11. Editorial Note
At the 364th meeting of the National Security Council on May 2, 1958, there was a brief discussion pertaining to U.S. policy toward China during a discussion of NSC 5810, “Basic National Security Policy,” dated April 15, 1958. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5810 Series) The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, May 2, reads as follows:
“General Cutler then went back to his briefing note in order to deal with the second of the two most significant paragraphs in the new statement—namely paragraph 41, dealing with Communist China. He pointed out that paragraph 41 in NSC 5810 repeated the guidance in last year’s basic policy with respect to Communist China. However, this paragraph contained no guidance as to a future attempt by other nations to seat Red China, rather than the Chinese Nationalist Government, in the United Nations. In view of the fact that there were many straws in the wind to indicate that such a move might be made, and that the United States might not be able to block it, he personally believed, along with certain Planning Board members, that the United States should be considering now, while it still enjoys its strong majority in the UN, alternative ways of dealing with such a contingency, and of finding a way to preserve the independence of Taiwan despite the loss of its status as representative in the UN of all China. Upon concluding his remarks, General Cutler asked Secretary Dulles to speak to this problem.
“Secretary Dulles pointed out that, in line with General Twining’s fears as to the unfortunate psychological impact of a change in basic policy, he believed that the last thing in the world we would want to commit to writing was a proposal of the sort suggested by General Cutler for paragraph 41. Furthermore, he doubted whether the tide was actually running against the United States in the UN with respect to seating Communist China. On the contrary, there was some evidence that the tide had turned in favor of our position against the admission of Red China. For example, the United Kingdom has committed itself to support the moratorium during the lifetime of the Macmillan government. Secretary Dulles doubted, therefore, whether any change in British policy on this subject was imminent.
“General Cutler asked if there would not certainly be a change if Aneurin Bevan were soon to become Foreign Secretary. To this point, Secretary Dulles replied that if we were to review all our policies on such assumptions as this, there were a lot more significant changes to be made than our attitude toward the admission of Red China to the UN. If Bevan became Foreign Secretary, we would presumably be ousted from all our missile bases in the United Kingdom.
[Page 22]“The President expressed the belief that if the United States were to recognize Red China and agree to the admission of Red China to the United Nations, there would be a wave of insistence in Congress and among the American people that the United States withdraw completely from the UN.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
The Council made no changes in paragraph 41 of NSC 5810, which was approved with amendments as NSC 5810/1, May 5, 1958; the text is scheduled for publication in volume III.