Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

5. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles ⁰

Washington, March 22, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Revision of the Japanese Security Treaty¹

REFERENCE

• Ambassador MacArthur’s letter to you dated February 18, 1958,² attaching a draft revised security treaty

The basic determination to be made with respect to a revision of the Japanese Security Treaty is whether such a revision is timely. Ambassador MacArthur does not discuss this point, save to note that the question of revision would be raised by the Japanese some time this year. The same question was raised by the Japanese during the visit of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in 1955 and also during the visit of Prime Minister Kishi in 1957.

In 1955 you took the position that replacement of the existing Security Treaty by another was premature. While the United States had always hoped that the Security Treaty could be translated into a different form of treaty when Japan had developed the capacity to defend itself, the time for that had not yet come. Japan’s political situation was very confused, and unfriendly elements in the Diet could block the Government’s efforts to build up its defense system. You emphasized your view that a new type of treaty should develop from the conditions contemplated by the existing treaty, namely, when Japan makes an adequate contribution to its own defense, when a healthy spirit of partnership with the United States has been created and when anti-Communist elements are strong enough to ensure passage of their programs and an attitude of cooperation with the United States (Memorandum of conversation of meeting with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu on defense matters on August 30, 1955).³

In 1957 in discussing this matter with Prime Minister Kishi, you agreed to minor clarifications dealing principally with the relationship of the Security Treaty and the United Nations Charter. In addition, the Japanese-American Committee on Security was established to provide a greater degree of mutuality in connection with the Security Treaty.

At the same time you took the position that replacement of the Security Treaty by another type of treaty or any detailed revision would have to be submitted to the Senate. You felt that the ensuing debate would not be helpful to Japanese-American relations and that outcome would be doubtful. You made plain your view that the basic issue was whether the Japanese Government desired to continue its close and intimate relationship with the United States. If the Japanese desired to ease the United States out of Japan, the United States could consider alternative arrangements in the Far East. Prime Minister Kishi assured you that he had no desire to change the existing close relationship with the United States.

There is a serious question as to whether it can be said that the Japanese have satisfied the conditions precedent to a revised Security Treaty as laid down by you on these earlier occasions. While, as indicated in Ambassador MacArthur’s letter, the Japanese desire a more “mutual” security treaty, their willingness to undertake the obligations of a mutual security partnership with the United States continues to be subject to doubt at this time.

On the other hand, there is a restiveness in Japan with respect to the alleged “one-sided relationship” resulting from the Security Treaty. Although the form of the Treaty continues unaltered, its substance is already badly eroded and it is questionable whether the United States could at this time exercise the “rights” provided for therein.

Whether or not it is now time to undertake a full-scale revision of the Security Treaty in an attempt to obtain a true mutual security treaty, or a treaty having the potentialities of becoming a mutual security treaty, could be determined by consultation between Ambassador MacArthur and Prime Minister Kishi to ascertain whether in fact there exists already sufficient mutuality of objectives on both sides to support such a treaty. To enable Ambassador MacArthur to discuss the matter we should provide him with a list of our long-term objectives in a mutual security relationship with Japan. The present political situation in Japan is such that the commitments which the Japanese would be willing to undertake in a mutual security treaty negotiated at this time are very limited. We must therefore be very careful to avoid restrictive wording in a new treaty which would greatly limit its usefulness in the future when we hope the Japanese will be willing to enter into a more meaningful mutual security relationship. If we bear in mind our long-term objectives in Japan we can perhaps reach agreement with the Japanese on an “expendable” treaty which would accommodate these objectives.

It is possible that Mr. Kishi will provide information as to Japanese objectives and attitudes which will materially affect our posture. It is conceivable that from the result of these discussions we might conclude that the time for a full-dress revision has not come and that a lesser revision is in order. On the other hand, genuine treaty revision may be indicated. Only after realistic goals are determined in this manner should we proceed to the formulation of treaty previsions giving effect to these determinations.

When we reach the point of treaty drafting we could prepare a number of alternative treaty provisions, attacking these problems from various points of view. It is only after this work has been done that we shall be prepared to discuss treaty provisions with the Japanese. We should not, therefore, initiate negotiations with a draft of the type suggested by Ambassador MacArthur, which provides no alternatives.

With respect to the draft mutual security treaty submitted by Ambassador MacArthur in his letter to you of February 18, 1958, I have the following comments.

Article VI⁴ of his draft would limit the treaty area to present-day Japan plus the Ryukyus and Bonins and the islands the Japanese hope to get back from the Soviet Union. I think, instead, consideration should be given to having a new or revised security treaty open-ended, in the sense that by mutual agreement the parties could designate additional areas protected from aggression under the treaty and also in the sense that other nations in the general area could accede to the treaty.

Another factor to be considered is whether the revised security treaty can be so drafted as to permit the Japanese to assume additional military obligations as amendments to the Japanese constitution are developed. This could be done, for example, by language patterned after the SEATO agreement⁵ whereunder Japan would undertake to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes”.

Recommendation

That I answer Ambassador MacArthur’s letter in terms of the above. I would include in the letter a list of some of the long-term objectives which we hope to achieve with the Japanese (Tab B). In addition, the letter would authorize him to consult with Prime Minister Kishi about long-term security objectives of a mutual character, to provide the basis for consideration of whether and/or what kind of revisions in our security relations with Japan are desirable at this time.

Attachment B

SOME LONG-TERM SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN JAPAN

1. A militarily strong Japan able to defend its own territory and willing and able to use its forces abroad for the defense of free world nations.

2. Japanese membership in an over-all regional security pact, or in related bilateral or limited security pacts, capable of providing collective security for the entire free world position in the Far East.

3. Continued United States military presence in Japan to the extent required by the existing situation, with the right to utilize military bases in Japan in order to fulfill our commitments for the defense of the free world.

4. Japanese agreement to the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

5. A Japan with a strong economy capable of maintaining a high level of employment with a rising living standard, and good morale, and providing the substructure for necessary armament.

6. A Japan where economy is geared to the maximum beneficial extent with the economies of the free Asian and other free world countries, including a Japanese contribution of skills, technology, capital and capital goods to the economic growth and development of the underdeveloped countries.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Japan. Secret. Drafted by Pfeiffer and Parsons and cleared in draft in L.
1. In a letter dated March 8, MacArthur set forth potential objections which he believed the U.S. military would raise against revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and posed counterarguments. (Ibid., Central Files, 794.5/3–858) See Supplement.
2. Document 4.
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, Part 1, pp. 96–104.
4. See footnote 4, Document 4.
5. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol, signed at Manila September 8, 1954, and entered into force for the United States, February 19, 1955. For text, see 6 UST 81.
6. Dulles commented on these objectives in a March 23 memorandum to Robertson concluding that “The essential, it seems to me, is that the Japanese should accept the basic premise that their future lies in close cooperation with the United States to create a balance of power as against the Soviet Union and Communist China.” (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Japan)