105. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Offshore Island Situation
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. George Yeh, Ambassador of the Republic of China
- Mr. Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary
- Dr. S.Y.Tan, Minister, Chinese Embassy
- Mr. J.W. Bennett, Chinese Affairs
In a courtesy call on Mr. Murphy on September 18 Ambassador Yeh remarked that there was much public misunderstanding of how there came to be so many Chinese forces on the offshore islands. He related the history of the offshore islands, pointing out that in 1949 Quemoy was garrisoned by only some 6,000 troops when it was attacked by the Communists. None of the 14,000 attacking Communist troops returned home, being either killed, wounded or captured. After this the GRC naturally increased the garrison. However, the Chinese did not really dig in on Quemoy until 1955. In September 1955 [1954], according to Ambassador Yeh, the Communists unleashed a savage bombardment of Quemoy, causing many casualties. The Government then decided that they really had to build up the defenses of the island permanently. There are now perhaps some five divisions there.
Asked by Mr. Murphy, about casualties in the present bombardment, Ambassador Yeh said that civilian casualties had been very heavy, so heavy that the actual number has been kept secret. Altogether he said about 3,000 civilian casualties had been incurred so far. He ascribed this high rate to the fact that the civilians do not have the shelters and the discipline of the military.
Mr. Murphy inquired about the targets of GRC bombardment of the mainland from Quemoy. Ambassador Yeh said that GRC gunners did not shoot at the city of Amoy, although they had fired at the port a few times to test Communist reactions. He said he could not believe the Communist story that Amoy University had been hit. It was within range, but it was not GRC policy to fire at civilian targets.
Mr. Murphy asked Ambassador Yeh how he would describe the military importance of the offshore islands. Ambassador Yeh said that they were important as military “outposts,” although they had never been considered as stepping stones for an invasion of the mainland. However, their psychological importance far transcended their military significance. To the Communists, Ambassador Yeh said they had military value because of their position off the ports of Amoy and Foochow and the fact that the GRC was able to interdict Communist shipping from them.
Ambassador Yeh said that the Communists were very “conservative” in their military tactics. He referred to their caution in the air and to the fact that they had lost several planes to the CAF. He also said that they were keeping their larger naval vessels away from the area of the offshore islands and had so far made use only of smaller craft.
Ambassador Yeh said that he differed with President Chiang about interpretation of Communist intentions. The Communists do not in Yeh’s opinion intend to attack the offshore islands with a full-scale assault. [Page 220] That would be too costly. He said he guessed that Khrushchev went to Peiping because Mao Tse-tung was unhappy about some things, especially his continued exclusion from international meetings and the selection of India to attend the proposed summit conference. At Peiping Mao probably impressed on Khrushchev the need for “doing something” and the two cooked up a scheme to put the pressure on the offshore islands for the purpose of helping the Soviets out at New York (in the UN) or in some possible international conference resulting from the crisis that would be created. The Warsaw talks were an afterthought. But the Communists have done “that sort of thing” before, as when in 1953 Malik suddenly announced that they were willing to talk peace in Korea. Yeh said he did not look for an all-out attack by the Communists on Quemoy unless as a desperate measure for the purpose of saving face if they could win a concession no other way.
Mr. Murphy asked about the supply situation on Quemoy. Ambassador Yeh said that actually it was quite good. There was about three or four months’ supply of rice on the island, and the only shortage was in edible oils. The army had some 150,000 rounds of heavy ammunition, which they were using conservatively. (By way of contrast, Yeh said the Communists had shot up all their forward area ammunition supplies. As of early September he said the Communists had fired some 170,000 rounds.) He said that the GRC did badly need the 8 inch howitzers we were giving them and remarked en passant that the GRC had first asked for these weapons “three or four years ago.” On the naval side, Yeh said the GRC was very short of patrol craft, having a total of only four all told.
Ambassador Yeh said twice that the Communists had not yet used the technique of concentrated fire. He said he hated to think what the consequences might be if they did. So far they have been scattering their shots all over the islands. Not one GRC gun position on Quemoy has yet been hit. Nor has any of the GRC’s main dumps. The morale of the troops on Quemoy is excellent. Some 20% of the men are Taiwanese and some of Taiwanese are among the best gunners. Yeh said he did not believe that the Communists would attack the minor Quemoy islands with the purpose of occupying them. He said that GRC gunfire could make them untenable if they tried it.
Mr. Murphy inquired about the feelings of the Taiwanese toward the present situation. Ambassador Yeh replied that stories of differences between Taiwanese and mainlanders were greatly exaggerated. He said the only real excitement he noted in Taiwan was among the wives of the CAF pilots who of course were anxious about their husbands’ safe return from missions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–1958. Secret. Drafted by Bennett on September 19.↩