Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

292. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, March 17, 1960, 7 p.m.

742. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following is Country Team message. While we have not yet fully evaluated election proceedings, there is growing evidence that LP-administration employed on wide scale various coercive devices to ensure landslide victory. Reaction of many Koreans likely to be one of intensifying though submerged discontent with LP and administration, and Koreans will be highly sensitive to indications of US Govt’s attitude on elections. Any actions we take which lend themselves in interpretation of denoting US approval or indifference to conduct of elections likely to bewilder and engender resentment among many Koreans and might encourage Govt to feel it could take further repressive actions with impunity.

Obviously US must in circumstances avoid statements and actions which could be interpreted as indications of US approval or indifference, but until thorough-going analysis of elections completed and matter considered further here and in Washington obviously premature to attempt recommend exact course of action to be followed by US.

We nevertheless recommend that there be delay in announcements that any DLF loans or major program decisions at least during next two or more weeks which, coming so soon after elections, might be regarded as indicators of US reaction to elections. Certainly LP administration will be seeking to convey to Korean public impression that US is not unfavorable to these elections. For same reasons, we believe that dedication Chung-ju fertilizer plant should be postponed until at least mid-April so as to separate event from elections. Such would have adverse economic effects but they might reduce any possibility of US appearing, or being made to appear, as condoning handling of Korean elections.

Embassy believes that opportunities should be seized by US official and unofficial spokesmen to comment constructively and express concern in press, etc. regarding elections. In this connection, we consider Dept’s statement to press March 14¹ useful and balanced. Meanwhile we can expect that US press and perhaps Congressional and other US comments will (and should) supply ominous warning to ROKG of trends in American opinion and, played up here in local non-LP press, will help show Korean people at this critical juncture that US is concerned with fate of democracy in Korea. Moreover, any evidence of US concern and of possible rethinking of policies may have sobering, salutary impact on ROKG and even upon positions it may take in international field.

Foregoing relates to immediate situation and to posture we planning to take in face of it. Looking beyond, however, we believe present political picture (in which elections may be regarded as merely the latest in a series of repressive measures going back over a year) likely deteriorate further in terms of political stability. Although a tactical easing of ROK Government pressure likely in the immediate post-election period, we do not believe this will represent basic deviation from present Liberal Party determination maintain absolute control of political scene at all costs. If we define basis US objectives in Korea as the encouragement of a politically stable and militarily strong nation which is pro-US and anti-Communist in character, then these objectives fundamentally threatened by direction of current trends. Any reversal of these trends will be a difficult and delicate maneuver requiring time and willingness to assume risk of reaction from those elements of ROKG whose equities will be affected. Alternative, however, is to stand by and watch while Korean political scene may further corrode, while Korea’s international standing is compromised, while resentment mounts, and while US prestige and recognized authority may become target of a hostile public.

Before submitting any recommendations on how to meet this situation, we would welcome Washington comments on foregoing.²

Green

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/3–1760. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Hong Kong and CINCPAC.
1. Telegram 696 to Seoul, March 14, contained the text of Lincoln White’s statement on March 14. (Ibid., 795B.00/3–1460)
2. In telegram 724 to Seoul, March 21, the Department of State indicated that it concurred in the Embassy’s assessment and was planning to postpone pending loan agreements and aid deliveries in order to ensure that the Rhee government did not conclude that the United States approved of or was indifferent to the conduct of the March 15 elections. (Ibid., 795B.00/3–1560) See Supplement.