Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

277. Memorandum of Discussion at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, June 25, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5817;¹OCB Report on NSC 5817, dated April 29, 1959;²NSC Action No. 2083;³ Memos for NSC, same subject, dated June 17,⁴ 23⁵ and 24,⁶ 1959)

Mr. Gray gave the background of the proposed revisions of our current statement of U.S. policy toward Korea. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)⁷

He then invited the Council’s attention to the first suggested revision in Paragraph 2–d reading as follows:

“Maintaining ROK forces capable of assuring internal security and, together with U.S. forces in Korea and such outside U.S. combat and logistic support as is readily available, capable of (1) deterring or successfully resisting aggression from North Korean forces alone, and (2) deterring aggression by North Korean forces together with those Chinese Communist forces previously in North Korea and now estimated to be in the proximity of the Korean peninsula, or, conducting a successful holding operation against these Chinese and North Korean forces [, and (3) exercising the degree of power, determination, and range of capabilities which have served since the Korean Armistice Agreement in effectively contributing to the peace in Asia.]*#⁸

“*The U.S. and ROK forces envisaged above would need immediate and substantial U.S. military assistance to resist successfully a major Chinese Communist-North Korean attack if additional Chinese reinforcements available from Manchuria and Northeast China were moved into Korea.

“#State proposal.”

Mr. Gray explained that it seemed to him and some members of the Planning Board that the bracketed language proposed by the Department of State actually constituted a new mission for the ROK forces. He then asked Secretary Herter to speak to the proposed additional language.

Secretary Herter explained that the language in the brackets, proposed by the State Department, had been very carefully discussed with Secretary Robertson who felt strongly that the ROK forces should continue to have military capabilities of a character that would give confidence to the rest of Free Asia that we mean business. Therefore, the State Department did not feel that the ROK military capabilities should be reduced. While Secretary Herter said he did not object to the deletion of the word “determination” from the State proposal, he felt that the rest of the language was significant and should be included in the revised Paragraph 2–d.

Secretary McElroy pointed out in the first instance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their written comments upon this paper, supported the State Department proposal. The Department of Defense on the other hand did not support the inclusion of the State proposal because it seemed to Defense that there was implicit in the State language a directive that the present force levels of the ROK armed forces should be continued. To continue these forces at their present level might or might not be what this Government would actually want to do in the future. There was also the suggestion, continued Secretary McElroy, that these ROK forces might be used outside of the territory of the Republic of Korea.

Secretary Herter intervened to state that no such implication was intended by the State proposal.

Secretary McElroy also stated that the Defense Department held very strong views on the proposed revision of Paragraph 10 also bearing on ROK force levels. Secretary McElroy said that it seemed to Defense that there was no need to determine at this precise time whether the ROK forces should be maintained at their current level or whether the level should be decreased in Calendar Year 1960. He thought it would be wiser to let this question be decided later in the light of the circumstances.

Mr. Gray suggested that inasmuch as Secretary McElroy had not referred to Paragraph 10, it might be sensible for the Council to consider this paragraph. He read the paragraph as follows:

“With respect to ROK forces:

• “a. Continue military assistance to the Republic of Korea for support of agreed force levels in order to carry out agreed military programs and objectives.*
• “b. [Initiate arrangements to reduce the strength of the ROK Army during CY 1960 to not exceed 16 active divisions and]**⁹ in conjunction with an equipment and modernization program, plan for a gradual further reduction in the ROK armed forces as soon as practicable. Such planning should take account of the international and the enemy situation, the effect of initial reductions, the effect on the ROK economy, modernization of U.S. forces in Korea and the over-all level of U.S. military assistance programs world-wide.

“*During FY 1959 the authorized strength of ROK forces was reduced from 720 thousand to 630 thousand as a result of an agreement reached after nearly two years of long and difficult negotiations with President Rhee. Through CY 1959 the United States is committed to assist in supporting ROK forces up to a personnel strength of 630,000, with individual service components as follows: The ROK Army not to exceed 18 active and 10 reserve divisions; the ROK Navy at a level of approximately 60 combatant vessels and one Marine division; the ROK Air Force at a level of 10 air squadrons, including 6 jet fighter-bomber squadrons.

“** Treasury–OCDM Budget proposal.”

After explaining what appeared to him to be the alternatives of the proposed revision of Paragraph 10, Mr. Gray again solicited the views of Secretary McElroy. Secretary McElroy said that the Department of Defense was favorably disposed to Paragraph 10, provided the bracketed language in sub-paragraph b, proposed by Treasury, Budget and OCDM, were deleted. The size of the ROK forces in the future, said Secretary McElroy, would depend on financial resources available to us and on various other factors which were not determinable. The Defense Department felt that it was necessary to retain some flexibility in dealing with this problem even though it was quite prepared to state the general desire of the U.S. to reduce ROK force levels when such a reduction appeared to be practicable.

Mr. Gray then referred the Council to the comments of the Defense Department on the Financial Appendix which accompanied the proposed new revisions in NSC 5817. He cited particularly the Defense comment that “in view of reduced Military Assistance Program resources and the prospect of still further reductions, fiscal limitations have become an increasingly significant determinate of country programs. Korea has had to share in these overall reductions and the Korean program must now generally conform to an order-of-magnitude dollar limitation as well as support MAP force objectives.” In short, said Mr. Gray, the Defense Department acknowledged that the problem of modernization was a world-wide problem. Modernization furthermore would be costly and would have to be applied to smaller forces than at present existed unless more funds for modernization became available than could now be foreseen.

Admiral Burke, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained the excruciating difficulties which had been involved in inducing the ROK Government to reduce its armed forces to the current level of 18 divisions and 630,000 men. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that this level of forces was required by the situation in Korea and that if we put more heavy pressure on the ROK Government, we would involve ourselves in a serious political problem without being able to achieve the desired reduction. While Admiral Burke pointed out that most of the 18 ROK divisions were 9 per cent under strength, he admitted that the cost of modernization was heavy and that we would therefore be obliged to modernize ROK forces only to the degree that we could afford to do so and had the financing available. All in all, Admiral Burke concluded that it was best to leave the force levels as they were.

Agreeing with Admiral Burke, Secretary McElroy pointed out that we had a certain amount of money available with which to pay for personnel in the ROK armed forces or to modernize the ROK forces. Such funds as we have must be divided between these two requirements.

Secretary Herter warned that if we did proceed now to cut the ROK force levels, we would automatically increase the already serious unemployment situation in the ROK. Putting soldiers into the army was perhaps the least expensive way to deal with South Korean unemployment.

The President speculated as to whether we were not tacitly assuming that the North Korean armed forces were going to be armed with the very latest weapons. The President doubted that this would be the case. Moreover, in general, the President said, he found it hard to reconcile the policy suggested by the bracketed portion of Paragraph 2–d and the directive in Paragraph 10–b. The language in Paragraph 2–d plainly suggested no reduction in the ROK force levels whereas the language in Paragraph 10–b clearly looked forward to a gradual further reduction in ROK armed forces. These seemed to the President contradictory policy concepts.

Admiral Burke said that this was precisely why the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed that the whole of Paragraph 10–b should be deleted.

The Director of the Budget stated that of course he realized the military and political difficulties involved in any further effort to reduce the size of the ROK armed forces. Nevertheless, Mr. Stans felt that he should point out that our policy on this subject, adopted in 1957, had called for an effort to reduce the ROK divisions to 16 active divisions. We had failed to achieve this objective and moreover we had proceeded to modernize not only our own U.S. forces in Korea but also some of the ROK forces. We were now accordingly faced with a grave financial problem. Apropos of this problem Mr. Stans cited the recommendation in the Interim Report of the so-called Draper Committee¹⁰ that the number of ROK divisions should be reduced to 12 although Mr. Stans pointed out also that the Draper Committee recommendations called for greater modernization of the ROK divisions. All the same, Mr. Stans insisted that it took less money to modernize 12 divisions than it did to modernize 16 or 18. He therefore expressed the belief that the revised paragraph should contain a clear directive for further gradual reduction in the level of ROK forces.

The President disagreed with Mr. Stans and explained that it seemed better to him that we should keep the ROK forces at their present level of 630,000 men, proceeding to provide what modernization for these forces we could afford to provide. Such modernization did not necessarily mean that we would have to provide these ROK divisions with all the latest weapons. We would simply provide what we could afford. If we thus kept the ROK forces at their present level of strength, we would not have to face the new problem of perhaps another 100,000 unemployed men in South Korea. The President expressed his view that he did not want the ROK forces to deteriorate in their capabilities and that therefore some modernization was indicated. This did not alter the fact, according to the President, that it was our own U.S. forces deployed in Korea that should be the main focus of modernization.

In response to the President’s comment on the apparent conflict between the directive in the last part of Paragraph 2–d and the directive in Paragraph 10 with respect to ROK force levels, Secretary Herter said he was obliged to concede that the language proposed by the State Department in Paragraph 2–d was probably not much more than a pious hope.

Mr. Gray suggested a revision in the State proposal in Paragraph 2–d which both Secretary Herter and Admiral Burke said would be satisfactory. The Council appeared to agree with this revised proposal.

Thereupon the President suggested the deletion of all of Paragraph 10–b as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President explained that while our best plan was ultimately achieving a gradual reduction in ROK force levels, this goal was not feasible in the immediate future. Furthermore, the President expressed irritation at having a large number of staff people in the Pentagon making plans which no one really believed were going to be carried out in the near future. In the President’s view there were just too many staff people in Washington making too many staff plans.

The Vice President expressed the opinion that the level and character of the ROK armed forces was essentially a psychological problem applying not only to South Korea but to all of Free Asia. The Vice President asked which meant the most to the ROK Government and the governments of the other Free Asian states–men or modernization? The general answer to the Vice President was that the size of the forces was thought to have greater significance than their degree of modernization. If that were the case, continued the Vice President, could we not cut back on the resources we applied to modernization to a point where it would cost us no more overall than as if we had cut back the force levels to 16 divisions? After all, it was clearly U.S. military power in Korea that was going to be really decisive if the issue were ever joined with the Communists.

Admiral Burke observed that he was inclined to agree with the Vice President’s view. Most of the savings that we could anticipate making would come from the equipment item. The pay and food cost for personnel in the ROK armed forces was relatively not very high.

Secretary McElroy said he wished to make it quite clear that we were not doing very much that could be described as rapid modernization of the ROK forces. In point of fact, most of the new equipment we gave them consisted of replacements for worn-out equipment.

Mr. Stans inquired whether he could persist in making one more reference to the recommendations of the Draper Committee with respect to Korea. He then referred to one of the recommendations of the Committee that we attempt to reduce tensions in Korea by reaching some kind of an agreement with the North Korean Communists which might permit a substantial reduction both in the North Korean and in the ROK force levels. Mr. Stans went on to urge that the National Security Council suspend action on revising NSC 5817 until the Planning Board had had an opportunity to consider this and the other recommendations regarding South Korea made in the Interim Report of the Draper Committee. Under Secretary Scribner explained that except for the bracketed portion which was new all the rest of Paragraph 10–b was already in NSC 5817. The Treasury Department felt that if we eliminated all of Paragraph 10–b, we would in point of fact be changing the whole direction of our policy with respect to gradual reduction of ROK forces. If Paragraph 10–b were omitted, we would not only plan no further reductions, we might indeed even find ourselves shifting to plans for increasing the level of ROK forces. This, at any rate, seemed the implication of deleting Paragraph 10–b entirely.

With respect to Secretary Scribner’s views, the President said he felt compelled to point out one important aspect of the matter. It seemed clear to him that we could not consider the Republic of Korea in a vacuum. It had to be considered in the context of the world situation. To illustrate his point, the President read a portion of a cable just received this morning on the most recent discussion between Averell Harriman and Khrushchev. Harriman had written that this interview was positively terrifying and that Khrushchev had seemed to him an even more dangerous enemy than Stalin. Khrushchev had talked threateningly about what he would do if hostilities arose about Berlin or about Formosa. He boasted that the Soviet Union had an effective ICBM while the U.S. did not. He had also boasted that he had given rockets to Communist China which could effectively destroy the power of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. This kind of intelligence meant to the President that we could not sit down and coolly calculate whether the ROK was to have 16 or 19 divisions without regard to other situations in the world. The President strongly emphasized his view that the U.S. could not afford to be weak anywhere. The U.S. could not retreat piece-meal here and there. If it did the end of the process would be a “Fortress America” position. The President insisted that he was not arguing that it was necessarily wrong to reduce ROK forces but he did insist that there was a real danger that the U.S. would display weakness in too many critical places in the world. While, said the President, he realized that we were trying to match the Soviets in missiles, we could not afford to let ourselves become weak in other areas of the struggle with the Russians.

Mr. Stans said that despite the President’s view, he felt that it would be desirable for the paper to state the objective of reducing ROK forces as soon as such a course of action became practicable.

The President inquired of Mr. Gray whether or not the Planning Board had made a study of the Interim Report of the Draper Committee. Mr. Gray replied that the Planning Board had not considered the Draper Committee Interim Report as such although the views of the Draper Committee’s report with respect to Korea had been taken into account by the Planning Board in presenting these proposals for a revision of NSC 5817.

The Vice President observed that it was extremely difficult to get any real feel of the Asian complex without actually visiting Asia. This was Secretary Robertson’s view. The Vice President went on to say that the primary concern in the problem under discussion was not so much the military effects but the political and psychological effects of a further reduction of the ROK forces. The impact of such a reduction would strike not only South Korea but all of Free Asia.

At this point Secretary McElroy asked the President if General Lemnitzer could speak to the problem. General Lemnitzer described the extreme difficulty of negotiating the last reduction in the level of the ROK armed forces. He went on to say that he had not personally studied the conclusions and recommendations of the Draper Committee with respect to the Republic of Korea but he felt that any deal with the Communists involving mutual reduction and withdrawal of forces would have no basis in fact. The Communists have repeatedly broken all their promises and in General Lemnitzer’s view it was impossible to make a deal with them as the Draper recommendations alluded to by Mr. Stans appeared to recommend. Likewise General Lemnitzer expressed himself as strongly opposed to any further reduction in the level of the ROK forces. Actually, he argued, we got more for our dollar in terms of ROK soldiers than we got for our dollar anywhere else in the world. He said he felt very strongly on this point. He also added that actually there was very little going on in the way of modernization of the ROK forces as we in the U.S. understood the term modernization as applied to our own forces. The ROK forces mostly got military equipment that was being phased out of our own Army. The ROK forces were austere in their equipment and in every respect.

The President inquired whether the ROK forces had “47” tanks. General Lemnitzer replied that tanks of this type were being moved in. The President then asked that when one calculated our military assistance to Korea and provided such items as these old tanks, what do we charge for such items? General Lemnitzer answered that the cost was based on a reduced price derived from a formula worked out in the Department of Defense.

General Lemnitzer then resumed his statement by emphasizing the need of all the ROK forces now authorized in order to protect a frontier of 155 miles in length between North and South Korea. General Decker had stated that this number was essential to frustrate the constant efforts of the North Koreans to infiltrate South Korea and subvert the ROK.

Mr. Stans, with a smile, asked the President’s indulgence if he read one more sentence from the Interim Report of the Draper Committee. He read a sentence of which the essence was that the time had come to reduce the drain both on ROK and U.S. resources. He again added his previous recommendations that the Planning Board should be directed to study the Draper Committee Report insofar as it related to Korea.

The President stated that if it was the mature military judgment that we need the number of ROK forces that we now have to hold the line in South Korea, he could think of nothing more costly than to proceed to cut the ROK force levels. Let us not, said the President, make mistakes in a hurry. Just because things at the moment are quiet on the Korean front did not mean that they would remain so. While the President said he was all for having the Planning Board proceed to study the Draper Committee Report, he would prefer now to follow the line of policy provided in General Lemnitzer’s statement in favor of maintaining the status quo in the ROK force levels and modernizing these ROK divisions with phased-out U.S. equipment.

(The Vice President left the meeting at 10:05 a.m.)

Mr. McCone observed that he was around Washington in 1949 and 1950 when we pulled most of our forces out of Korea with the well-known results. This, he feared, could happen again. He thought that the ROK soldier was pretty cheap in terms of what we were actually buying with him, and he expressed himself as well impressed by General Lemnitzer’s views.

Mr. Gray then stated that Paragraph 10–b would be deleted and that the NSC Planning Board would proceed to study those sections of the Draper Report relating to Korea.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council’s attention to the proposed new Paragraph 9–a reading as follows:

“Continue to deploy in Korea a minimum of two U.S. infantry divisions, one U.S. Army missile command, one U.S. Air Force tactical missile unit, and U.S. Air Force units, rotating on a continuing basis, with an over-all capability at least as great as the capability of the U.S. fighter-bomber wing on station in Korea throughout FY 1958, together with necessary support forces.”

The President studied the text of Paragraph 9–a for a moment and then asked whether the military people present really liked to see so much tactical detail in a general policy statement. Secretary McElroy replied that in general our military people disapproved of paragraphs going into such detail as Paragraph 9–a but since something like this paragraph was already in NSC 5817, the Defense Department had thought it would be unwise to seek its removal. Admittedly, inclusion of this paragraph would make it harder to change the types of units which the U.S. would deploy in Korea and would in general tend to much rigidity. Still, in this instance, Defense thought it best to have the paragraph included. Secretary Herter commented that if the paragraph remained in the paper, its punctuation should be cleaned up. Attorney General Rogers thought that the paragraph could be eliminated and a footnote in explanation inserted. The President, however, suggested new and more general language for Paragraph 9–a which met with the approval of the Council.

Mr. Gray then turned to the proposed Paragraph 14 reading as follows:

“Continue to strengthen the governmental and democratic institutions of the ROK, using UN agencies as feasible, and to make clear to the Government of the ROK the importance with which the United States views the strengthening of such democratic institutions.”

The President immediately commented that he thought he saw the hand of the State Department in the phraseology in Paragraph 14. Mr. Gray, however, explained that the original source of the language was the Bureau of the Budget which had suggested originally U.S. assistance to Korea be made contingent upon the ROK Government’s strengthening democratic institutions. Secretary Herter commented that he had no objection to Paragraph 14 as now written although he would have objected to the qualification on U.S. assistance originally proposed by the Budget.

Mr. Gray then turned to the last proposed Paragraphs, 24 and 24–A.

The President, upon reviewing the new language suggested by the State Department for Paragraph 24, stated that it seemed to him that we would be asking for trouble if President Rhee were ever to learn that if he moved unilaterally against North Korea, it was U.S. policy to bail him out and defend South Korea against the inevitable Communist counter-attack. Secretary Herter likewise shared the President’s anxiety lest knowledge of this policy become an invitation to Rhee to march north unilaterally. In reply Mr. Gray pointed out that this policy guidance would be contained in an Annex with the same extremely limited distribution now given to Annex F of NSC 5817. Mr. Gray agreed that if Rhee should ever get wind of this policy, it could serve as an invitation to him to march north. Nevertheless, it seemed to be the view of the Government that we would have to undertake to protect the integrity of South Korea against Communist counter-attack even if Rhee ordered his troops to march into North Korea.

The President inquired whether in fact this would be our policy? Secretary McElroy pointed out that there were lots of other things we could do if Rhee started to march north, including throwing out the Rhee regime. The President insisted that the only hope of preventing Rhee from taking such an action would be a clear and forceful U.S. disavowal of Rhee’s action.

Both Secretary Herter and Secretary McElroy agreed with the last statement that the President had made but said that the statement did not answer the problem of what we would do in the event Rhee marched north and the result was a Communist counter-attack against the Republic of Korea. We certainly could not let the Communists take over South Korea.

The President inquired whether it was really possible, given the general loyalty of the ROK forces to the UN Command, for President Rhee to launch an attack unilaterally against North Korea. General Lemnitzerreplied that the contingency was highly unlikely. The danger of such unilateral action was more remote now than it had ever been and insisted that no major attack could be started by President Rhee without the prompt knowledge of the UN Command.

Secretary Herter then proposed a new revision of Paragraph 24–A and read it. The President commented with respect to the new proposal that if we became aware that President Rhee was moving north to attack North Korea, we would simply have to remove Rhee and his government. Such a move would simply have to be stopped. Again Secretary Herter agreed with the President but asked how we proposed to keep the Communists from counter-attacking and seizing South Korea. The President stated with emphasis that everything possible must be done to stop a unilateral South Korean move on North Korea before it started, including deposing Rhee. Thereafter, if South Korea wanted to go on to commit suicide, we would say go ahead and do it. Nevertheless, said the President, he thought this whole problem highly academic. If ever this attack on North Korea occurred, the President said that the military alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea would be broken at that moment. We would then have to decide what was necessary to do in defense of our own interests. Admiral Burke suggested that this last statement of the President’s might very well provide for a new version of Paragraph 24–A. This view was accepted and Secretary Herter also suggested a drafting change in Paragraph 24–f.

The National Security Council:¹¹

a. Discussed the draft revisions of Paragraphs 2–d, 9–a, 10, 14 and 24 of NSC 5817, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2083–b and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 17, 1959; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 23, 1959.

b. Adopted the above-mentioned revisions of NSC 5817, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Paragraph 2–d: Include the bracketed portion revised to read as follows: “, and (3) exercising the degree of power and range of capabilities sufficient to demonstrate throughout Asia the continuing determination of the Republic of Korea to oppose Communist aggression.”

(2) Paragraph 9–a: Revise and add a footnote to read as follows:

“a. Maintain in Korea U.S. armed forces with capabilities comparable to those existing on June 30, 1959.*

“*U.S. forces deployed in Korea as of June 30, 1959, consisted of two U.S. infantry divisions, one U.S. Army missile command, one U.S. Air Force tactical missile unit, and U.S. Air Force units rotating on a continuing basis with an overall capability at least as great as the capability of the U.S. fighter-bomber wing on station in Korea throughout FY 1958, together with necessary support forces.”

(3) Paragraph 10: Delete subparagraph b and the footnote thereto.

(4) Paragraph 24: Revise to read as follows:

“24. If, despite the actions taken under Annex F, ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the United States should consider that such renewal terminated the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and should take such steps as may be determined at that time to be necessary to protect U.S. security interests.”

c. Directed the NSC Planning Board to study those portions of the report by the Subcommittee for the Far East of the President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program relating to the Republic of Korea, in order to determine whether further recommendations for changes in NSC 5817 should be presented to the Council.¹²

Note: NSC 5817, as revised by b above and approved by the President, circulated as NSC 5907¹³ for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follows agenda item 3.]

S. Everett Gleason

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason.
1. Document 237.
2. See Supplement.
3. See footnote 3, Document 274.
4. On June 17 Acting Executive Secretary Gleason sent a memorandum to the members of the NSC enclosing the draft revisions of paragraphs 2–d, 9–a, 10, 14, and 24 of NSC 5817 that were prepared by the NSC Planning Board to NSC Action No. 2083–b. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5817) See Supplement.
5. On June 23 Lay circulated to the NSC the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposed revisions to NSC 5817. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5817) See Supplement.
6. On June 24 Lay circulated to the NSC the draft revision to the Financial Appendix to NSC 5817 with attached comments by the Department of Defense. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5817) See Supplement.
7. See Supplement.
8. Brackets in the source text.
9. Brackets in the source text.
10. See footnote 1. Document 268.
11. Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2102, approved by the President on July 1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
12. On July 23 Lay sent a memorandum to the NSC indicating that the Planning Board had considered this directive and responded that the report in question had been available and was considered in the preparation of the policy statement that was approved as NSC 5907. Accordingly, the Planning Board considered that no further action was required and recommended no additional changes in NSC 5907. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5907) See Supplement.
13. Document 279.