128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China0
270. Your 452.1 We are fully aware of grave threat posed to Kinmen garrison by continuing Chinese Communist bombardment and strangulation tactics and of strong pressures on GRC from legislators and public opinion to take effective action to break siege. However, we do not accept view that situation so critical as to require, at least within next few days or weeks, kind of military action proposed by Premier Chen, which would be strongly condemned by US and world opinion and could lead to large-scale, possibly nuclear conflict, whose catastrophic impact on Taiwan is perhaps inadequately comprehended by GRC leaders and population. Joint Chiefs believe resupply operation can be even further improved and are exerting further efforts in that direction. Success of such an operation would have desirable impact on friend and foe alike.
In meantime opposition of world opinion, including large segment US opinion, to idea of war resulting from effort to hold islands makes it imperative that US and GRC demonstrate willingness and determination seek peaceful solution. We already have a serious public problem here in trying to develop support for the limited measures so far taken. You should emphasize to GRC leaders that it would be fatal to their own interests if they should appear to world to want and actively to be seeking an expansion of hostilities. Such an attitude would seriously jeopardize support for GRC in this country, while GRC’s position in UN would be undermined if not destroyed. Moreover if conflict were extended as result GRC actions there would be minimum of support and strong world opposition.
We are under no illusions about chances of reaching any settlement through the Warsaw talks, but it is an exercise we must go through. Talks serve purpose of providing cover under which there conceivably might be some de facto easing of war tensions. They also provide means for showing up Peiping’s aggressive purposes and for making more effective appeal for support of US and allied opinion. If we are to hope for any success in attempt to place onus on Chinese Communists for failure reach peaceful solution, it is important that GRC refrain from public denunciation of concept of negotiations and that it continue to exercise restraint in military operations. This may be hard to endure; but it is essential in terms of many factors involved.
[Page 275]As far as UN is concerned, it is not question of choice whether or not to raise issue in that forum. Issue is bound to be raised by someone; in fact plenty of resolutions are already circulating on subject; though matter probably will not come up for actual debate for while yet. When issue is raised, we would want to have resolution submitted asking for ceasefire, renunciation of use of force, and an examination of measures to tranquilize situation. Chicoms will almost certainly oppose any UN recommendations of type which would command necessary majority support. However Communist persistence in use of force in face of UN condemnation of such force and of UN recommendations for peaceful solution would serve to prepare US and allied opinion for whatever further measures we would then have to take. Again, as in case of Warsaw talks, it is highly desirable that Chinese Reds, in contrast to GRC, be revealed as opposing peaceful solutions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2058. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lutkins, Martin, and Green; cleared in draft with OSD/ISA; and approved by Robertson.↩
- Document 111.↩