Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

130. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

MC–5

New York, September 26, 1958, 10 a.m.

SECRETARY’S TRIP TO NEW YORK

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Mr. Greene
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. SELWYN LLOYD
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Sir HAROLD CACCIA
  • Mr. Anthony Moore
  • Mr. Denis Laskey

SUBJECT

• Far East

The Secretary and Mr. Lloyd resumed their discussion of the previous evening on the Far East.¹ The Secretary said that if the United States introduces a new paper in the Warsaw talks next Tuesday, it will go as far as possible without, however, implying any Chinat renunciation of title to the offshore islands.

Mr. Lloyd read further details from the report of the British Embassy in Peiping of what the Indians there had told them about a conversation with “one of the highest Chinese authorities.”² According to this report, the ChiComs are most concerned about a build-up on the offshore islands and will not accept any cease-fire arrangement that would permit continuation of the build-up. While they insist in this context on withdrawal from the islands they are willing not to push their claims to Taiwan. Moreover, the ChiComs want to keep the Warsaw talks going but have been alarmed by the President’s and the Secretary’s statements and regard as preposterous the United States proposal for thinning out of forces on the mainland adjacent to the offshore islands. Finally there is in the report the hint of Indian mediation.

Mr. Lloyd and the Secretary agreed that this report reflects a complete misunderstanding of the United States position, which the Secretary thought might be calculated simply to fool the Indians. On the other hand, if it were bona fide, it might, as Mr. Lloyd had suggested, be a hopeful development. Mr. Lloyd added that Krishna Menon³ had told him here in New York, that he, Menon, is certain that the ChiComs will not push for Taiwan now.

On the other side of the coin, Mr. Lloyd said, are Khrushchev’s belligerent attitudes and the attitude Gromyko took in the conversation he had had with him Tuesday evening. The first hour of this had been a “sullen refrain” that the Americans must leave the Taiwan area and that there is “no risk of war” in the present Communist posture. Gromyko had also refused to “deliver lectures in Peiping” about the risk of war. Finally, however, after more than an hour of this he had seemed to give a little, to the extent of admitting that there might be risks in the present situation and of reflecting cautious interest in some accommodation. He had asked Lloyd whether the Americans might be willing to separate the issues of the offshore islands and of Taiwan.

Mr. Lloyd asked about the long-term prospects. He recalled that the Japanese Foreign Minister had expressed to him his concern over the effect in the Western Pacific if Chiang Kai-shek’s position were to be undermined or overthrown. Mr. Lloyd said that for himself he was more concerned with the problem of the overseas Chinese in South East Asia if Chiang Kai-shek’s Government went under. Mr. Lloyd recalled that in his conversation at Newport with the President, the latter had agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom should examine the long-term aspects of the present situation.

The Secretary suggested, and it was agreed after some discussion, that such an examination should be begun by the intelligence people on both sides working together. The Secretary agreed that Sir HAROLD CACCIA might approach Allen Dulles to get this started and that thereafter it might prove desirable to have Sir Robert Scott⁴ visit Washington to advance the assessment. Mr. Lloyd asked what would be done if either side breaks off the Warsaw talks. The Secretary said that the matter would then have to come to the United Nations, but we had not yet decided whether to take it to the Security Council or to the General Assembly; a Soviet veto would have to be expected in the Security Council. As to substance, he felt a resolution condemning the use of force and encouraging peaceful settlement, somewhat along the lines of the New Zealand resolution in 1955, could be envisaged.

In response to Mr. Lloyd’s inquiry, the Secretary flatly denied the truth of a rumor Mr. Lloyd said was circulating to the effect that present hostilities had been started, not by the Chinese Communists, but by the Chinats in an attack shortly before August 23. The Secretary pointed out that the present Chinese Communists’ operation had been planned and built up long in advance. The Secretary also assured Mr. Lloyd that there is no truth in a recent story put out by someone in the Pentagon about a leaflet raid over the mainland by the Chinese Nationalist aircraft. There had, in fact, been no such raid, and the story had been intended as a cover for United States reconnaissance flights. In this context the Secretary summarized Chinat operations from the islands against the mainland, characterizing them as largely negligible and ineffectual.

There ensued considerable discussion of the possibilities of mediation by someone having both the qualifications and the confidence of both sides. The Secretary and Mr. Lloyd agreed that while Secretary General Hammarskjold (whom the Norwegians had suggested) is skilled in such matters, he is now so deeply and essentially engrossed in the Middle East question that it would not be practicable or desirable to divert him from that to get into the Far East problem. Mr. Lloyd was disposed to press the idea of sounding out Nehru as to whether he would undertake the task in relation to the Far East, and indicated that he might speak to Krishna Menon, as a way of communicating with Nehru but certainly not with a view to getting Menon himself into the act. The Secretary expressed some doubt that Nehru’s concern for the analogy of Goa would enable him to develop a solution to the offshore islands question that would be acceptable to the Chinese Nationalists. He pointed out that the Nationalists would never agree to turn the islands over to the Communists and only under the strongest pressure might they accept their demilitarization. Nonetheless, if Nehru could figure out some way to solve the present issue of the islands without disastrous repercussions in Taiwan and throughout the Western Pacific, that would be fine by the Secretary. Mr. Lloyd thought that Nehru may be sufficiently concerned at the growing power of the Chinese Communists that he would not automatically take their side.

Mr. Lloyd said further that he had told a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations earlier in the week that the British Government would not do anything in this matter unless asked to do so by the United States Government. The Secretary responded that we have no objection to the United Kingdom, but doubt that their mediation would be plausible or effective; it would suggest in the United States that the United Kingdom is neutral; and the Communists would undoubtedly not accept them as neutral. In any event there is need of an intermediary and we will welcome any suggestions the British may have. The operation could be undertaken quietly and behind the scenes—as it was by Nehru in 1954 and 1955—and in the Secretary’s view a de facto let up in shooting, to which we would respond if the Chinese initiated it, is a more likely prospect than a written agreement for a cease-fire. Continuation of the Ambassadorial talks might well provide a cover for such a détente as it had in 1955.

Mr. Lloyd asked for the Secretary’s long-term view of the Chinese representation issue, saying that he thought it would be harder next year to get the moratorium formula accepted, than it had been this year. The Secretary observed that we have not yet used all the arguments against Chinese Communist admission to the United Nations. In answer to Mr. Lloyd’s further question, he did not think we could keep the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations forever, but in his view they have to be excluded until they shall have demonstrated good behavior and acceptance of the principles of the United Nations Charter for a reasonable time. This period is not to be judged simply by the calendar but must be adequate to show a basic and sincere change from the Chinese Communists’ present attitude; if they were to get into the United Nations in their present mood it would mark the end of the United Nations as we know it, might mark the end of United States support of the United Nations, and it would give encouragement to all members of the United Nations who do not believe in its principles. The Secretary added that he was not certain that the Chinese representation issue is solely a question of credentials.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1123. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.
1. Recorded in a September 25 memorandum of conversation by Greene. (Ibid.; see Supplement)
2. According to Greene’s memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 1 above, Lloyd told Dulles the previous evening of a report from the British Chargé in Peking on a conversation with an Indian Embassy officer in which there appeared to be “a hint that the Indians might undertake mediation between the Chicoms and the United States.”
3. V.K. Krishna Menon, Indian Representative to the United Nations.
4. British Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia.