NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 375th Council meeting on August
7, 1958, adopted the revisions to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the statement
of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5702/2, subject to the amendments thereto which are set
forth in NSC Action No. 1960–b.
Noted the President’s authorization that deliveries of equipment such as
jet aircraft to ROK forces could now be
made so long as they are consistent with the above amendment to
subparagraph 10–a of NSC 5702/2 [NSC Action No. 1960–b].4
The above action, as approved this date by the President, is being
transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.
The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes
NSC 5702/2.
[Enclosure]
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA
Objectives
1. Long-Range Objective: To bring about the
unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a
free, independent, and representative government, friendly toward
the United States and other territorial integrity assured by
international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for
internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of
attack by a foreign power.
2. Current U.S. Objective: Pending achievement
of the above long-range objective; to assist the Republic of Korea
to make a substantial contribution to Free World strength in the
Pacific area by:
- a.
- Encouraging the ROK in the
further development of stable democratic institutions and of
cooperative relations with the other free nations in
Asia.
- b.
- Enabling the Republic of Korea to achieve a maximum rate
of economic development compatible with a reasonable degree
of stability and present levels of essential
consumption.
- c.
- Preventing more of Korea from coming under Communist
domination either by subversion or aggression.
- d.
- Maintaining ROK forces
capable of assuring internal security, and, together with
U.S. forces in Korea, capable of (1) deterring or
successfully resisting aggression from the North Korean
forces alone, and (2) deterring aggression by North Korean
and Chinese Communist forces now estimated to be in North
Korea, or, with limited U.S. outside support, conducting a
successful holding operation against such forces.7
- e.
- Influencing the ROK to
conduct its foreign relations in conformity with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter.
- f.
- Encouraging the conditions necessary to form, and then
participating in, a Western Pacific collective defense
arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic
of China and the ROK,
eventually linked with ANZUS and SEATO.
3. To achieve both the long-range and current objectives through
peaceful means, if possible to do so without compromising U.S.
obligations, principles, or military security.
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Major Policy Guidance
4. There is little prospect of Communist agreement on any reasonable
formula for establishment of a unified democratic Korean state; but
short of unification on terms of a character which the United States
has advocated, there can be no settlement of the tensions in the
Korean area.
5. U.S. interests are deeply involved in Korea. Unless the United
States continues to provide strong political, military and economic
support to the Republic of Korea, the Communist bloc probably will
ultimately succeed in extending its control over the whole of Korea.
Such a development would undermine Free World security in the
Northeast Asia area, and (because of the symbolic importance of
Korea with respect to alliances and collective security) would be
seriously detrimental to U.S. policy of supporting peace and justice
through the United Nations and to the general struggle against
Communism throughout the Far East.
6. In the light of the above, U.S. objectives should also take into
account the importance of reducing Korean dependence on U.S.
assistance and making greater progress toward the ultimate goal of a
self-supporting economy.
7. The United Nations’ role with respect to Korea is an asset in the
struggle against Communism. The UN
provided the principal legal basis for successful resistance against
Communist aggression. Initiatives have come from the United States,
but the general support of the United Nations and the allies of the
United States is of great psychological force, both with respect to
world opinion and the attitudes of the Republic of Korea.
8. Pending a political settlement, and in the absence of a renewal of
hostilities, and conditioned upon satisfactory cooperation by the
ROK in carrying out its
agreements with the United States, the United States should take the
following actions:
Military
9. a. Through the period FY 1959
continue to deploy in Korea a minimum of two U.S. infantry
divisions, and U.S. Air Force units, rotating on a continuing basis,
with an over-all capability at least as great as the capability of
the U.S. fighter-bomber wing on station in Korea throughout FY 1958, together with necessary support
forces; and complete as practicable the deployment of one U.S. Air
Force tactical missile unit.
b. Continue replacing equipment of U.S. forces in Korea, including
planes, with improved models of such equipment as and when required
for military reasons.
c. Continue equipping U.S. forces in Korea with modern weapons, [1 line of source text not declassified].
[Page 487]
10. With respect to ROK forces:
- a.
- Continue to seek formalization of the agreement to reduce
the ROK forces to an
over-all authorized and actual ceiling of 630,000. Whether
or not such an agreement is formalized, assist in supporting
ROK forces up to this
personnel strength through CY
1959, with individual service components as follows: The
ROK Army not to exceed
18 active and 10 reserve divisions; the ROK Navy at a level of
approximately 60 combatant vessels and one Marine division;
the ROK Air Force at a level
of 10 air squadrons, including 6 jet fighter-bomber
squadrons.
- b.
- Plan during FY 1959 for
gradual further reduction in the ROK Army forces as soon as practicable. Such
planning would take account of the international and the
enemy situation, the effect of the initial reductions, the
effect on the ROK economy,
the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea, and the over-all
level of U.S. military assistance programs worldwide.
- c.
- Continue military assistance to the Republic of Korea to
carry out these military programs and objectives.
11. Continue to develop the ROK as a
military ally by:
- a.
- Developing the military capacities of the ROK military leadership.
- b.
- Cultivating the friendship of the ROK military leadership toward the United
States.
- c.
- Impressing upon the ROK
military leadership, U.S. views on Far Eastern and global
military strategy.
12. The United States should seek to maintain the support of United
Nations members for the independence and territorial integrity of
the ROK. Specifically, it should
seek to preserve the Unified Command, assure support for the Joint
Policy Declaration, and continue the military involvement of
participants in the UN Command.
Political
13. Accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line
while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the
use of other than military action.
14. Continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions
of the ROK, using UN agencies as feasible.
15. Seek to influence the ROK
administration and political leadership to support U.S. views on
major foreign policy issues.
16. Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual
respect and participation in multilateral activities between the
ROK and other free nations of
Asia, as a means of lessening the dependence of the ROK upon the United States for
political and moral support. Endeavor to develop a community of
interest between the ROK and Japan,
and also with the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Republic of China
through the offer of U.S. good offices, if and when it becomes
evident that such
[Page 488]
an offer
would help resolve outstanding problems and encourage joint
cooperation.
Economic
17. Provide economic and technical aid to Korea to:
- a.
- Contribute to the support of ROK military forces.
- b.
- Maintain essential consumption at approximately present
levels.
- c.
- Encourage and assist the ROK to:
- (1)
- Complete the rehabilitation of its economy.
- (2)
- Increase economically sound and diversified
agricultural and industrial production, at the
maximum rate consistent with the maintenance of a
reasonable degree of economic stability and designed
to achieve an increasing degree of self-support,
emphasizing the goal of relieving unemployment and
narrowing its foreign trade gap.
- (3)
- Make a progressively greater financial
contribution to its own development while continuing
to provide support for its military forces.
- (4)
- Develop substantially increased numbers of trained
technical, professional, administrative and
managerial personnel.
18. Seek to influence the ROK to:
- a.
- Use external assistance and its own human and material
resources more effectively.
- b.
- Adopt and implement sound economic and fiscal policies,
taking an increasingly greater responsibility for improving
fiscal management.
- c.
- Channel growth primarily into investment rather than into
further increased consumption.
- d.
- Provide for increased participation by domestic and
foreign private investment in Korean economic
development.
- e.
- Stimulate and develop economic self-help measures,
particularly in rural areas.
- f.
- Develop a sense of greater responsibility for its own
economic future and a lessened reliance on the United
States.
19. Encourage the ROK to take the
necessary steps toward normal commercial relations with other Free
World countries, particularly Japan.
The Korean Armistice
20. In accordance with the U.S. statement issued June 21, 1957 (Annex
G), continue to observe and support the Korean Armistice Agreement,
and to this end:
- a.
- Establish through adequate evidence, the nature and scope
of any violations of the Armistice Agreement by the
Communist side, especially with respect to Article 13 (D).
Continue to publicize to the maximum extent feasible the
fact that the Communists, with the connivance of the
Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
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Commission, have
violated provisions of the Armistice Agreement since its
inception.
- b.
- Take further action as necessary to deal with the
situation caused by Communist violations of the Armistice
when the United States determines:
- (1)
- That the UN Command
is at a significant disadvantage because of such
violations, and
- (2)
- That the advantage of taking; such action
outweighs the military and political disadvantages
thereof, including the possible non-agreement of the
UNC allies to such
a course. Prior agreement of our UNC allies for this
action should be sought, but they should not be
given a veto on U.S. action.
- c.
- In the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against
U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or
vessels outside Communist territory; take action in
accordance with paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5.8
21. If Communist forces renew hostilities in Korea, the United States
should:
- a.
- Implement the U.S.-ROK
Mutual Defense Treaty.
- b.
- Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the
signatories to carry out the commitment that “if there is a
renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the
principles of the United Nations, we should again be united
and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of
the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it
would not be possible to confine hostilities within the
frontiers of Korea.
- c.
- Counter any argument designed to establish that a failure
of the Unified Command “fully and faithfully to carry out”
and “scrupulously observe” the Armistice Agreement has
relieved the subscribers to the Joint Policy Declaration of
any obligation under the Declaration.
- d.
- If Communist Chinese military power participates in or
supports a Communist renewal of Korean hostilities, take
direct military action against such participating or
supporting power, wherever located, [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] to
achieve U.S. objectives. In such operations make clear our
intent to limit Korean hostilities and seek to avoid
provoking or inviting Soviet intervention. In addition:
- (1)
- Clarify to all, the necessity of direct military
action against Communist China as the only feasible
way of honoring our collective security commitments
to the UN and our
security commitments to the ROK.
- (2)
- Call on other UN
members for effective military assistance
appropriate to direct military action against
Communist China.
22. The United States should seek to ensure that the ROK does not unilaterally renew
hostilities, by:
- a.
- Continuing to persuade the ROK to maintain its forces under the UN Command while that Command
has responsibilities for the defense of Korea.
- b.
- Continuing to make clear to ROK leaders, where circumstances necessitate,
that if the ROK unilaterally
initiates military operations against Chinese or North
Korean forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, then:
- (1)
- UN Command ground,
sea, and air forces will not support such operations
directly or indirectly.
- (2)
- The United States will not furnish any military or
logistic support for such operations.
- (3)
- All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease
immediately.
- (4)
- The UN Commander
will take any action necessary to prevent his forces
becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and
to provide for their security.
- c.
- Making UN Command plans and
dispositions which will reinforce the statements made to
ROK leaders under b
above and manifest U.S. determination to carry them out, in
so far as this is consistent with sound military deployments
to cope with a Communist attack.
23. In anticipation of the possibility that President
Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities
by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the Demilitarized
Zone, despite all the actions taken by the United States under the
preceding paragraph, the United States should take the measures
stated in Annex F (not reproduced herein; circulated only to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence).
24. If, despite the actions taken under Annex F, ROK forces should renew hostilities
unilaterally, the United States should consider:
- a.
- Stopping all economic and military assistance to
Korea.
- b.
- Discontinuing all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.
- c.
- Taking such other military measures as seem feasible and
consistent with the security and capability of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action.
- d.
- Evacuating UN
civilians.
- e.
- Notifying the United Nations and the Communists that the
UN Command will
disassociate itself from the ROK action, but will defend UN Command forces against any
Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist
counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UN Command forces, to undertake
such military action as may be necessary for the security of
UN Command forces.
- f.
- Renewing hostilities with the Communists only if necessary
to protect the security of UN
Command forces.
- g.
- Promptly seeking to obtain the support of the other
members of the UN Command;
and, as appropriate, informing the UN of the actions taken by the UN Command under UN authority to prevent or limit
hostilities, and requesting consideration of the situation
by the United Nations General Assembly, under the Uniting
for Peace procedure if the Assembly is not otherwise in
session.
Unification of Korea
25. In order to achieve a unified Korea under an independent and
representative government friendly toward the United States,
[Page 491]
established through the
holding of genuinely free elections under UN supervision for representation in the National
Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to
the indigenous population in Korea, the United States should be
prepared to:
- a.
- Engage in political negotiations between the Communists
and the UN side (with the
ROK associated with the
latter), if it appears such negotiations would be
productive.
- b.
- Conclude arrangements with the Communists and such other
nations as are concerned, to guarantee the political and
territorial integrity of a unified Korea.
- c.
- Accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for
internal security and capable of strong resistance in event
of attack by a foreign power.
- d.
- Forego all rights granted to the United States under the
U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty, and refrain from stationing U.S. forces and
maintaining U.S. bases in Korea, provided no other foreign country is granted such
rights or maintains such forces and bases.
26. Any such agreement should not preclude the provision of U.S.
economic and military assistance to Korea.
North Korea
27. Make clear that the United States does not regard the North
Korean regime as a legitimate regime.
28. Encourage the non-Communist states and the UN to continue to refuse to recognize the North Korean
regime, and to treat it as a non-legitimate regime condemned for
aggression and discourage any non-Communist political or economic
intercourse with North Korea.
29. Encourage the people of North Korea to oppose the Communist North
Korean regime and to sympathize with the Republic of Korea.
