330. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State0
232. For Assistant Secretary Parsons. Deptel 152.1 In course of one hour and 45-minute conversation with PriMin Chang Myon this morning, we discussed all subjects covered reftel as well as number of lesser points requiring his immediate attention.
This conversation being fully reported by airgram leaving next pouch.2
[Page 690]I found Chang Myon (and FinMin Kim and Reconstruction Min Chu who sat in during economic phases our discussion) receptive and in general agreement with our views although I believe we should expect difficulties and delays in bringing ROKG fully to support our positions on certain issues. I cautioned them against any public statements which would create unwarranted hopes or false impression regarding any increase in United States aid level to Korea. Chang Myon replied that he had avoided such statements for those reasons, but he and his colleagues expressed hope that present level United States aid to Korea could be maintained and if possible some small increase (possibly out of presidential emergency fund) could be made both in order to meet Korea’s real needs and as sign of United States confidence in new government. In particular they stressed need for United States assistance in establishing stabilization fund to offset possible adverse psychological impact revision exchange rate.
Although today’s conversation necessarily general, I believe it served useful purpose in initiating our relations with new government on proper constructive note of frankness and desire for full cooperation.
I am calling on PriMin again tomorrow, accompanied by Dr. Moyer and General Magruder, at which time I hope to discuss economic and defense matters in more detail with PriMin and responsible ministers.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.13/8–2460. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- Document 329.↩
- Airgram G–48 from Seoul, August 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/8–2660) See Supplement.↩
- Telegram 246 from Seoul, August 26, reported this conversation. McConaughy noted that General Magruder emphasized the importance of keeping the military out of politics and political considerations out of military appointments. Dr. Moyer pointed to the importance of reducing the large backlog of economic problems, such as exchange rate revision and the completion of programmed projects, and stated that it was essential to devise more effective arrangements for consultation and decisionmaking between the Embassy and the South Korean Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.13/8–2660) See Supplement.↩