Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

129. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Mission to the United Nations (Barco) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

New York, September 25, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Offshore Islands

Ambassador Lodge has asked me to provide you with a summary of the developments regarding the Norwegian proposal for an initiative on this subject, about which he spoke to you on Tuesday, September 23rd.¹

You will recall that the Norwegian Ambassador, Nielsen, spoke to us on Tuesday morning at Foreign Minister Lange’s request. They felt that the dangers in the present situation in the Offshore Islands might be alleviated if the Secretary-General were asked to step into the situation and if the UN were to undertake a neutralization of the Offshore Islands. They thought the present talks in Warsaw were hampered because both sides could not get down to business so long as the military situation was in its present aggravated state. Moreover, the Norwegians did not believe an initiative in the UN by the U.S., a development they believed might be forthcoming, could contribute to a relaxation of tension in the area.

Ambassador Lodge informed you of Norway’s intention, in view of the above considerations, to propose in Mr. Lange’s General Debate speech, provided the U.S. were agreeable, that the Secretary-General take steps to obtain a neutralization of the Offshore Islands. In response, you indicated that you had long thought the Secretary-General was the best bet and that at some stage we might call on him ourselves. You suggested that it would be satisfactory for the Norwegians to express the hope that Hammarskjold would interest himself in the situation to see whether a mutually acceptable solution could be found to stop the fighting. You expressed the view that both the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists would find “neutralization” unacceptable and suggested that the Norwegians stop short of suggesting it.

That afternoon Ambassador Lodge informed Ambassador Nielsen of your reaction in the precise terms he had received it from you.

Ambassador Nielsen then discussed the subject with the Secretary-General, with whom they had not consulted prior to speaking with us. Hammarskjold said if this turned into simply another effort to try to get a cease-fire, it would not work. However, if it were proposed, he would not shirk his responsibilities. Hammarskjold then said he felt that if both the U.S. and the Chinese Communists “wanted a catalyst”, and thereby demonstrated a common ground of mutual interest, in that both regarded the present situation as unsatisfactory, Hammarskjold would be “available and interested”. Hammarskjold and Lange discussed and discarded the possibility of using a group of three nations or an individual nation as alternatives to the office of the Secretary-General. The choice of nations to compose a group would present too many difficulties; India had somewhat preempted the field as a single nation and would not be desirable because they were too partial in the controversy. As his terms of reference, Hammarskjold suggested he be asked “to see whether ways could be found to ease the immediate tension.”

Ambassador Nielsen informed Ambassador Lodge of the talk with the Secretary-General. Ambassador Lodge said that while he could not be sure exactly what Hammarskjold meant by “catalyst”, he felt it should be clear from his conversations that the U.S. was anxious to see the Secretary-General “interest himself” in the present situation. Saying that he took this as the kind of positive response that the Secretary-General wanted, Ambassador Nielsen then discussed with Ambassador Lodge the best way of ascertaining the views of the other side. He said Mr. Lange felt it would be desirable to raise this with Gromyko in the first instance. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that one never got a clear-cut answer to a hypothetical question from the Soviets. He said a direct approach by the Norwegians to the Chinese Communists would be better. In any event, he urged that the Norwegians not condition their intention to proceed with their proposal on a positive response from the Communists. They might well be brought around, regardless of an initial negative reaction, if public opinion pressures were developed by such a proposal as the Norwegians had in mind.

Yesterday Ambassador Nielsen informed us they had decided to make the initial approach to the Chinese Communists and had taken the matter up in Oslo with Peking’s Ambassador. They expected a reply by Friday, the 26th. Last night they intended to broach the subject in general terms to Gromyko, leaving it to him to infer that Norway had raised this with the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Nielsen also informed us that they agreed with us as to the desirability of proceeding with this initiative regardless of the Peking or Moscow reaction. They intend to do this in Lange’s general debate speech next Tuesday, September 30. They were slightly troubled by the fact that Lange would be seeing you in Washington on Monday and that this fact might be related to his subsequent proposal. They are prepared however to discount any disadvantages this might have.

This noon, Ambassador Nielsen informed us that they had received a very cold reaction from Gromyko last night. The subject of the Offshore Islands was raised by Mr. Lange with Gromyko after dinner in the presence of Krishna Menon and the Icelandic Foreign Minister, but only in a general way. Gromyko took the standard, hard line that what is involved is a civil war. “There must be no distinctions between the Offshore Islands and Formosa and the Pescadores. This is an internal Chinese problem.”

Mr. Lange decided that, although the conversational tone was friendly, the Soviet line was so rigid he would not pursue it further. Consequently he never got to the point of broaching the possibility of the Secretary-General undertaking any steps in this connection. Ambassador Nielsen said this did not by any means foreclose the possibility of Norway’s taking an initiative. They agreed that the Russians were bound to show no softness and provide no opening, if only to maintain the position they have publicly taken and show no fear from their side. Ambassador Nielsen said he concluded that the Russians assume the United States is not happy with the development of the situation in the Offshore Islands and might be anxious to find ways of disengaging. This would account for the uncompromising attitude of Gromyko. Ambassador Nielsen said that when they had received Peking’s reaction, and he now expected to have it by Sunday night, they would inform us. The only factor which might impel them not to take their proposed initiative would be Hammarskjold’s own unwillingness, in the light of Peking’s reaction, to become involved. Ambassador Nielsen said the most that could be expected from Peking was a conditional “yes” which at the same time restated Peking’s position regarding the Offshore Islands and Formosa. He said that a negative answer on the substance which nevertheless indicated a willingness to talk to Hammarskjold would be enough for them to make the proposal in Mr. Lange’s speech, provided the Secretary-General agreed.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9-2558. Secret. Sent through James J. Wadsworth, Deputy Representative to the United Nations. Drafted by Charles D. Cook, Deputy Counselor of the Mission to the United Nations.
1. In a telephone conversation, recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Dulles. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)