NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA
The National Security Council, Mr. Fred C.
Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Attorney General, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 411th
Council meeting on June 25, 1959, adopted the revisions of the statement
of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5817, subject to the amendments thereto which are set
forth in NSC Action No. 2102–b.
The President has this date approved the revisions in the statement of
policy in NSC 5817, as amended and
adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5907; directs its implementation by all appropriate
Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and
designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating
agency.
Annex F has this date been reaffirmed by the President, and in view of
its sensitivity has been transmitted only to the Secretaries of State
and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of
Central Intelligence.7
The Financial Appendix, together with Annexes A through E and Annex
G8 are also
enclosed for the information of the Council.
The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes
NSC 5817.
[Enclosure]
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA
Objectives
1. Long-Range Objective: To bring about the
unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a
free, independent, and representative government, friendly toward
the United States and other countries of the Free World, with its
political and territorial integrity assured by international
agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and
capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign
power.
2. Current U.S. Objective: Pending achievement
of the above long-range objective; to assist the Republic of Korea
to make a substantial contribution to Free World strength in the
Pacific area by:
- a.
- Encouraging the ROK in the
further development of stable democratic institutions and of
cooperative relations with the other free nations in
Asia.
- b.
- Enabling the Republic of Korea to achieve a maximum rate
of economic development compatible with a reasonable degree
of stability and present levels of essential
consumption.
- c.
- Preventing more of Korea from coming under Communist
domination either by subversion or aggression.
- d.
- Maintaining ROK forces
capable of assuring internal security and, together with
U.S. forces in Korea and such outside U.S. combat and
logistic support as is readily available, capable of (1)
deterring or successfully resisting aggression from North
Korean forces alone; (2) deterring aggression by North
Korean forces together with those Chinese Communist forces
previously in North Korea and now estimated to be in the
proximity of the Korean peninsula, or conducting a
successful holding operation against these Chinese and North
Korean forces; and (3) exercising the degree of power and
range of capabilities sufficient to demonstrate throughout
Asia the continuing determination of the Republic of Korea
to oppose Communist aggression.10
- e.
- Influencing the ROK to
conduct its foreign relations in conformity with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter.
- f.
- Encouraging the conditions necessary to form, and then
participating in, a Western Pacific collective defense
arrangement, inc hiding the Philippines, Japan, the Republic
of China and the ROK,
eventually linked with ANZUS and SEATO.
[Page 574]
3. To achieve both the long-range and current objectives through
peaceful means, if possible to do so without compromising U.S.
obligations, principles, or military security.
Major Policy Guidance
4. There is little prospect of Communist agreement on any reasonable
formula for establishment of a unified democratic Korean state; but
short of unification on terms of a character which the United States
has advocated, there can be no settlement of the tensions in the
Korean area.
5. U.S. interests are deeply involved in Korea. Unless the United
States continues to provide strong political, military and economic
support to the Republic of Korea, the Communist bloc probably will
ultimately succeed in extending its control over the whole of Korea.
Such a development would undermine Free World security in the
Northeast Asia area, and (because of the symbolic importance of
Korea with respect to alliances and collective security) would be
seriously detrimental to U.S. policy of supporting peace and justice
through the United Nations and to the general struggle against
Communism throughout the Far East.
6. In the light of the above, U.S. objectives should also take into
account the importance of reducing Korean dependence on U.S.
assistance and making greater progress toward the ultimate goal of a
self-supporting economy.
7. The United Nations’ role with respect to Korea is an asset in the
struggle against Communism. The UN
provided the principal legal basis for successful resistance against
Communist aggression. Initiatives have come from the United States,
but the general support of the United Nations and the allies of the
United States is of great psychological force, both with respect to
world opinion and the attitudes of the Republic of Korea.
Strengthening the ROK
8. Pending a political settlement, and in the absence of a renewal of
hostilities, and conditioned upon satisfactory cooperation by the
ROK in carrying out its
agreements with the United States, the United States should take the
following actions:
[Page 575]
Military
9. a. Maintain in Korea U.S. armed forces with capabilities
comparable to those existing on June 30, 1959.11
b. Continue replacing equipment of U.S. forces in Korea, including
planes, with improved models of such equipment as and when required
for military reasons.
c. Continue equipping U.S. forces in Korea with modern weapons, [1 line of source text not declassified].
10. With respect to ROK forces,
continue military assistance to the Republic of Korea for support of
agreed force levels in order to carry out agreed military programs
and objectives.12
11. Continue to develop the ROK as a
military ally by:
- a.
- Developing the military capacities of the ROK military leadership.
- b.
- Cultivating the friendship of the ROK military leadership toward the United
States.
- c.
- Impressing upon the ROK
military leadership, U.S. views on Far Eastern and global
military strategy.
12. The United States should seek to maintain the support of United
Nations members for the independence and territorial integrity of
the ROK. Specifically, it should
seek to preserve the Unified Command, assure support for the Joint
Policy Declaration, and continue the military involvement of
participants in the UN Command.
Political
13. Accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line
while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the
use of other than military action.
14. Continue to strengthen the governmental and democratic
institutions of the ROK, using
UN agencies as feasible, and to
make clear to the Government of the ROK the importance with which the United States views
the strengthening of such democratic institutions.
[Page 576]
15. Seek to influence the ROK
administration and political leadership to support U.S. views on
major foreign policy issues.
16. Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual
respect and participation in multilateral activities between the
ROK and other free nations of
Asia, as a means of lessening the dependence of the ROK upon the United States for
political and moral support. Endeavor to develop a community of
interest between the ROK and Japan,
and also with the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Republic of China
through the offer of U.S. good offices, if and when it becomes
evident that such an offer would help resolve outstanding problems
and encourage joint cooperation.
Economic
17. Provide economic and technical aid to Korea to:
- a.
- Contribute to the support of ROK military forces.
- b.
- Maintain essential consumption at approximately present
levels.
- c.
- Encourage and assist the ROK
to:
- (1)
- Complete the rehabilitation of its economy.
- (2)
- Increase economically sound and diversified
agricultural and industrial production, at the maximum
rate consistent with the maintenance of a reasonable
degree of economic stability and designed to achieve an
increasing degree of self-support, emphasizing the goal
of relieving unemployment and narrowing its foreign
trade gap.
- (3)
- Make a progressively greater financial contribution to
its own development while continuing to provide support
for its military forces.
- (4)
- Develop substantially increased numbers of trained
technical, professional, administrative and managerial
personnel.
18. Seek to influence the ROK to:
- a.
- Use external assistance and its own human and material
resources more effectively.
- b.
- Adopt and implement sound economic and fiscal policies,
taking an increasingly greater responsibility for improving
fiscal management.
- c.
- Channel growth primarily into investment rather than into
further increased consumption.
- d.
- Provide for increased participation by domestic and
foreign private investment in Korean economic
development.
- e.
- Stimulate and develop economic self-help measures,
particularly in rural areas.
- f.
- Develop a sense of greater responsibility for its own
economic future and a lessened reliance on the United
States.
19. Encourage the ROK to take the
necessary steps toward normal commercial relations with other Free
World countries, particularly Japan.
[Page 577]
The Korean Armistice
20. In accordance with the U.S. statement issued June 21, 1957 (Annex
G), continue to observe and support the Korean Armistice Agreement,
and to this end:
- a.
- Establish through adequate evidence, the nature and scope
of any violations of the Armistice Agreement by the
Communist side, especially with respect to Article 13(D).
Continue to publicize to the maximum extent feasible the
fact that the Communists, with the connivance of the
Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, have violated provisions of the Armistice
Agreement since its inception.
- b.
- Take further action as necessary to deal with the
situation caused by Communist violations of the Armistice
when the United States determines:
- (1)
- That the UN Command
is at a significant disadvantage because of such
violations, and
- (2)
- That the advantage of taking such action outweighs
the military and political disadvantages thereof,
including the possible non-agreement of the UNC allies to such a
course. Prior agreement of our UNC allies for this
action should be sought, but they should not be
given a veto on U.S. action.
- c.
- In the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against
U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or
vessels outside Communist territory; take action in
accordance with paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5.13
21. If Communist forces renew hostilities in Korea, the United States
should:
- a.
- Implement the U.S.-ROK
Mutual Defense Treaty.14
- b.
- Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration14by calling upon the
signatories to carry out the commitment that “if there is a
renewal or the armed attack, challenging again the
principles of the United Nations, we should again be united
and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of
the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it
would not be possible to confine hostilities within the
frontiers of Korea.”
- c.
- Counter any argument designed to establish that a failure
of the Unified Command “fully and faithfully to carry out”
and “scrupulously observe” the Armistice Agreement has
relieved the subscribers to the Joint Policy Declaration of
any obligation under the Declaration.
- d.
- If Communist Chinese military power participates in or
supports a Communist renewal of Korean hostilities, take
direct military action against such participating or
supporting power, wherever located, [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] to
achieve U.S. objectives. In such operations make clear our
intent to limit Korean hostilities and seek to avoid
provoking or inviting Soviet intervention. In addition:
- (1)
- Clarify to all, the necessity of direct military
action against Communist China as the only feasible
way of honoring our collective security commitments
to the UN and our
security commitments to the ROK.
- (2)
- Call on other UN
members for effective military assistance
appropriate to direct military action against
Communist China.
22. The United States should seek to ensure that the ROK does not unilaterally renew
hostilities, by:
- a.
- Continuing to persuade the ROK to maintain its forces under the UN Command while that Command
has responsibilities for the defense of Korea.
- b.
- Continuing to make clear to ROK leaders, where circumstances necessitate,
that it the ROK unilaterally
initiates military operations against Chinese or North
Korean forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, then:
- (1)
- UN Command ground,
sea, and air forces will not support such operations
directly or indirectly.
- (2)
- The United States will not furnish any military or
logistic support for such operations.
- (3)
- All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease
immediately.
- (4)
- The UN Commander
will take any action necessary to prevent his forces
becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and
to provide for their security.
- c.
- Making UN Command plans and
dispositions which will reinforce the statements made to
ROK leaders under b
above and manifest U.S. determination to carry them out, in
so far as this is consistent with sound military deployments
to cope with a Communist attack.
23. In anticipation of the possibility that President
Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities
by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the Demilitarized
Zone, despite all the actions taken by the United States under the
preceding paragraph, the United States should take the measures
stated in Annex F (not reproduced herein; circulated only to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence).
24. If, despite the actions taken under Annex F, ROK forces should renew hostilities
unilaterally, the United States should consider that such renewal
terminated the U.S.-ROK Mutual
Defense Treaty and should take such steps as may be determined at
that time to be necessary to protect U.S. security interests.
[Page 579]
Unification of Korea
25. In order to achieve a unified Korea under an independent and
representative government friendly toward the United States,
established through the holding of genuinely free elections under
UN supervision for representation
in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct
proportion to the indigenous population in Korea, the United States
should be prepared to:
- a.
- Engage in political negotiations between the Communists
and the UN side (with the
ROK associated with the
latter), if it appears such negotiations would be
productive.
- b.
- Conclude arrangements with the Communists and such other
nations as are concerned, to guarantee the political and
territorial integrity of a unified Korea.
- c.
- Accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for
internal security and capable of strong resistance in event
of attack by a foreign power.
- d.
- Forego all rights granted to the United States under the
U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty, and refrain from stationing U.S. forces and
maintaining U.S. bases in Korea, provided no other foreign
country is granted such rights or maintains such forces and
bases.
26. Any such agreement should not preclude the provision of U.S.
economic and military assistance to Korea.
North Korea
27. Make clear that the United States does not regard the North
Korean regime as a legitimate regime.
28. Encourage the non-Communist states and the UN to continue to refuse to recognize the North Korean
regime, and to treat it as a non-legitimate regime condemned for
aggression and discourage any non-Communist political or economic
intercourse with North Korea.
29. Encourage the people of North Korea to oppose the Communist North
Korean regime and to sympathize with the Republic of Korea.
