Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

297. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, April 17, 1960, 7 p.m.

869. Embtels 742¹ and 794;² Deptels 724³ and 783.⁴ Immediately two following telegrams⁵ contain, respectively, our recommendations in political field and in economic-mutual assistance field for new look in US actions toward Korea and programs in Korea. All these recommendations are within context of current agreed US policies and of precepts set forth Embtel 794. They are based on recognition shared by Country Team and Washington agencies of need for more positive actions to reverse trends in Korea which endanger US national interests (Embtel 742 and Deptel 724).

As tactical considerations affecting implementation of all recommended actions, the following points are emphasized:

(1) President Eisenhower’s projected visit to Korea will provide useful focal point to impress upon ROKG necessity (A) to act more responsibly in international affairs in furthering ROK and US interests; (B) to strengthen democratic institutions in manner which will restore Korean public confidence in ROKG, which becoming seriously estranged from broad elements of populace, and provide for basic, long-term political stability; and (C) to ensure just, effective utilization all US aid funds, preventing exploitation of our aid for ROKG political purposes.

(2) Since domestic situation now even graver than that described Embtel 742, urgent need for immediate remedial action. Hence, key feature of recommendations in following messages relates to submission US aide-mémoire spelling out US concern and recommending corrective steps, such aide-mémoire to be delivered soonest by Secretary Herter to Ambassador Yang with simultaneous delivery by Ambassador to President Rhee. Since obviously desirable that President’s visit evoke free world comment favorable to ROK and not to be depicted as disciplinary mission to wayward ally, ROKG must be given to understand through aide-mémoire and other means that immediate substantive remedial measures required to provide requisite setting for visit.

(3) Certain members of Congress and other prominent Americans, notably those having influence with ROKG, should be familiarized with our basic assessment and courses of action and should be encouraged to support these actions through appropriate means at their disposal. It should be made clear that recent trends in ROK if continued will seriously prejudice continued US economic support for Korea and compromise our ability to help Korea achieve greater international standing and influence.

Although ROKG has taken number of desirable steps over past month in international and domestic fields (as in regard to release of most Japanese detainees, resumption of trade with Japan, supporting our law of sea position, firing of Home Minister, public information director and certain police chiefs), there is clear need for basic corrective measures, yet there is little evidence that this will be undertaken by ROKG unless concerted pressure brought to bear by Washington. Tendency remains for any one solutions and stopgap gestures [sic] rather than coming to grips with international and especially domestic ills. Meanwhile, there is growing atmosphere of popular resentment marked by outright violence which could suddenly take most dangerous turn leaving situation wide open for Communist manipulation. Severe repressive ROKG measures to control such situation would only deepen popular antagonism, blacken ROKG reputation before world, and leave this nation even more susceptible to Communist subversion. While authoritarian trends may be tolerated by US Government in certain other Afro-Asian countries, situation here is one of increasing authoritarianism and decreasing authority.

If ROKG reaction to our recommended course of action is negative and uncooperative, then more drastic measures will have to be undertaken. ROKG should be given so to understand. However, it is our hope that recommended actions will at least produce a significant reversal of current trends and, although full ROK support and cooperation in execution of all our recommendations is highly unlikely, still it is realistic expectation that sufficient progress will be achieved over next few months to prevent situation from further erosion and start Korea along more promising road.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–1760. Secret; Priority.
1. Document 292.
2. Document 294.
3. See footnote 2, Document 292.
4. See footnote 3, Document 294.
5. Telegrams 870 and 871 from Seoul, April 17, contain the detailed political and economic recommendations cited in telegram 869. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–1760) See Supplement for both.