107. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)0
190910Z. Personal for Admiral Burke, VAdm Riley, VAdm Beakley. To Admiral Felt locally by hand. Private conference with Vice President late last night brought out significant points with peculiar implication. Details my conversation given Ambassador this morning and relayed to State.1 Significant points are (a) VP thinks US fiddling while GRC burns [Page 225] and (b) this first time he has approached me with gravely serious attitude. I can only conclude this GRC maneuver to raise my whipping boy status one notch since Minister Defense not getting through to me so good now on political matters. Highlights VP discourse are (A) US will probably not take bold stand in UN or Moscow [Warsaw] talks. (B) Moscow talks doomed for failure. (C) only thing Commies respect is force. (D) ChiNat public and military cannot hold out long under pattern of present submissive punishment. (E) ChiNat combat counteraction inevitable.
He made no requests. He omitted any reference to US combat involvement but implication clear in his opinion US is not facing the issue honestly, squarely and boldly.
New subject. All press hailing increased success convoys. This is true and eight inch How movement went exactly as per plan and well handled. We can expect vigorous reaction from Commies and soon. Ambasador and I talked again on evacuation. My opinion this respect is remote but possible risk ChiComs will bomb Taiwan air bases and convoy staging points. Ambassador much more concerned re possibility internal GRC demonstrations against Americans. I don’t know which is greater threat but we agreed hold off a while longer. My purpose this despatch like those preceding keep you informed background developments of military nature. You will note I have eschewed personal opinions which usually become too colored in local atmospere. I can’t close this one however without busting out one or two. If we don’t tell these so and sos across the pond in no uncertain terms and tell ‘em soon that we’re going to take no more of their guff we are going to be in a shooting war within two weeks. If we do tell them they will scream aggressor and back down. This is our private fight: the US and Red China. We are going to get no Allies to help us.
If we back down now the least little bit we had better move fast out of Taiwan and we will be the laughingstock of a great part of the world. We’ve got to draw a line somewhere on losing real estate to the Reds and we’ve committed ourselves so far now that it looks like Kinmen is it so what are we waiting for. Talk first yes—but talk fast and fierce and hold a gun right between their eyes. Maybe Herb was right and we should have gotten tough with ChiNats —but it’s too late now—we are in it but good. We can still get out but not the way we’re trying to do it now. I feel better. Regards. Smoot.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Taipei Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Item 147, Lot 62 F 83, Offshore Islands and Taiwan Straits (1958 Crisis). Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to CNO and COMSEVENTHFLT.↩
- Telegram 439 from Taipei, September 19, reported a conversation between Chen and Smoot at a dinner party the night before. Chen had told Smoot that Kinmen could not hold out indefinitely under constant harassing fire and that if it continued, Nationalist counteraction of some kind was inevitable. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1958; see Supplement)↩