133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0
493.1. Foreign Minister asked me to call this morning. He said President had inquired of him this morning whether any reply had been received to his request for direct US participation in Kinmen airdrop.1 Foreign Minister replied negatively, whereupon President directed that matter be brought to my attention again. Foreign Minister said President stressed morale aspect of US participation. Foreign Minister said that he had told President of my belief that US would be reluctant to participate in airdrop at this time.
2. I pointed out to Foreign Minister that current instruction prevented us from participating directly in actions on or over offshore islands, and reiterated my belief that US Government would find it difficult to change that position now.2 I then recounted to Foreign Minister numerous actions we have taken and are in process of taking to improve SEA and airlift capabilities. I said we were confident that with backstopping we are now receiving from Washington, and assuming comparable effort on part of GRC, we will be able to surmount our convoy problem and land adequate supplies to enable Kinmen defenders to hold out indefinitely. I said fact that US supplies would reach Kinmen in [Page 285] mounting quantities and in American equipment would be tangible evidence of US support. I said that we would also be sending an American General officer to Kinmen within next few days for morale boosting purposes. This, too, would be tangible evidence of US support. I then took opportunity to indicate to Minister our belief that more energetic effort is called for on part of GRC to make convoy efforts definite success. I said we had reports of apathy at Kachsiung and on Kinmen. Admiral Smoot and I believe more vigorous Chinese effort is needed to match our own effort. I said that Admiral Smoot would be speaking to this point with Tiger Wang and Defense Minister.
3. I also took opportunity to describe to Foreign Minister domestic and foreign public opinion difficulties confronting US Government in reference to Strait crisis. Foreign Minister replied he has received several reports from George Yeh on this subject and appreciated our position. I then explained that we may need considerable time in which to explore various possibilities for peaceful settlement. I said I was confident that GRC would understand our position this regard and would accommodate itself to this fact. I expressed personal belief that Strait situation may be prolonged for some time to come and might become endurance contest between Kinmen defenders and Communist attackers. I said that it seemed to me GRC might be well-advised to accommodate itself to this sort of situation. Foreign Minister said he agreed Strait situation may turn into prolonged struggle. He said he personally believed, granted adequate resupply, that Kinmen could hold out indefinitely. He also expressed belief that public opinion on Taiwan could be held in check and recounted some of steps he and Prime Minister have taken during past two weeks to mold and channel public opinion.
4. I had long talk this morning with Admiral Smoot on convoy and related problems. We came to conclusion that with back stopping now promised and with energetic effort on part of Chinese, adequate supplies can be sent to Kinmen to maintain defense. Probably minimum of about 400 tons daily will be needed. Smoot is working on Chinese to step up their efforts and he will in his talks with Chinese military authorities endeavor to condition them to idea that test of endurance may develop in regard to holding offshore islands.
5. Comment: I am confident that convoy problem can be solved. I am also confident that Kinmen defenders can be conditioned to fight on indefinitely, even though they are at disadvantage. American encouragement will, of course, be most important in this regard. I am confident also that GRC has it within its capability to control public opinion here and condition it to long pull. President Chiang will be impatient, will try to involve us more directly, and will protest and tell us of his difficulties from time to time, but it is my belief that he understands necessity of keeping in step with us and will do so.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2758. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:28 a.m. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.↩
- Telegram 472 from Taipei, September 24, reported this request, which Huang had conveyed to Drumright the previous evening. (Ibid., 793.00/9–2458; see Supplement)↩
- Telegram 272 to Taipei, September 26, instructed Drumright to inform Huang that after consideration of Chiang’s request, the U.S. view remained that “direct U.S. participation in airlift not necessary or desirable at this time.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2458) Telegram 495 from Taipei, September 27, reported that telegram 272 had arrived that afternoon and that Drumright had communicated its substance to Huang. (Ibid., 793.00/9–2758) Telegram 272 is in the Supplement.↩