Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, December 27, 1958, 6 p.m.

283. My 282.¹ After some stalling by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and conversation with Vice Minister which was obviously designed to learn tone of President’s message and to convey hint that I should not burden President Rhee with recital details of recent National Assembly action, appointment was made for 10:30 this morning at Chinhae. Vice Minister accompanied me.

President Rhee received me warmly, and after reading President’s message attentively, remarked that there seemed to be impression Korea had violated democratic principles. “Is this correct,” he asked.

I replied that it was certainly correct that both substance of National Security Act amendment and manner in which it was enacted had disturbed American opinion, and that President felt impelled to bring this situation to President Rhee’s attention in friendly manner.

President Rhee then asked “what do you think I should do,” but without waiting for my reply launched into 45-minute version of 1952 events in Pusan, in which he demonstrated to his satisfaction that 1) there had been connection between his opponents and Communists and that similar connection probably existed today between Communists and DP; and 2) that foreign attempts (notably UNCURK) to intervene in Korea’s domestic affairs had been defeated, as would such attempts today. He also implied that Muccio had connived against him by reporting falsely to Washington, and managed adroitly to hint that he had some hope I would not make same error during my tenure in Seoul. In course of his summing up, he referred to reports Embassy had been “negotiating” with DP.

After President Rhee had finished speaking, I referred again to President’s message, saying it was because he valued Korea as ally that he had written. I pointed to role of public opinion in formulation and execution of US foreign policy, and said US Govt felt it incumbent to bring to attention its allies action which had adverse reaction in US, as surely our allies would not hesitate to raise US actions adversely affecting them. I went on to say that not only Embassy, but I as well, had talked to DP leaders, adding that I was prepared to say publicly anything I had said privately to DP, and indeed had frequently done so. I added that my reports to Washington would always be consonant with my obligations to my government.

Turning to events in National Assembly on Dec 24, I said that American opinion could hardly be expected to understand LP action in acting while DP members were confined to basement of building. President Rhee interrupted me, and with air of surprise asked Vice Minister if it were true DP members were under confinement–Vice Minister hesitated, hedged, and finally avoided direct answer despite reiterated questions from President Rhee and my urging. Exchange on this subject ended with President Rhee charging him with preparing full report on incident.

President Rhee then assured me he would look into matter, “and if wrong has been done, I will correct it.” He asserted his attachment to democratic principles, and conversation ended with mutual assurances of need for frank discussion between friends.

My assessment of President Rhee’s position is that he was sincerely convinced of need for amendment, and that it was a good one, having been persuaded by LP leaders (who I believe are afraid to admit to him that party is increasingly unpopular) that some connection exists between Communists and DP, whose accession to power must therefore be prevented at all costs; that he had not been given full truth re Dec 24 National Assembly events; and that I may have planted seed of doubt in his mind. Re this latter point, I am not hopeful of any useful result, however, as I fear LP leaders will be able to convince him my report of proceedings was erroneous.²

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.21/12–2758. Secret; Niact; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in two sections.
1. Telegram 282 from Seoul, December 27, reported that President Eisenhower’s message was delivered to President Rhee at Chinae that morning. (ibid.)
2. Rhee responded to Eisenhower’s letter on January 7, 1959. He stated that the exclusion of the political opposition from the Assembly Chamber during the adoption of the National Security Law had occurred because those Assembly members excluded had attempted to disrupt normal proceedings. He added that the new law would be applied in such a way as to dispel concerns about the survival of democracy in Korea. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series, Rhee 1958–1960)