4. Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Dulles0

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am sending to you and Walter Robertson with this letter our first cut at a draft mutual security treaty with Japan1 (mentioned in my telegram no. 2083 to you)2 which would replace the present Security Treaty. I believe it is virtually certain that the question of revision of the existing Security Treaty will be raised with us by the Japanese during the present year. Therefore, it is essential that we think through this matter so that we will be in a position to discuss it in a considered fashion when it comes up.

In formulating the enclosed draft, we had in mind the view which you expressed to me in January 1957 before I came to Tokyo, which you reiterated to me last June,3 that in modifying the existing one-sided Security Treaty, our objective should be a truly mutual security treaty rather than simply trying to tinker with the existing instrument. We also had in mind the fact that the new treaty should follow the same basic pattern as the other treaties which the United States has negotiated in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, of which you were the principal architect.

The crux of the matter will probably be the definition of the treaty area. In the past, some of our people have suggested that, for such a treaty to be really mutual, Japan would have to agree to come to the aid of the United States if the continental United States or its territories elsewhere in the Pacific were attacked. Given the present Japanese interpretation of Japan’s Constitution and the political facts of life in this country, any such condition would prevent the conclusion of a mutual security treaty. If we are to have Japan as a partner and thus be able to continue to use certain of her military and logistical facilities which are very important to us, it is not essential for Japan to be committed to come to our aid except within a fairly limited area. This is the area where it is very important for us to have Japan committed to act in the event that either we or the Japanese are attacked. This is the premise of the [Page 9] proposed language in Article VI of the attached draft,4 and I believe it is consistent with the Japanese interpretation of their Constitution and with our basic interests.

In the enclosed draft, in a parallel column to each Article of the draft treaty, we have made notes which explain briefly and in general terms the origin of the language suggested. While there is perhaps more which could be said in describing each article, the text of the draft treaty speaks pretty well for itself and sets out our considered view as to what kind of a treaty would correspond to the practical political realities of the situation in Japan and at the same time secure for us the minimum essential commitments and facilities which are important to us. The new arrangements would not be as advantageous to us as the present ones. However, if we are not prepared to move forward when the time comes with constructive proposals which are based on the principles of equality and mutuality, and which will thus meet the political realities of the situation here, we will progressively run the risk that Japan will come to believe that its best interests are served by terminating the existing Treaty with no replacement. And, if Japan should reach that most unfortunate conclusion, we would have no way to prevent her from simply announcing the termination of the present one-sided treaty by unilateral declaration.

As I also pointed out in my telegram, the Administrative Agreement would also have to be re-negotiated. The present one (which as a result of the vastly different circumstances obtaining in 1951 is a very one-sided one in our favor) came under a good deal of attack in Japan because it was not ratified by the Diet, and we would have to bear in mind that a new agreement of this kind would probably have to go before that body. We know that the Japanese have been scrutinizing very carefully our agreements with NATO countries for military facilities, and I believe they will have them very much in mind and will not expect us to be more demanding with respect to Japan than we are with our European NATO allies. I might mention that we have reason to believe the Japanese will, in particular, concentrate particular attention on revision of Articles II, III, IV, V, XIV, XXIV, and XXV of the Administrative Agreement.

I hope very much you will have an opportunity to consider this whole question before your trip to Manila and Taipei and that I will be able to get at least your preliminary reaction when I see you in Taipei at [Page 10] the Chiefs of Mission meeting, as it is very important that I know your thinking.

With every good wish, as always, Sincerely,

Doug
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/2–1258. Secret.
  2. Not printed; see Supplement.
  3. Document 3.
  4. Possibly a reference to a conversation among President Eisenhower, Admiral Radford, and others, June 18, 1957, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, Part 1, pp. 357360.
  5. The draft, not printed, defined the treaty area as “all territory under the administrative control of Japan and the island territories in the Western Pacific which are referred to in Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and which are under the administrative control of the United States of America.”