294. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State0
794. Embtel 742.1Reftel set forth our belief that present ROK political scene likely to deteriorate further in terms of political stability and that any reversal of these trends will be difficult, delicate maneuver requiring time and willingness to assume risk of reaction from those ROKG elements whose equities will be affected. However, we saw no alternative to taking a more positive stand against these trends and we undertook to submit recommendations on how this situation might best be met.
Before making specific recommendations, we wish first to highlight certain precepts and principles which we believe should serve as guidelines to any actions we take in helping prevent further dangerous erosion in ROK domestic and international positions.
It is our first precept that this cannot be done unless there is full coordinated support from all US agencies concerned and unless we have adequate coordination with Congress. As Washington is aware, ROKs tend to feel that State Department positions and pronouncements are not necessarily those of US Government as a whole, and ROKs have developed elaborate and not ineffective means for circumventing Department and of playing one US branch or agency against another. As long as this process is allowed to continue, the weight of our statements and démarches will not be adequately felt here in Seoul. It is therefore important that Washington and US officials in Seoul speak with one voice, enlisting the support of Americans having influence with President Rhee and ROKG in conveying US concern and suggesting moves for corrective action.
Not only should the US speak with one voice but it should speak with a clear voice. Plain speaking is essential at this time when many Koreans are confused as to where we stand. Although we should for-bear from interference in domestic affairs, this principle should not be carried to point where we fail to give a reasonably clear view of our position and of what we recommend. Fact is, of course, that we bear heavy responsibility for what Korea is today and same will be true of what Korea is tomorrow. Our blood, money, reputation and security are heavily invested in Korea. We have perhaps less reason to be passive observers here than anywhere else and the times call for a more vigorous effort to [Page 612] convey a clearer understanding of our viewpoint. We agree with Department that it is high time ROK came to understanding how their line of credit in the US is becoming depleted and how their international standing is fading.
Thirdly, through making our views more clearly known as a US viewpoint, we could hope to encourage Koreans to speak up and rally in support of actions we consider it to be in their own interests to pursue. There is already widespread latent support in Korea for those positions, just as there is widespread dissatisfaction there among government officials, ROK military and others regarding (A) Korea’s unrealistic foreign policy, especially toward Japan and (B) coercively–administration measures to retain power at any cost. While Koreans by and large are straining to learn what the US proposes to do and while we should convey a clearer understanding of our viewpoint, it nevertheless is up to the Koreans to take the initiative and to carry through with the necessary actions. Our “solutions” cannot be imposed on them.
Fourthly, this Embassy is opposed to economic sanctions or moves to cut back the military assistance program. This might cause irreparable damages to long-term economic and military programs serving basic US interests. It might also injure innocent parties, not only the Korean people, and cause opinion here to turn against the US. It would invite counter-measures by the ROKG leading to harsh antagonistic atmosphere where the kind of remedial measures we have in mind might have little chance of gaining acceptance. This is not to argue against cutting back on certain programs such as our support of ROK police and the office of public information, which are making use of US funds in a way damaging to US interests as in the last elections, or against a general tightening up of our aid administration to ensure program is not misused for political purposes.
In line with this precept, we question wisdom delaying cotton, fertilizer, POL and machinery procurement as suggested Deptel 724.2 These delays would not get at basic political problem and might adversely affect our aid program objectives and penalize ordinary Koreans whom we are trying to help. We therefore urge Washington proceed with these program actions in normal manner. Further, we would not recommend delay in approval first quarter counterpart allotment to military budget, which is overdue. Nor, as a fifth precept, do we recommend tactic of maintaining a cold, aloof attitude towards ROK officialdom in order to express our displeasure. This would also create a bad atmosphere for pursuing corrective actions we have in mind, would weaken contacts at time when contacts should be firmest, and is in any [Page 613] event a rather ineffective and self-demeaning approach. At same time, however, as stated in the first paragraphs of reftel, we believe we should avoid as far as feasible doing or saying anything that could be interpreted by the ROKs, or be made by the ROKG to appear, that we endorse measures we obviously do not.
As a sixth precept, we believe we should avoid blundering into the pitfall of making threats and then having our bluff called. We must be prepared to follow through and make good on any threatened action. This has not always been the case heretofore, and has contributed to an impression that our warnings can be ignored.
As a final precept we wish to repeat what was said in reftel regarding a probable tactical easing by the ROKG of certain repressive measures in the immediate post-election period. We do not believe such an easing will represent any fundamental deviation unless concerted action is taken to strike at basic ills in the ROK picture. This is not to deny the importance of encouraging and applauding corrective actions taken by the ROKs but to point to the need for ROKs coming to understand that current remedial measures fall far short of what we regard as necessary. Certainly on domestic side, recent firing of Home Minister and various police chiefs is inadequate.
Against background of these general precepts and principles and within context of current US policies, specific Country Team recommendations will be made. These now under active consideration and will probably be wired in by mid-April.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–260. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Document 292.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 292.↩
- On April 6 the Department of State responded in telegrams 783 and 784 by urging the Embassy to forward the specific courses of action anticipated in telegram 794 from Seoul. Department officials wanted Embassy recommendations in reconsidering the scope and timing of assistance programs for the Republic of Korea. As with the exchange rate controversy in January, the Department wanted the Rhee government to recognize the necessity to act responsibly, both domestically and internationally. The alternative, the Department noted, was “to court risk inability to maintain adequate support and gradual deterioration if not disintegration long term US-ROK relationships.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–260) See Supplement for both.↩