Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, October 13, 1958, 10 p.m.

794. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt and POLAD. COMUS/Japan exclusive for General Burns. Embtel 792.¹ Following are points raised informally by working level Foreign Office officials on Acheson–Yoshida exchange of notes of September 8, 1951.

1. Foreign Office officials said that under Japanese interpretation Acheson–Yoshida exchange of notes was related to security treaty as well as peace treaty. Notes were exchanged physically at time and place where security treaty signed outside of San Francisco. With respect GOJ procedures, notes were submitted to Diet and ratified by Diet along with security treaty. Japanese note was signed only by Yoshida and not by entire delegation which signed peace treaty. In addition, notes appear to make clear that, with respect to US, facilities and services are provided by administrative agreement implementing security treaty and that, in absence security treaty, notes would have provided for support of US forces as well as UN forces.

2. They asked whether notes were intended to apply to future UN actions in Far East unrelated to Korean incident. They mentioned that GOJ interpreted obligations under Article 2 of UN Charter (which is referred to in notes) as not automatic but subject to provisions of Article 43(3) in each specific case. They commented informally that notes also appeared to refer specifically to hostilities flowing from North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and that therefore reference to “any UN action in Far East” logically referred only to hostilities arising out of broadening of Korean action which they recalled was distinct possibility at time notes exchanged. (Comment: Foreign Office officials appeared troubled not by obligation to support UN forces in event of resumption of Korean hostilities but by what they thought might be our notion of advance Japanese commitment to give support automatically to any and all future UN actions in Far East. They pointed out Diet would probably never concur to such blanket interpretation.)

3. They also asked whether language in Acheson–Yoshida notes “Japan will permit and facilitate support in and about Japan” in U.S. view included “operational use” of Japanese bases by UN forces without Japanese consent. Such an interpretation, they believed would not be accepted by Japanese Diet and people and would be inconsistent with provision nor consultation in our formula.

4. Would appreciate Department’s comments soon as possible.²

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/10–1358. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 32.
2. The Department replied in telegram 572 to Tokyo, October 16, that issues raised in telegrams 792, 793, and 794 from Tokyo were under study and instructed the Embassy to “limit response to comments already made” to Japanese Foreign Office working level queries. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/10–1358) See Supplement. See also telegram 707 to Tokyo, November 10, in the Supplement.