Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

144. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 30, 1958, 5:55–6:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs
• Prime Minister Walter Nash of New Zealand¹
• Mr. Lloyd White, Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. A.D. Mcintosh, Secretary of External Affairs of New Zealand

The Prime Minister said he had been disturbed at the Secretary’s reactions to his statement in Parliament on the Taiwan Straits situation.² He said he had been “hurt” when he received the report of the Secretary’s comments, and that the press had not reported correctly his statements. He had therefore sent a full text of it to the Embassy to pass to the Department. The Secretary said that he has had considerable experience with the press, and has been misquoted so often that he tends to take a charitable view of what others are quoted as saying.

The Secretary said that the Taiwan Straits situation is a very difficult one. We take a broad view of the problem and do not consider it a small issue of a couple of islands. The Soviet Union, or at least Khrushchev, appears to be developing delusions of grandeur because of their developments in the nuclear energy field and are beginning to believe that they can rule the world. They hold that it was their stand that kept the British and French from going ahead in the Suez crisis; that their stand prevented the United States and Turkey from proceeding with a planned attack against Syria; and that they also prevented an attack against Iraq which, they state, was our intention when we landed troops in Lebanon. It is not clear whether Khrushchev actually believes all this or whether he is a prisoner of a myth which he himself has created. We do not know what happened in Peiping when Khrushchev met with Mao but it is not unlikely that Khrushchev boasted about the strength and position of the Soviet Union and that Mao pressed him for action. The Khrushchev letter to the President, which was returned, is an illuminating document in that it called for the United States to get out of Taiwan and withdraw its fleet from the area, threatening to expel us by force if we did not do so.

The Secretary continued that we do not like the present position of having to defend the offshore islands. The Chinese Nationalists, however, consider these islands as sacred soil which they have been holding onto since 1949. At the time they gave up the Tachen Islands, and since then, we have tried to get them to hold Quemoy and Matsu only as outposts which would not be strongly defended in case of an attack. Notwithstanding our efforts, they have placed large forces on those islands. Although we could of course break the back of the GRC, we cannot see our way clear as to how it can be done without at the same time losing Taiwan. The loss of Taiwan would of course not be by military action but rather as a result of a break in the morale of the government and the people.

The Secretary added that the only thing we are interested in is Taiwan, not the offshore islands. We have, however, not seen our way clear as to how we can settle the offshore island problem without losing Taiwan. We have also made some soundings in the area and have found that our prestige would suffer a severe blow if we pulled back under threat of force. There would be a feeling in other countries in the area in such a case that we were pulling out and that this might be the beginning of the end.

The Secretary said that we have been restraining the GRC. We feel that we can find a way to meet the problem of interdiction. The situation might be like that in Berlin in 1948 when we kept the city supplied by an airlift, that after the Chinese Communists find they cannot take the islands, they will let the situation subside. The Chinese Communists have not brought all their power to bear. They could use bombers but this would result in the GRC retaliating by attacking the airfields from which the bombers originated, which in turn would begin a chain of events which in itself would be indicative that the Chinese intend to go to war. The situation, however, might subside rather than having something like this develop. If it should subside, we would make strenuous efforts to eliminate any source of harassment by the Chinese Nationalists. We want to bring about a demilitarization of the islands but cannot do so under fire.

The Prime Minister said that he was concerned with two things: (1) the menace to trade in and out of Amoy and in the Fukien area in general, which gave the Chinese Communists a better case; he said he could not see how the Chinese Communists could let such a situation continue especially in view of the number of troops reported stationed in Quemoy; and (2) a statement allegedly made by Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese Nationalists could go it without the Americans.

The Secretary said that there had been no interference with commercial traffic in and out of Amoy, at least over the period of the last two years. Mr. Nash said that the Chinese Communists might wonder about the build-up in the area and that this might in itself constitute an irritation. The Prime Minister mentioned that an incident which recently occurred during the visit of a Communist Chinese trade mission to New Zealand might be of interest. During the discussions, when they had reached the point as to what might be bought and sold, the Communist Chinese, without any forewarning, broke off the talks and departed without any explanation. The Prime Minister said he speculated as to possible reasons for such action, pointing out at the time that something must be brewing in Communist China. This took place several days prior to the beginning of the bombing of Quemoy and Matsu. He emphasized that this was pure speculation because he didn’t know whether the Chinese Communists actually knew what was planned. The Secretary commented that they probably did know since they have a very good intelligence service, as evidenced by the fact that they apparently know everything that is going on in Taiwan.

The Prime Minister said that just before his departure from New Zealand he had discussed the Taiwan Straits situation with the Committee on Foreign Relations. He had pointed out to the Committee that New Zealand does not want to do anything that will hurt our position in the area. He had reviewed the entire problem for the Committee, including disposition to be made of Quemoy and Matsu. He said he thought that Formosa should be given to the Taiwanese and that the islands should be demilitarized. The Prime Minister said that in his opinion it was necessary to protect the Chinese on Taiwan but that the solution might be to let the Chinese stay there as individuals but not occupy the dominating position.

(The Prime Minister had to depart at this point as he was to be the guest of honor at a reception at the New Zealand Embassy.)

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–3058. Secret. Drafted by Mein on October 6. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
1. Nash was in Washington for a meeting of the ANZUS Council held on October 1.
2. Reference is to his statement of September 11; see footnote 1, Document 86. Dulles commented on the statement, as reported in the press, in a conversation of September 11 with New Zealand Ambassador Sir Leslie Munro. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1158; see Supplement)