Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

108. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, September 19, 1958, 8 p.m.

443. Reference: Deptel 245.¹

1. Moderate, clear statement of views and attitudes of GRC leadership toward present crisis will be found in Premier Chen Cheng’s report of September 16 to Legislative Yuan. (See Embtel 411² for summary and Embassy despatch 133, September 17³ for full text. See also Embtel 439⁴ for Chen’s further private comment.) Although he has exercised great restraint thus far under extreme provocation, I would rate President as advocate of more active retaliation policy than Chen.

2. As I have reported GRC has no faith negotiations with Communists will bring results. GRC leaders here are impressed with our military preparations and vigorous military help, but they have no confidence in our diplomacy. They are 100 percent certain Warsaw talks can move ahead only at GRC expense. Therefore, they will breathe sigh of relief if talks fail. GRC leadership is convinced Communists respect military force alone. They Felt we had Communists on run until we offered to resume talks. Now they fear US attempts to buy transitory peace at their expense. This belief persists and will have harmful overtones as long as we talk about matters vital to existence of GRC with its sworn enemies.

3. GRC has already given us notice that it will repudiate commitments made by us which adversely affect its vital rights and interests. I believe GRC is firm in its position. It will particularly resist commitments to “freeze” situation, “neutralization”, or demilitarization. Such commitments would be regarded as forever barring leadership from sacred commitment to liberate mainland compatriots and put kiss of death to its existence even in Taiwan. I believe, as I have reported elsewhere, GRC would be glad to return to status quo ante and perhaps to agree to some self-denying measures to ease possibility of provocation to other side. But it is not willing to agree to infringements of its sovereignty or to agree to extinguish legally its hopes of going home. In my opinion, there is no possibility GRC would agree to abandon Kinmen. GRC will use every resource in its power to hold islands. I do not believe US efforts at persuasion would be effective. On contrary, I fear our persuasions would be scorned, rejected, and all good will built up over past few years would vanish. All confidence in our professions as an ally would evaporate.

4. If we managed in some way to persuade GRC to abandon islands, and I don’t believe it can be done, I think stability of GRC would be seriously impaired. It would no longer command respect of its mainland followers here or of Taiwanese and in these circumstances its lease on life could not be long. Further, its international support would be prejudiced as well as loyalty of overseas Chinese. Loss of sense of mission among dedicated Chinese leadership would be most important of intangible losses. Taiwan has been excellently administered under this leadership and it is doubtful whether suitable replacements could be found.

5. I have yet to find evidence that GRC leadership has sought in this crisis to involve US deliberately in war with Communists. Leadership has instead asked us to establish deterrents that would stop war from spreading. These requests have sought flat statement on our part to defend off shores and movement of US military forces into area as retaliatory threat. GRC leadership has thus far refrained from asking our direct participation in hostilities. Instead, it has sought our concurrence to take retaliatory action in Amoy vicinity which we have not yet seen fit to give. Thus far GRC has not taken retaliatory action in absence of our concurrence. My estimate is that GRC patience is running out but is not yet exhausted. It may feel able to prolong present agony another two or three weeks if it thinks such prolongation should benefit its over-all interests or be convinced by US this effect. But if present conditions continue without appreciable change, GRC will be obliged to take retaliatory action in attempt to relieve Kinmen defenders. It will hope for our concurrence, but will proceed without it whenever situation is regarded as justifiably desperate. GRC has capability alone to launch aerial attacks against mainland and it may have capability to carry out some small commando operations. Neither is likely to be very effective and without our material support GRC air force could not withstand for long numerically greater Communist air force. Smoot believes GRC is planning some military measure it has not revealed to him. Evidence remains fragmentary. Smoot now believes Tiger Wang with whom he is on close terms would let him know in advance of operation if it materializes.

6. Public opinion here hardens as interdiction continues and demands for its lifting are barely under control despite efforts of GRC to limit public and legislative sentiment. If interdiction is not breached, or if retaliatory action is not taken to help Kinmen defenders, we may expect another welling up of protests and demands soon. GRC had already gauged accurately swing of international opinion and while it has attempted to cultivate world opinion by its restraint, it is concerned mainly by extent to which such opinion affects US attitudes and positions.

7. I believe a strong, unwavering attitude of support to our GRC ally is only policy we can safely follow in this crisis. Concessions to Communists will not be accepted by our ally and our attempts to get such concessions would breach our alliance and destroy our friendship. Concessions would only whet appetite of Communists and put us in more difficult position to resist later. Communists indictment of US as “paper tiger” would ring true to millions of Asians and our prestige and influence out here would soon be nil and policies we have followed through Eisenhower administration would have to go on scrap heap. Taiwan would fall to Communists in 2 or 3 years if we abandoned GRC and before long we would be defending our Pacific coast under great odds.

8. My suggestions of measures we should take now are as follows:

A. Abandon Warsaw talks when we have completed feeling out other side with implication we will meet force with force.

B. If feasible, condemn Communist China in UN for resumption of use of force to get ends

C. Build up our military posture over Taiwan to needed strength.

D. Release restraints on GRC, provide it with necessary equipment and advice, and let it get to job of attempting to reduce Kinmen interdiction. I believe it would be advisable for us to stay on sidelines (if possible) while we see whether GRC with our massive material help can crack interdiction. I would suggest that we try to abstain from actual participation in hostilities with our forces unless that is deemed only way to save Kinmen and our ally I believe GRC will give good account of itself if we backstop it adequately and give it our firm support internationally.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1958. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Received at 10:40 a.m. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. Telegram 245 to Taipei, September 18, transmitted an urgent request for the Embassy’s appraisal of the mood and intentions of Chiang and the top GRC leadership including the “chances of their taking drastic, unilateral action designed to embroil us in shooting war with Chinese Communists” and their possible reaction if the United States were to press for demilitarization or evacuation of the offshore islands. (Ibid., 793.00/9–1858; see Supplement)
2. Dated September 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1658)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 793.21/9–1758)
4. See footnote 1, Document 107.