Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

7. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 9, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Okinawa

For some time the Secretary of State and I have been much concerned about our failure to make with the Japanese an acceptable and mutually agreeable arrangement for the Okinawa Base.¹

The problem is rather simply stated. We will obviously have the need for the Base for some years. At the same time the natives on Okinawa are growing in number and are very anxious to repossess the land that they once owned.

Regardless of legal or treaty arrangements, this conflict creates problems not only with our relationships with the people of Okinawa and Japan but could, if they become acute, be used for ammunition in the Communist propaganda attacks upon us. The situation could become unpleasant. While I do not expect the matter to assume the importance of the Cyprus difficulty with Britain, nor of the Algerian with France, still there could easily develop a situation that would create much embarrassment for us.

We feel certain that in the cases of Cyprus and Algiers the local populations would have readily accepted some five to six years ago privileges and rights that the respective mother countries would now gladly accord them. But the undercover struggles in these regions have for their purpose the expulsion of foreign troops from the area and so aroused emotions, misunderstandings and hatreds that nothing less than complete independence will seemingly satisfy the bulk of these populations.

The lesson is that we should be forehanded with offers that the Okinawans will clearly recognize as generous and understanding and which will have the effect at least for some years of forestalling trouble.

The Secretary of State informs me that he and the Defense Department are working actively on the problem. I personally hope that there will be an offer made of some division of territory so that there may be established an American enclave of minimum size to meet our needs.

I would think that such a political agreement could be established together with reasonable financial remuneration. We might make of all these peoples firm allies rather than latent enemies.

DDE ²

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diary. Secret.

1. The Secretary brought up the Ryukyus in his conversation with the President on April 1:

   “I referred to relations with Japan and the desirability of some adjustment of our position there which would be sufficiently timely so that we and our Japanese friends could get credit for it. I spoke of the situation in Okinawa and the difficulty we had there, particularly with the Military High Commissioner who operated on a ‘be tough’ basis. I said I thought we should explore the possibilities of an enclave, of which we would have permanent or semi-permanent possession, with the administration of the rest of the island turned back to the Japanese. The President thought this idea well worth exploring.” (Memorandum of conversation with the President by Dulles, April 1; ibid., Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.