Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

263. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)⁰

Washington, January 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Return of Ambassador Dowling for Consultations

We estimate that 1959 will be a difficult year in terms of U.S.-ROK relations and U.S. interests in the Republic of Korea. The stage is being set in Korea for the 1960 Presidential election and the influence we may be able to exert is likely to have an important effect on the future course of events there. It is for this reason that I am convinced that it is highly desirable for Ambassador Dowling to return to Washington for consultations.

The Ambassador should be able personally to give us a better assessment of the situation than we can gain from telegrams and other communications. He can give us the flavor that results from first hand knowledge growing out of personal conversations with members of both the Liberal and Democratic parties as well as government people. Knowing the Korean personalities involved as well as he does, Ambassador Dowling will be able to give us the necessary additional information to enable us to build our program of coping with the problem presented by the present situation in the ROK.

Another aspect of the situation is seriously disturbing and reinforces the conviction that the Ambassador should return for consultations as soon as possible. As things are developing, there is a serious danger that the influence of the U.S. Government in Korea may decrease as a result of the National Security Law controversy. The Ambassador has already pointed out this danger. We believe the problem is even more serious than the Ambassador himself has intimated, however, and that his own position is being threatened. The identical telegrams sent to you and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Flemming, and we suspect many others, by Dr. Helen Kim¹ is but one indication that the ROK Government and the Liberal Party have initiated a campaign to undermine the Ambassador’s position (“. . . please inquire Korean Embassy for further facts . . .” which implies clearly the American Ambassador and the Embassy have not been reporting accurately to the Department).²

President Rhee has already alluded, when the Ambassador delivered the President’s message, to the tactics he has used in the past in dealing with U.S. Government officials who disagree with him (“. . . he also implied that [Ambassador]³ Muccio had connived against him by reporting falsely to Washington, and managed adroitly to hint that he had hope I would not make the same error during my tenure in Seoul . . .”).⁴ In the minds of many Koreans, Ambassador Muccio’s recall and subsequent retention in Washington for almost two years before being appointed Minister to Iceland was a direct outgrowth of the 1952 Pusan political crisis. They feel that these developments regarding Ambassador Muccio were a direct result of President Rhee’s intervention. The resignation of Ambassador Lacy is viewed similarly by a large number of Koreans.

In view of the seriousness of the period ahead with respect to U.S. interests in Korea, it is very important that President Rhee and the Korean people understand clearly the full support of the Department, and the U.S. Government generally, Ambassador Dowling and Embassy Seoul enjoy.

For the above reasons, the need to have the Ambassador’s personal assessment of the situation and the importance of reaffirming the Department’s confidence in him, I believe that for psychological and political reasons that Ambassador Dowling should return to Washington for consultations. To be most effective, I believe the Ambassador should stay in Washington for only a short period (perhaps a week) with due publicity given to the meetings he has with high level officers of the Department, and if possible with the President. It will also be important to demonstrate the firmness and unanimity of U.S. policy with respect to Korea by continuing to make it clear during the course of the year that the Ambassador has the Department’s full support.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram authorizing Ambassador Dowling, at his discretion, to return to Washington for consultations.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1–659. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis.

1. Telegram 255 to Seoul, January 2, conveyed the text of the telegram sent to Robertson on December 30 by Helen Kim:

   “Seasons greetings. Washington Post Sunday editorial shows lack of understanding of our new legal measures to combat Communist subversion makes derogatory remarks about our state and its head seemingly favoring the opposition party of our internal politics but factually hurting us all in our common struggle against Communism. Please inquire Korean Embassy for further facts and help disseminate correct information. Thanking you Helen Kim.” (Ibid., 795B.00/1–259)

2. All ellipses are in the source text.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. See Document 260
5. Not found attached. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the attachment was telegram 260 to Seoul, January 7, and that Robertson signed it. Telegram 260 summarized the reasons outlined here for recalling Dowling for consultations and left it to Dowling to decide whether and when to return. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1–759) See Supplement. Dowling returned to Washington on January 18. In telegram 276 to Seoul, January 14, the Department of State instructed that, during Dowling’s absence, dealings with the Korean Government should be confined to essential activities. “This would act support US position connection ROK National Security Law crisis and counter obvious ROK efforts demonstrate publicly that since US-ROK relations and cooperation proceeding normally, US supports LP action taken National Assembly December 24.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/1–1459) See Supplement. Dowling returned to Korea on February 18.