8. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)0
SUBJECT
- Reversion of Administrative Rights in Ryukyus to Japan
In a conversation with Minister Shimoda of the Japanese Embassy at luncheon on Wednesday, April 9, I asked him what he considered to be the most important problem in United States-Japanese relations. His immediate response was the continued administration by the United States over the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands.
In response to my query as to why this is such an important problem, Minister Shimoda stated that the Japanese consider that the Ryukyus and Bonins were a part of Japan proper before World War II. He added that Japan gave up Formosa, Korea and Manchuria. The Japanese people understand this, since these territories had been taken by conquest. The situation is different, however, for the Ryukyus and Bonins. I quickly responded that the same applies to the Kuriles, to which Minister Shimoda readily agreed.
[Page 18]I then asked Minister Shimoda what the Japanese thought should be done in relation to the Ryukyu–Bonin problem. He explained that there are two schools of thought: The first would call for the immediate reversion of the administrative rights in the Ryukyus and Bonins to Japan. The second advocates a gradual movement, including such things now as the adoption of Japanese textbooks in the Ryukyus, Japanese registry of births and deaths, to be followed by additional measures so that eventually administrative rights would have been turned over to Japan on a de facto basis.
I immediately explained that the proposal of the first school of thought would have the distinct disadvantage of inviting the Japanese to whittle away at the freedom of use by the United States of the military bases in the Ryukyus. Such whittling away would be detrimental not only to the United States but also to the defense posture which is so important to Japan. He explained that the Japanese people would understand that to obtain the return of the territory they would have to pay a price for it, and the price they would have to pay would be completely unfettered utilization by the Americans of the bases in the Islands.
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
I then pointed out that under such circumstances the Socialists and the Communists would exert continued pressure against unlimited use of the bases by United States forces, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He responded that the answer to this one would be obvious and would put the Government of Japan in a much more tenable position than now. They could respond, and in his judgment it would stick with the Japanese people, that the United States had returned the territory belonging to Japan, whereas the Communists had not acted in this good faith in relation to the Kuriles, the Habomais and Shikotan. He felt that being in this position would be very beneficial to the Government of Japan on the territorial question.
The discussion of this topic concluded with Minister Shimoda’s prognosis that in his judgment the Government of Japan would request the immediate return of the administrative rights to the Ryukyus and Bonins shortly after the general election which is now expected to be held around May 18, 1958.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/4–1258. Secret. Drafted by Parsons.↩