Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

209. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker)⁰

Washington, January 22, 1958, 6:45 p.m.

DEF 935870. This is a joint State–Defense msg in four parts from ASD/ISA signed Sprague. Ref (A) UK 977635 CC DTG 180315Z (Dec) (B) UK 977659 CC DTG 300518Z (Dec);¹ (C) UK 977672² CC DTG 090340Z.

• Part I. Upon return Ambassador Dowling you should seek early meeting with President Rhee to present following (Part II) U.S. position developed as result Ambassador consultation Washington.³ This is final U.S. concession. Over-all strength ceiling which it establishes substantially meets request of MND expressed in Ref (A), Para 4.⁴
• Part II.

  Inform President Rhee that the authorized ROK 4 Service force level for CY 1959 will be reduced from 720,000 men to 630,000 men–a reduction of 90,000 spaces.

  Reductions in personnel so that actual strength should not exceed

  630,000 should be made where possible from units listed in Format A, FY 59 MAP submission.⁵ Deadline date for reductions is extended from 30 June 1958 to end CY 1958.

  Although DoD–State would prefer reduction of 4 active divisions and comparable elimination of support units, you are authorized to organize ROK Forces including strength adjustment within over-all ceiling (630,000) as you deem appropriate on 18 division basis.

• Part III. U.S. prepared proceed with plans and actions necessary to transfer 2nd jet wing (F86’s) when ROK agree reduce according to latest U.S. support plan.
• Part IV. Statement of U.S. position should not be made as ultimatum but as best U.S. is able to do.⁶ ROK should be advised of proposed U.S. military assistance and defense support figures for FY ‘58. If question is raised as to FY ‘59 answer Congressional appropriation has not yet been made.

0. Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Department of the Army Communication Center Files. Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACAF.
1. Regarding reference A and B telegrams, see footnote 2, Document 206.
2. , Document 206.
3. In a January 22 memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Herter and Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague, Cutler indicated that President Eisenhower had approved the draft cable to CINCUNC that afternoon. The changes that the President made involved the specification of 630,000 as the maximum actual personnel total and a modification of the language in Part IV to make it explicit that the statement of the U.S. position should not be presented to President Rhee as an ultimatum. The President also felt that the Republic of Korea should be advised as to U.S. military assistance and defense support figures, but since the estimates for FY 59 had not yet been made to Congress Cutler noted that the cable had to be drafted to indicate that such information could not yet be made available. (Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records) See Supplement.
4. In paragraph 4 of UK 977635, the Embassy reported that the Ministry of National Defense requested that the strength level of the Korean Armed Forces as of August 31, 1957, listed as 693,158, be used as the base figure against which a reduction of 60,000 would be made.
5. Not found.
6. Ambassador Dowling reported, in telegram 550 from Seoul, January 27, that he had informed President Rhee of the general tenor of the new U.S. proposal on reduction of forces, adding that he and General Decker would resume talks on the subject shortly with the Defense Minister. Dowling noted that this seemed to satisfy Rhee, although he “pointedly” made no comment on the substance of the proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56395B/1–2758) See Supplement.