Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

132. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Washington, September 26, 1958.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On 16 September 1958 Under Secretary of State Herter, in a telephone conversation with Rear Admiral Hayward, USN, Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, requested thoughts on alternative courses to continuing the present support of the GRC with respect to the off-shore islands. I am enclosing a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject, with which the Department of Defense concurs.

The resupply of Kinmen appears gradually to be improving. Recognizing that improved resupply is in itself an incomplete solution, we are seeking alternative courses which will improve the US–GRC position, and which will anticipate new developments. We shall, of course, consult with the Department of State on appropriate courses as they develop.

Sincerely yours,

John N. Irwin, II

[Enclosure]

¹

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT

• Taiwan (U)

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 16 September 1958 between Under Secretary of State Herter and Rear Admiral Hey ward, USN, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Mr. Herter requested some thoughts on what alternative courses there might be to continuing the present support of the GRC in occupation of the off-shore islands. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to affirm their belief in the ability of the GRC and the United States to continue the present system of resupply of Kinmen. As the GRC personnel become more adept in the resupply effort, it is believed that an increasing amount of supplies can be delivered.

2. Any modifications to the degree of support now being furnished the GRC involve increasing U.S. participation in the conduct of supply operations and increased U.S. protection of these operations. This latter alternative cannot be limited with any degree of assurance since the extent of U.S. involvement would necessarily be dependent upon ChiCom reaction.

3. With respect to the Radford–Robertson–Chiang Kai-shek conversations of 1955, the considerations concerning a naval blockade (interdiction) of the China coast opposing Taiwan is no longer valid. The purpose of the blockade was to prevent the seaborne movement of POL and other military supplies to that area, which at that time could not be supplied by land. Completion of the railroad to Amoy has removed the ChiCom’s dependence on seaborne supply.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2658. Top Secret.
1. Top Secret. Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 19 and sent forward to the Secretary of Defense with a covering note of September 20 from Twining. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39)