Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

111. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, September 20, 1958, 1 p.m.

452. USUN for Secretary and Robertson. Premier Chen Cheng summoned me this morning. Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister S.K. Chow were present. Conversation lasted 1-1/2 hours.

2. Premier said problem at Kinmen is not one of supplies which are adequate till end October but of physical exhaustion of defenders under continuous heavy pounding of Communist artillery. This is gradually affecting forces’ morale; there is limit to human endurance under such conditions. Defenders’ morale also adversely affected by continued blockade and our decision to resume talks with Communists. This is not understood by forces at front. Military and civilian morale is gradually being affected too. He and Foreign Minister were now compelled to spend great deal of their time in explanations to public bodies and private citizens. He would convoke another large meeting of legislators, Control Yuan and National Assembly members and KMT leaders this afternoon to offer explanations and bring them up to date.

3. Chen recalled that at meeting held on August 24¹ we had urged restraint and had since urged withholding retaliatory blows. But month had now passed and enemy was continuing his attack at high level of intensity. GRC patience and endurance have been stretched to maximum extent. He had told officers and men at onset of bombardment GRC would provide three weeks for cessation of enemy attacks. GRC is near end of rope and cannot wait longer. Communists respect force and talks will have no purpose but to increase their arrogance. Time has come to use force to break blockade of Kinmen. Attacks on Communist artillery emplacements are of doubtful value. Best tactic is to destroy Communist communications and airfields.

4. Chen said that in conducting retaliatory blows GRC would not “at beginning” ask for direct participation of US Armed Forces. It would be unnecessary and undesirable. GRC would, however, appreciate full US logistical, coordinating and back-stopping support. Premier summed up by saying GRC patience and endurance are overstrained, GRC cannot go on as at present and maintain position. Only way to stop Communists was to attack. It is necessary to lift interdiction and exhaust responsibility of gallant defenders of Kinmen.

5. Premier stated categorically GRC would not withdraw from Kinmen under any circumstances. GRC would also reject formal “cease-fire”, demilitarization, neutralization, et cetera. He did not favor taking Strait crisis into UN as it would have no helpful effect. He doubted if US could carry condemnatory resolution because of vacillating position shown by free world nations. Further talk would only help Communists.

6. I asked Premier if he asking our formal concurrence to retaliatory action. He avoided direct reply by saying he was telling me what GRC intends or proposes to do. I asked if he spoke with concurrence of President Chiang (who is in Makung today). Chen said he was not speaking with specific authority of Chiang, adding by implication President wanted even more speedy action.

7. I asked if Premier proposed to limit retaliatory action to immediate Kinmen area. He said CAF would try to limit actions to that area, but would have to go back some distance to take out railroad. He said GRC purpose is to lift Kinmen stranglehold and indicated GRC would try to limit hostilities.

8. I asked if GRC intended to consult US Commanders about tactics before taking action. He replied GRC would expect to do so.

9. Comment: Premier’s purpose in talking with me was plainly to serve informal notice that existing situation cannot be continued much longer, that GRC will be obliged to use counter-blows to lift siege, that force is only way to deal with Communists and that GRC is determined to take that action in near future. I would estimate that we have at most a week or ten days before blow may be expected to fall.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2058. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:36 a.m. Also sent niact to USUN.
1. See Document 42.