Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

10. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Drumright)⁰

Washington, April 29, 1958.

Dear Drum: I have read with much interest and have carefully considered your Despatch No. 581¹ transmitting memoranda of conversations between President Chiang and the Secretary and myself and recommending acceding to President Chiang’s request that we cooperate with the GRC in establishing guerrilla bases on the China mainland. We have also held preliminary talks with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at the working level.

I agree entirely with your assessment that President Chiang is becoming more restive and that he and the GRC officials concerned would be much encouraged if we found it possible to support the type of operation they propose. However, we should frankly recognize from the outset that our cooperation in such operations might only give a temporary fillip to their morale and, indeed, might terminate by leaving them more frustrated than at present if the operation should fail or if, it having developed to a certain point, we felt we could not under conditions then prevailing, face the risk which further expansion would entail. In short, before starting down the recommended road, we must try to satisfy ourselves where it is leading.

I am not sure how much detailed knowledge you have of the efforts to support guerrilla operations on the mainland during the early 1950’s. The Chinese Communist security services proved highly successful in nipping all such efforts in the bud. It is true that today there is more widespread dissatisfaction with the Communist regime, but on the other hand their security services also appeared to have improved. There is a wide gap between the existence of extensive dissatisfaction with the Communists and a willingness on the part of individuals to risk their necks by becoming a part of a resistance movement. It is only when the latter condition prevails among a sufficient number of people that the type of guerrilla action proposed would be of any use. This means that we have to know more than we do today of the state of mind of the people in the areas of the mainland which might be selected for guerrilla bases.

We have, of course, pointed out to President Chiang the failure of previous efforts to organize guerrilla resistance on the China mainland as, for example, in Admiral Radford’s conversation with President Chiang on August 1, 1956,² According to Karl Rankin’s letter of October 8, 1956 to Admiral Radford,³ President Chiang believes that those efforts failed because they were on too small a scale. He now seems to be thinking in terms of training some 30,000 or more paratroopers and dropping large numbers of them more or less simultaneously in various parts of China. This seems to us a very risky operation and one which should not be undertaken until we have more evidence than we have today that it might be successful. The failure of such an attempt would not only be a heavy blow to morale in Taiwan, but might well create difficult international problems for us to no purpose.

Certainly, we should carefully study President Chiang’s proposal and discuss its feasibility among ourselves. We intend to have further talks here on the subject. It might be that a small, carefully worked out effort, beginning with the acquisition of good intelligence on a particular area would be well worthwhile. However, the matter should be approached cautiously and we must avoid giving President Chiang the impression that on the basis of present intelligence we could accept any proposal for large scale operations against the mainland.⁴

In our discussions here we will consider your proposal for a small joint committee to study the problem of mainland infiltration.

I will write you further on this and in the meantime would welcome your comments.⁵

Sincerely yours,

Walter S. Robertson⁶

0. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Drumright. Secret; Official–Informal.
1. Document 7.
2. For a memorandum of the conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. III, pp. 411–415.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Rankin Files: Lot 66 D 84)
4. In a May 27 letter to Robertson, Drumright wrote that at a meeting with U.S. representatives on May 23 Chiang had declared that for 3 years he had advocated dropping trained guerrilla paratrooper units in selected areas on the mainland and that he still believed in the efficacy of that type of operation. Drumright wrote that he intended to suggest to General Bowen, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, that he discuss the subject with Chiang in order to point out the “difficulties and fallacies” of this concept. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Drumright)
5. In a May 22 letter to Robertson, Drumright withdrew his suggestion for concurrence in the establishment of a joint committee. He wrote that a combined U.S.–GRC Special Forces exercise was to be held later in the year, the purpose of which would be “to provide the GRC with realistic training in the preparation and use of Special Forces in their role of supporting conventional military operations”, and which was expected to “disabuse them of certain incomplete and inaccurate concepts regarding the proper role of Special Forces and the difficulties of their employment.” (Ibid.)
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.