142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0
510. 1. Substance Deptel 2701 as amended by Deptel 2742 conveyed Premier and Foreign Minister at conference today. Vice Foreign Minister Chow and Admiral Smoot also present.
2. Premier accepted representations calmly and with equanimity. He spoke of need for our two governments to have full mutual understanding. He granted importance of public opinion but believed governments should not be led by it; instead governments should lead public opinion not only through speech making but through private discussions with opinion moulders. Premier found latter most effective.
3. Premier said he would not be honest if he denied GRC desire to overthrow Reds. However GRC does not seek to do so by war. It hopes [Page 300] instead to see Reds overthrown by internal revolts. It is most important therefore for GRC to engage in political rather than military measures to help with overthrow. In view of continuous and expanded Red oppression, mainland people are dissatisfied and want to know when they will be liberated and what will be policy of GRC. It is up to GRC to use political measures to inform and win over mainland people. It is Communists who are desperate and want war; it is they who are faced with many problems and who want to create military crisis.
4. Although GRC does not want war, it does not fear war. Fear only encourages aggressors. Premier said he had had more than 30 years’ experience as soldier. He knew horror of war and would try to avoid it. He had spoken as he had on September 20 because Kinmen resupply situation very serious. Fortunately, it is better now. If they can solve resupply problem, it may be unnecessary to resort to retaliatory attacks. GRC’s limit of endurance is gauged by two factors: (1) resupply problem; (2) attempted Communist amphibious landing. If supply problem cannot be solved or if off-shores are assaulted amphibiously, GRC will be compelled to act.
5. Premier said GRC still is opposed to Warsaw talks for simple reason they will accomplish nothing. He indicated some disturbance over presentation Beam is to make today based on an incomplete and confused telegram (in Chinese) from George Yeh. He said any agreement to reduce troops and equipment would be dangerous. He then instructed Foreign Minister to discuss this matter with me. He also justified GRC action in putting so many troops on Kinmen and said Communist aggression had justified GRC decision in this regard.
6. Admiral Smoot took opportunity of meeting to discuss GRC–US cooperation in convoy operations, to point out shortcomings and to ask Premier’s assistance in overcoming them. Premier said he would be glad to help and invited Admiral to consult him at any time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–3058. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:29 a.m.↩
- Document 128.↩
- Telegram 274 to Taipei, September 26, authorized Drumright to give the substance of telegram 270 to the Premier and Foreign Minister, except that with respect to the second sentence, he was to convey U.S. views on the undesirability of the military actions proposed by Chen without mentioning any time period. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2658) A copy of the paraphrase of telegram 270 which Drumright gave to Chen and Huang is in Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Item 147.↩