31. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State0

743. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt and POLAD. COMUS/Japan exclusive for General Burns. Embtel 741.1 As authorized in Deptel 474,2 I met yesterday with PriMin Kishi and FonMin Fujiyama to discuss replacing Security Treaty with new mutual treaty. Following is full summary of our meeting:

At opening of our discussion, I informed Kishi that following the Secretary’s meeting with Fujiyama, GOJ request to replace Security Treaty with mutual treaty had been discussed with Executive branch and confidentially with certain key Congressional leaders. Request for new treaty raises a serious problem for US since US is asked to give up broad continuing rights it now has by virtue of present treaty for new treaty which would impose upon US heavy obligation insofar as terms of a new treaty are concerned. Nevertheless, US prepared to accede to Kishi’s request and discuss with Japanese replacing present treaty with mutual treaty. This decision was taken primarily due to importance US places in closest possible relations with Japanese Government and to its confidence in PriMin Kishi’s desire for strengthening partnership with [Page 93] US on basis of durable and firm treaty relationship. I pointed out that new treaty and security arrangements raise number of difficult problems for US. We therefore intended from very outset to lay all our cards on table and indicated frankly general limits and bounds within which we must work if we are to find solution which US could live with.

I then gave Japanese text of draft treaty3 pointing out that draft had been prepared in effort to meet various suggestions raised previously with US by Kishi and Fujiyama in earlier talks. I explained treaty was also drafted to reflect broad community of interests and interdependence between Japan and US not only in field of security but in economic and other respects.

I then carefully reviewed each article in draft treaty, drawing upon commentary prepared by Department,4 and stressing particularly our views with respect Articles V, VI, and X. Re Article V, I said words “territories or areas under the administrative control” included 4 main islands of Japan, small islands now under Japanese control, Article III peace treaty islands now under US administrative control and islands in Pacific administered by US. Language of treaty also would require no amendment if northern islands are restored to Japanese control by USSR or at such time as Article III peace treaty islands may be returned to Japanese administration.

However, I made clear our draft has no effect on rights of US under Article III of peace treaty. I also explained our interpretation that term, “in accordance with constitutional process”, means Japan would not be obligated send its forces outside Japan if constitution interpreted to prohibit such use of Japanese forces.

Re Article VI, I stressed our deep desire present administrative agreement in effect although we prepared to take necessary technical steps to cure references in agreement to present security treaty. With such technical steps, administrative agreement would not in our view appear one-sided since inequalities in present arrangements which have been criticized in Japan seem to stem from treaty and not administrative agreement. I pointed out that if US is to commit itself to responsibility for sharing Japanese defense, we would obviously need provisions covering facilities, status of forces arrangements, etc. and that our new draft mutual treaty together with present administrative agreement would seem to be far best arrangement.

Re Article X, I recalled that Kishi in previous conversations had mentioned desire to have treaty fixed for certain period, such as 10 years, following which it could be terminated by one year’s notice. [Page 94] Article X had been drafted to take his views into account with which we agreed.


I next discussed proposed formula5 in response GOJ request for consultation on introduction of nuclear and operational use of US bases in emergency. I recalled Fujiyama’s statements to Secretary on September 11 in which he mentioned that, in event of aggression against Japan area, GOJ would provide necessary operational bases in Japan and that, in event aggression against US outside Japan, present logistic use of US bases for support of US forces would continue. I pointed out that we attach great importance to use of facilities in Japan to meet Communist aggression outside Japan area against other free Asian nations. On basis of Fujiyama’s assurances regarding use of logistic and other facilities, we had developed formula providing for joint consultation on introduction nuclears and operational use Japanese bases as requested by Kishi and Fujiyama. I explained that first operative clause in formula on “deployment of US forces and equipment into bases in Japan” referred specifically to introduction of nuclears [2 lines of source text not declassified]. On second aspect of formula I stressed that it was our understanding that joint consultation formula applied to operational use of US bases and that formula would not create barrier for use of these facilities for logistic purposes.

I then explained why it was not practicable to include formula in treaty and suggested it be recorded otherwise either through exchange of notes or agreed minute, as Japanese preferred, either of which would be made public with treaty. I also indicated our desire that in due course our understanding on formula be confirmed by Japanese in some mutually agreeable way.

4. I next took up AchesonYoshida exchange of notes of September 1 [8], 19516 by which Japan agreed to permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan of UN forces engaged in any UN action in Far East. I said that since exchange of notes was related to the peace treaty and not to security treaty it seemed quite clear that undertaking of GOJ in Yoshida note would not be affected by new mutual security treaty. I said we would wish to inform Washington that Kishi agreed with our understanding.

Finally, I raised question of waiver of rights to exercise jurisdiction as set forth in Deptel 503.7 I recalled our approach to Kishi in June 1957 to make public Japanese intention to waive its right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of material importance to it and GOJ reply [Page 95] that it would be embarrassing and create real problems in Japan re status forces agreement if confidential agreement were made public. I said that without making 1953 confidential minute public, it would be materially helpful to US to work out some public formulation on this matter in which Japan would refer to its past practice of not exercising such jurisdiction and affirm that it would be Japanese policy to continue to do so in the future.
After presentation, Kishi said that in view of the detailed proposals made, he was sure we would understand that he must withhold comment until our proposals could be carefully studied by himself and Foreign Ministry. However, he desired to express at once his great appreciation for earnest and sincere effort made by US Govt to place US-Japanese relations on truly mutual basis. He said that the intent of our proposals obviously showed a desire for mutuality on our part in numerous respects.
At close of discussion, we agreed upon line to be used in response to press inquiries, as set forth Embtels 741 and 742.8 In connection with discussion of press line, I emphasized need to conduct our negotiations in private, pointing out that, if we do not hold these discussions very closely and keep them out of press, there is a great danger of building up public inflexibility on key issues both in Japan and US. This would make it most difficult for us to handle negotiations. Kishi whole-heartedly concurred. At Kishi’s suggestion, we agreed that discussions would be kept to very restricted number of people on both sides and, in particular, that no mention would be made of fact we had presented text draft treaty. Kishi emphasized that it was of paramount importance to avoid any indication re tabling of draft treaty. I gather he had in mind that when draft finally sees light of day it would be presented as document hammered out together on basis of Japanese proposals rather than based on a US draft.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/10–558. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to CINCPAC POLAD and COMUS/Japan.
  2. Telegram 741 from Tokyo, October 4, was a precis of this telegram. In the concluding paragraph MacArthur said that he and Kishi had agreed not to issue a formal communiqué at the end of their meeting and that they would reply to press inquiries in general terms. (Ibid., 794.5/10–458)
  3. Document 28.
  4. See Tab A to Document 27.
  5. Not found.
  6. See Tab B to Document 27.
  7. See Document 34.
  8. Document 30. For documentation concerning the confidential understanding on jurisdiction, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, pp. 1478 ff.
  9. Telegram 742 from Tokyo, October 4, transmitted the agreed text for response to press questions. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/10–458) See Supplement.