Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

86. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 13, 1958, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Offshore Islands Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. George Yeh, Chinese Ambassador-designate
• Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director for Chinese Affairs

The Chinese Ambassador-designate George Yeh called on the Secretary at the latter’s home at 10:30 this morning at his own request. After telling the Secretary that President Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Chen Cheng wished to be remembered to him, Ambassador Yeh set forth President Chiang’s views on three matters related to the offshore island crisis.

(1) The Generalissimo is annoyed that the three-mile limit is being observed by United States warships convoying GRC supplies to Quemoy. If the United States regards the waters within the three-mile limit as GRC territory, then the U.S. has the GRC’s invitation to go in. If the U.S. regards these waters as Communist territory, then it would have been better not to have said anything about them. Amb. Yeh said that he had explained to the Generalissimo that the three-mile limit was being observed by the U.S. as a practical measure to keep U.S. ships out of gun range.

(2) President Chiang was disturbed by the constant reference to the exchange of notes by the U.S. in its efforts to restrain the GRC. He Felt he was losing the respect of the Chinese people because it appeared that his government was not being allowed by the U.S. to hit back when it was being attacked. Amb. Yeh said that he had explained to President Chiang that under the exchange of notes the GRC retained the inherent right of self-defense and therefore had the right to hit back. The question was whether it was militarily advisable to do so. In other words, it was a matter of the GRC’s competence and not of being bound by the United States which prevented the GRC from hitting back.

(3) President Chiang was dissatisfied with the operations of the convoys going to Quemoy They were not landing the necessary equipment. He wanted 8-inch howitzers to be landed.

Ambassador Yeh asked the Secretary when the Warsaw talks would start. The Secretary indicated that preliminary contacts had been made in Warsaw but no time had been fixed yet. Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese Communists had wanted the first meeting to be held in their Embassy, but we had refused this and had suggested that a joint approach be made to the Swiss Embassy requesting that space be made available there for a meeting. We had not yet had the Chinese Communist reaction to this proposal. Ambassador Yeh Felt it would be advantageous to start the talks before the United Nations General Assembly. The Secretary agreed but pointed out we couldn’t stop the offshore island question coming up in the United Nations. He said he planned to discuss the matter himself there.

The Secretary said that in recent years there had been a trend toward appeasement in the world. While in the four years preceding the Korean War Communist actions in Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Berlin had alerted the world to the danger of Communist aggression, since 1948 there had been a decade of quiet in Europe. Thus the peoples of Western Europe had been lulled and were opposed to taking a strong line in Asia, unlike 1950. Another factor contributing to the trend towards appeasement is the fact that many of the new nations are susceptible to Communist influence. The United States is thus isolated in world opinion on this issue and we must recognize this fact.

Ambassador Yeh said this has been explained to the Generalissimo.

The Secretary continued the same line of thought by pointing out that the New Zealand Prime Minister had proposed a policy of giving up the offshore islands,¹ and it was only with great difficulty that we had persuaded him not to recognize Red China, a step which had actually been pledged by his party’s platform. Even Menzies, Australia’s Prime Minister was not strong in support of our position in view of the elections coming up in his country.² The Secretary recalled that Chamberlain was most popular after Munich. The Secretary said our position on the offshore islands was not popular in the world, and it would take all the President’s influence to keep opinion here at home firm. Therefore it was necessary to move cautiously. It would be extremely difficult to maneuver to save the situation. However, there were no two people more dedicated to saving the situation than Mr. Robertson and himself. He assured Ambassador Yeh there would be no appeasement and no surrender. The Secretary referred to the speculation in the press that he was prepared to surrender the islands in a negotiated settlement and emphasized that these speculations were entirely erroneous. His friends in Taipei should know that he would never consider such a thing.

Ambassador Yeh said that his government had tried to restrain their military people but they were taking a tough beating on Quemoy. Casualties have been greater than the published figures. The Secretary understood there had been about 1,000 casualties, but Ambassador Yeh said there had been about 4,000. The Secretary noted that this figure was not consistent with American intelligence reports.

Ambassador Yeh pointed out that the first phase of shelling at Quemoy was not as serious as the second phase, which would be pinpointing certain installations. People couldn’t stand this kind of shelling very long.

The Secretary said that it had been f foolish to put so many troops on the offshore islands. Ambassador Yeh replied it was too late now to do anything about that. The Secretary then recalled the visit to Taiwan of Admiral Radford and Mr. Robertson in the spring of 1955 when they had tried to persuade the GRC against such a policy.³ The Secretary stressed that President Eisenhower was extremely unhappy about the GRC’s having committed so much of its armed forces to the offshore islands. As a military man, President Eisenhower Felt that it was extremely foolish, utterly mad, military strategy to put the cream of the GRC’s forces in positions of this kind. Ambassador Yeh said that Quemoy was not regarded as a base but as an outpost. The Secretary responded that you wouldn’t put 40 percent of your forces on an outpost position, and again referred to the extent of the President’s preoccupation with this aspect of the offshore island problem.

Mr. Robertson said that even the strongest supporters of the GRC in this country cannot understand or explain the policy of concentrating such forces on the offshore islands. He said that if Quemoy remained an outpost and the GRC had put up a fight and lost, it would have been no disgrace. The Secretary drew a parallel between the GRC action at Quemoy and the French concentration at Dien Bien Phu, which had had disastrous consequences. The Secretary said that of course it was in a sense academic to discuss this now but he had mentioned it because it rankled in the President’s mind.

The Secretary said that the practical problem facing us right now is the interdiction of supplies by the Communists. Conditions on Quemoy were extremely difficult but our military people think the convoys could run more efficiently and that they will do so when certain corrections are made. For example, when they come under attack the landing ships now return to the Pescadores instead of going just over the horizon and waiting for a lull to make another run in. The Secretary realized the difficulty of this kind of operation, however, and Felt that it was a matter of the Chinese getting more experience. He did not believe there was any holding back on the part of the Chinese Navy.

Ambassador Yeh said that he had been interested in the accusation that the Chinese Navy was not taking risks. He had asked Admiral Liang about it. Liang told him that the landing operations were under the command of Hu Lien, the Army commander on Quemoy who had ordered the ships to leave as soon as they came under gunfire. Liang contended that his officers were willing to go ahead but had to take Hu’s orders. Mr. Robertson mentioned an instance where during a 41-minute lull there had been no unloading from the landing ships.

Ambassador Yeh pointed out that MAAG had not trained the Chinese Navy in landing, loading and unloading operations on the grounds that the training was not needed. The Secretary remarked perhaps MAAG was afraid it would be teaching them to launch an invasion of the mainland. He noted that in fact landing was a highly technical job and it was not surprising that the Chinese Navy had not done well.

Ambassador Yeh again brought up the subject of the Generalissimo’s concern at his Government’s being made to appear unable to defend itself because of restraints imposed by the United States. Yeh stressed that President Chiang would in fact consult with United States military commanders and take their advice, but he wants to be in a position to say publicly he could take action if he wished. He feels this is essential for the self-respect of himself and his government.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that we have never attempted to interpret the exchange of notes as restricting the right of the GRC to retaliate against an attack from the Communists.

Ambassador Yeh said that President Chiang had been behaving very well in his opinion, although he occasionally flared up when discussing the matter of his right to hit back. The Generalissimo Felt that our Ambassador had been harking too much on “hsieh ting,” i.e., on the agreement. He wanted Ambassador Yeh to tell President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles he would not do anything foolish militarily.

The Secretary suggested that the Generalissimo could say that under the exchange of notes the GRC has the inherent right of self-defense.

Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Drumright might have gone too far in continuing to remind the Generalissimo of his obligation under the exchange of notes. We certainly entertain no doubts of his good faith. He pointed out also, however, that the Generalissimo is somewhat isolated from the play of public opinion here and that the problem cannot, as far as we are concerned, be looked at as simply a matter of black and white.

The Secretary emphasized that we could not operate without the support of United States public opinion and to some extent of world opinion. Under a democratic system it is necessary to have such support if we are to do what we want. We want to do all we can in connection with the offshore islands, but we must create the right climate of world opinion. While there is no question of the legal right of the GRC to hit back against its attackers, whether this right should be exercised depends on military and public relations factors. But there is no reason why we can’t make it clear that the legal right is there. The Secretary pointed out that the Chinese Communists are trying to make us appear as the aggressors. They are even imitating out signals on the mainland in an effort to deceive us into making some move which might make us appear aggressive.

Ambassador Yeh said that he fully understood the problem. The Generalissimo recognizes also that the GRC has gained world sympathy by playing the role of “sitting duck” in the face of Communist attack.

The Secretary pointed out that by exercising restraint the GRC had gained sympathy. On the other hand, the GRC would have gained little, if anything, militarily by lack of restraint.

In closing, the Secretary indicated that it would be best to consult with the GRC on the Warsaw talks here in Washington.⁴He said that military matters could be coordinated best in Taipei. Finally the Secretary cautioned Ambassador Yeh about the importance of maintaining security in connection with our consultation on the offshore islands situation.

Ambassador Yeh said he fully understood the importance of security.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1358. Secret. Drafted by Martin and approved by Robertson.
1. Reference is to a September 11 statement by New Zealand Prime Minister Walter Nash. A copy is attached to a New Zealand aide-mémoire of September 15, which stated that press reports of the statement had been distorted but reiterated New Zealand’s view that the offshore islands were not necessary to collective defense in the Pacific and that negotiations leading to a cease-fire offered the best interim solution. (U.S. Mission to the United Nations, USUN Files, Formosa (1949–1962))
2. Australian Minister for External Affairs Richard G. Casey discussed the Taiwan Strait situation with Dulles on September 9. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–958; see Supplement)
3. For documentation concerning Robertson’s and Radford’s visit to Taiwan, April 24–27, 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. II, pp. 508–523 passim.
4. Telegram 390 from Taipei, September 13, transmitted the text of an aide-mémoire that Huang had given to Drumright that day expressing regret at the U.S. decision to resume the ambassadorial talks and requesting prior consultation if and when the talks touched on any matter affecting GRC rights and interests. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–1358) Telegram 229 to Taipei, September 16, instructed Drumright to assure Huang of the U.S. intention to remain in close touch with the GRC regarding the talks and to consult on all aspects affecting GRC rights and interests. (Ibid.) These documents are in the Supplement.