Office of the Historian

131. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)0

Washington, September 26, 1958, 6:21 p.m.

262341Z. Adm Felt and VAdm Smoot from Burke. Re final paragraph CTDC 250812Z.1

Agree your approach. So does State. Obviously utmost importance that ChiNat response to any type ChiCom attack on Tatan and/or Ehrtan not be of such nature as to invite aerial counterattacks on Big and Little Quemoy with resulting net worsening of GRC position there. You may also wish consult with Ambassador Drumright and recommend circumstances and manner whereby information contained State Department telegram 138 August 25 to Embassy Taipei2 is communicated to appropriate GRC authorities.

You are correct in that we must leave no false impressions that United States would militarily support ChiNat resistance against an isolated ChiCom assault on Tatan or Ehrtan. If ChiCom assault against Tatan and/or Ehrtan were part of assault against Quemoy and/or Little Quemoy then United States military involvement, of course, would be matter for Presidential determination.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2658. Top Secret; Routine. Sent to CINCPACFLT and COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US). Drafted by Burke.↩
  2. The last paragraph of this telegram from Smoot, September 25, stated that he had initiated a combined staff study on the problem of defending the Tan Islands which he hoped would show Nationalist staff planners the futility of attacking the mainland for that purpose. It said that Smoot was taking care to imply neither that the United States would assist in the defense of the Tans nor that it would recommend their abandonment. (Ibid.; see Supplement)↩
  3. See footnote 1, Document 43.↩