Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

106. Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green)⁰

Washington, September 18, 1958.

TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

1. The Quemoy resupply situation looks bad. Whether new beach delivery techniques will break the stranglehold on Quemoy is open to serious question. Efforts to break the blockade will in any event be very costly.

(a) ChiCom shore batteries maintain highly effective interdictory fire over all of the Quemoys and all waters around the Quemoys. These batteries are zeroed in on all usable beach areas and the two landing strips.

(b) During the period August 23 to September 7, no resupplies reached Quemoy due to ChiCom naval harassment. Since then, there have been 8 convoys, all of them U.S. escorted. The first was unopposed and landed 300 tons. The next two (September 8 and 11) failed to off-load any supplies. The last five (September 13, 14, 16, 17, 18) consisting of amphibious craft loaded aboard LSM’s and LST’s, have apparently unloaded from 25 to 75 tons on each convoy run.

2. As Secretary Dulles pointed out last Friday at his meeting with Secretary McElroy and the JCS:

“Under current conditions the ChiComs will in all probability continue to harass and prolong this interdiction operation; they will probably not assault the islands while the Warsaw talks and UN sessions are going on. For the same reason we don’t want to take new military initiatives during this period. The vital objective is to sustain at least the status quo.”¹

3. But can we sustain the status quo for very long without taking the initiative? Import supply requirements for Quemoy average 700 tons daily. During the entire period since August 23 less than one day’s supply has reached Quemoy. Stockpiles have been reduced by some 17,000 tons. There are now less than one month’s supply of food, ammunition and certain other necessaries on Quemoy. (If the GRC engage in effective counterbattery fire, there is only 10 day’s supply of ammo on hand.)

4. We might take the initiative in several ways: notably (a) the U.S. could carry out the resupply mission; (b) the U.S. could take military action such as naval bombardment and/or USAF attacks on ChiCom shore batteries; (c) the U.S. could agree to GRC attacks on ChiCom batteries. However, the ChiCom’s numerous batteries are so well emplaced and so heavily revetted that they could not, for the most part, be knocked out by any conventional weapons. Moreover, as SNIE 100–11–58 of September 16, 1958 points out, all of the above courses of action “eventually would probably involve U.S. attacks on the mainland and the U.S. could be charged before world opinion with expanding the scope of the armed conflict.”²

5. Thus any new effective military measures to relieve Quemoy involves the use sooner or later of atomic weapons. Recourse to atomic weapons would involve a grave risk of Communist retaliation in kind [document number not declassified]³ and the United States would be strongly condemned by world opinion, if not by public opinion within the U.S. The U.S. would probably be asked to withdraw all its forces and facilities from Japan, according to Ambassador MacArthur.

6. Meanwhile there are disturbing signs of GRC discontent, resentment and restiveness, of GRC efforts to get the U.S. involved in a nuclear war with Red China [document number not declassified]⁴ of GRC top military echelon’s “crying panic long before panic is a factor” (COMUSTDC/MAAG Taiwan to CNO September 14),⁵ and of Taiwanese sentiment becoming hostile to GRC and to U.S. (Taipei’s 406 of September 16).⁶ If the U.S. resists GRC pressures for new military initiatives, and if the GRC Government begins to lose face with its own people and in the international arena, there may be a dangerous rift in U.S.–GRC relations and/or the GRC may strike out on its own against the mainland. (COMUSTDC reports on September 14 that there are ominous signs that the GRC is “planning something big they don’t want us to know about”).⁷

7. It must be emphasized, in this connection, that it would be far worse in terms of Asian reactions if any change in the status of the Offshore Islands were to come about as the result of enemy military victory rather than as the result of negotiations. (See INR’s I.R. 7794 of September 4, 1958.)⁸

8. All of the foregoing emphasizes the need for strong diplomatic and other pressures (a) to bring the Communist Chinese to stop the gunfire and (b) to keep the GRC under control. At the same time, the Communists are unlikely to try to change the present military situation and they are unlikely to make any concessions at Warsaw. If they can stall at Warsaw for just one month without cease-fire conditions, Quemoy may be lost unless we go to war—a nuclear war—to try to save it. That is why it is so urgent that we force the pace and try to get hostilities stopped within the next fortnight.

The following courses of action are accordingly proposed for consideration:

(a) We must not let the Chinese Communists get away with stalling at Warsaw. We should make one more effort at Warsaw this Sunday. At that time we should put forward an explicit proposition along the lines suggested by Warsaw’s 411⁹ whereby we would undertake to refrain from certain actions considered by the ChiComs as provocative, and in return we could expect them to refrain from military action against us. We would not ask for ChiCom agreement to this effect but would merely inform them that our forces, and we would seek GRC cooperation too, would, beginning at a certain time and for a certain trial period, refrain from certain acts on the expectation that reciprocal moves would be made by the ChiComs. For our part we might undertake (a) cancellation of all U.S. escort activities, (b) no U.S. vessels or planes operating within 20 miles of Chinese coast, (c) seek to persuade GRC that its supply missions would not carry military equipment, but would carry only food, medical supplies and other necessaries.

(b) If, in the face of this entirely reasonable proposal for cease-fire conditions, the ChiComs should refuse to cooperate, we might shortly thereafter concert with the GRC to announce (a) our immediate suspension of all shooting or other military actions, as well as the termination of certain actions which might be considered rightly or wrongly by the ChiComs to be provocative, and (b) that this suspension will continue for as long as it is responded to by suspension of enemy gunfire and other hostile actions.

(c) If these two measures fail to stop the gunfire, then we should bring the issue before the General Assembly exposing the whole record, including the latest Warsaw talks. We should demand condemnation of the Red Chinese aggression; we should demand that the UN go on record as opposing resort to the use of force in resolving this crisis which might otherwise envelop the Far East, if not the world, in a nuclear catastrophe; we should specifically seek a UN resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. During UN debate on this subject, we should not oppose Red Chinese attendance on the same terms they attended the UN in 1950 (?) during the Korean war.

(d) During the debate, we could expect a number of countries to come forward with various types of compromise proposals. The U.S. might consider giving its silent consent to that proposal which was likely to have majority UN support and which, at the same time, provided for terms which we and the GRC could live with. Such terms might include (a) cessation of gunfire and other hostile acts, (b) avoidance of provocative actions such as leaflet raids, interference with shipping, overflights, etc., (c) demilitarization of the Offshore Islands area, (d) continuation of the Warsaw talks with a view to trying to effect settlement of further issues.

(e) The above program should be pressed forward urgently. Meanwhile any success we have in improving the resupply of Quemoy will give us more time in which to operate and will strengthen our bargaining position generally. We must therefore tax U.S./GRC ingenuity, determination and efforts to the limit in improving resupply without attempting any new military initiatives. We must also act to prevent the GRC from making dangerous moves and unwise statements. We should nevertheless prepare—and make no secret or our preparations—for further military action if that unhappy decision is forced upon us by Peiping. If that decision is taken, the record should by then have been made clear before U.S. and world opinion that Peiping was responsible, for it had been adequately warned and had persisted in its aggression in defiance of the majority will in the UN.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1858. Top Secret. Sent to Acting Secretary Herter with a covering note of September 19 from Acting Assistant Secretary Parsons which reads as follows: “With reference to our meeting in your office yesterday noon, I attach a revised memorandum which Marshall Green took to New York late yesterday afternoon. It reflects views expressed at the meeting, most particularly the feeling that with energetic resupply efforts we may have more time in which to maneuver for a solution.”
1. The quotation is from Document 83.
2. Document 99.
3. [Footnote not declassified.]
4. Document not found.
5. Document 90.
6. Telegram 406 from Taipei reported on public opinion in Taiwan concerning the offshore island situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1658)
7. See Document 90.
8. “Probable Far Eastern Reaction to a Loss of the Offshore Islands to Communist China.” (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, China, 1957–58)
9. See footnote 1, Document 93.