 25, 1958, 5:23 p.m.

3089. For Ambassador from Secretary. Your 1715.¹ Following summary of talking paper for my meeting with Lloyd² may be helpful to you in your conversation with Prime Minister:

1. There are three possible general interpretations of Peiping’s aggressive actions against Quemoy: (a) They will lead to an open assault against the offshores, possibly followed by an assault against Taiwan; (b) They will be limited to a Berlin blockade type of operation; (c) They will follow 1954/55 pattern when Chicoms, faced with strong U.S. counteraction, let tempo of battle gradually die down to a state of quiescence.

2. Interpretation (b) above seems most likely at present though it might give way to interpretation (c) if we were as successful in a Quemoy sealift as we were in Berlin airlift. We therefore determined to strive to keep Quemoy alive.

3. Our JCS estimate that Quemoy can hold out until November 15 at a resupply rate of 100 tons per day. Barring unusually bad weather and unforeseen obstacles, the JCS consider it possible that current resupply rate of about 125 tons daily can be improved by new delivery techniques to 300 tons per day level necessary to keep Quemoy going indefinitely on an austerity basis. Main problem will be morale, which is nevertheless good at present.

4. We are prepared to oppose a direct assault on islands.

5. We do not, however, propose take any new military initiatives and believe that Chicoms will likewise be disposed, especially during Warsaw talks, to avoid initiatives that would brand them before world opinion as responsible for broadening conflict.

6. We will continue to urge GRC to act within present ground rules, for any real extension of those rules would almost certainly bring about net worsening of situation for GRC. Latter nevertheless under strong provocation to aerial bombard shore batteries pounding Quemoy. So far the GRC has exercised reasonable restraint and we are striving to ensure this restraint continues.

7. We anticipate no “solution” emanating from Warsaw talks where we are pressing for a cease-fire, followed by agreement on conditions to eliminate provocations and to demilitarize offshore islands area. Chicoms are obdurately insisting on total withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan and other islands. Though seemingly futile, talks do serve purpose of providing a cover under which there might be some de facto easing of war tensions. They also create basis for showing up Peiping’s aggressive purposes. We may shortly wish to make clear record of those talks.

8. Issue is bound to come up sooner or later for active consideration in UN—sooner if Warsaw talks appear to be failure. When issue is raised in UN we would want to have a resolution proposed asking for a ceasefire, the renunciation of use of force and an examination of measures to tranquilize situation.

9. However, there is apt to be a strong tide in the UN calling for more comprehensive measures to cope with this offshore islands issue.³ We would hope that GRC could be induced not to reject some reasonable proposal commanding general UN support and providing for GRC’s essential interests.

10. Meanwhile, though acting to avoid war, we do not discount danger of war. Moscow’s role in affair is dangerous. But we are persuaded that a firm, resolute but non-aggressive posture is more likely to avert war than a course of retreat. We also believe that to succumb in face of enemy attack would touch off chain of events that might lead to collapse of our entire position in Far East.

11. In addition, believe text my speech tonight in New York⁴ may be helpful to you.

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2458. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Green; cleared with S/S, EUR, and FE; and approved by Dulles.
1. In telegram 1715 from London, September 24, Ambassador John Hay Whitney reported that he would be with Prime Minister Eden on September 26 and could convey any thoughts which the Secretary wished him to relay. He commented that Eden was under very heavy domestic pressure on the subject of the offshore islands, which would probably be the main topic on his mind. (Ibid.)
2. Reference is to a memorandum of September 24 from Robertson to Dulles. (Ibid., 793.5/9–2458) Dulles met with Lloyd on September 25 and 26 in New York; see Document 130.
3. Delga 37 from USUN, September 24, which transmitted Lodged comments on the U.N. debate on Chinese representation, commented that many friendly countries were preoccupied with the possibility of war resulting from the offshore island situation, and that this had made it much more difficult to maintain the U.S. position on the Chinese representation issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–258) For text, see vol. II, pp. 62–65. A U.S. resolution to postpone discussion of Chinese representation was adopted by the General Assembly on September 23 by a vote of 44–28 with 9 abstentions.
4. Dulles commented on the situation in the Taiwan Strait in an address that evening before the Far East-America Council of Commerce and Industry, Inc., in New York. He declared that the United States was “not prepared to retreat in the face of armed force,” but that “our position is otherwise flexible.” He stated that “we would find acceptable any arrangement which, on the one hand, did not involve surrender to force or the threat of force and, on the other hand, eliminated from the situation features that could reasonably be regarded as provocative or which, to use President Eisenhower’s words, were a ‘thorn in the side of peace.’” For text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, October 13, 1958, pp. 561–566.