Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

206. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, January 9, 1958, 12:40 p.m.

UK 977672 CC. State pass Ambassador Dowling. Joint Embassy–CINCUNC message.

1. Meeting held 8 Jan attended by Chargé d’Affaires,¹CINCUNC, MNDROK, Lt Gen Yu, Chairman, ROKJCS and General Paik, C/S ROKA. At meeting MNDROK presented U.S. Rep. with memo as follows:²

[7 paragraphs (41 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. U.S. representatives again reviewed U.S. offers to ROK to compensate for reduction in ground forces; pointed out that U.S. offer to modernize ROK communications and transport equipment and consideration of other items for inclusion ROKMAP was contingent ROK acceptance U.S. proposed reduction; also indicated possible effect on ROK economy of maintenance 40,000 which ROK consider would not be reduced; made point of U.S. investment in deterrent force and effect this force in maintenance peace in world including Korea.

3. MNDROK stated ROK position determined at highest level ROK Govt and was concurred in by both civilian and military officials. ROK Govt considers that a reduction of 100,000 should not be made at this time since it would require a reduction of at least 4 divisions to retain a balanced force which reduction cannot be justified in the light of the Communist capability in North Korea. A reduction of this magnitude would necessitate repositioning of several units and would require an expenditure of considerable money. MND stated that the additional 40,000 cut would mean only about $10 million to the ROK budget and $15 million to the U.S. budget which is an inconsequential sum for which to jeopardize the security of ROK. He indicated that he would attempt to support the additional 40,000 which ROK desires retain by austerity measures insofar as ROK budget concerned and by spreading thinner U.S. aid. MND also stated that in view of recent U.S.S.R. scientific achievements a reduction of more than 2 divisions at this time would have an adverse psychological effect on Korean people and armed forces.

4. Afternoon 8 Jan. Chargé and CINCUNC called on President Rhee. Foreign Minister and MND were present. U.S. representatives told President that before transmitting MND’s memorandum to Washington they wished to make certain that he was fully aware of U.S. commitments to compensate for reduction in ground forces; and that he understood effect on ROK economy of maintaining 18 divisions with reduced aid. U.S. offers were reviewed in detail and he was asked to reconsider ROK position. President stated that when he was informed of latest proposal (December 28) he was “upset” and distressed to think that of all countries in the world the U.S. should choose to cut its aid to Korea. He then spent the better part of an hour discussing the history of East Asia with particular reference to Japan’s infamy and depredations and presented the familiar argument that the U.S. should not help Japan to resume its position as a powerful nation. Although given opportunities to discuss details of the reduction of forces problem, the President made no specific reference to the MND’s memorandum except to say he had seen it and did not agree with it. Meaning of this statement was not clear to U.S. representatives who queried MND following meeting with President. MND said this meant President did not favor any cut in ROK forces; but that government decision supported reduction of 60,000 and MND took responsibility for this. While conversation with President took place in cordial and rational atmosphere much of it was irrelevant to issue and resulted in no commitment on his part in support of U.S. proposal. His remarks, rather, indicated that he felt that the ROK should maintain an adequate force to defend itself since the U.S. might be forced to withdraw its forces from Korea at any time depending upon the world situation.

5. ROK agreement to reduction of 60,000 requiring inactivation of not more than 2 active divisions appears firm. However, consider agreement to reduction beyond 60,000 not attainable at this time since opposed by both ROK civilian and military officials supported by President.

6. It is believed by both Chargé and CINCUNC in view present attitude all echelons ROK Government that it is unwise to press further at this time for 100,000 reduction since may result in deleterious effect on U.S.–ROK relations and may jeopardize position MND Kim who has done his utmost to support U.S. position. His removal from office because of pro U.S. attitude is possibility and would be serious blow to U.S. prestige making future dealing with ROK Government more difficult since improbable successor would be equally sympathetic U.S. position. Also consider it definite possibility if pressed too hard ROK may demand release ROK forces from UN Command.

7. In view of above it is recommendation of Chargé and CINCUNC that ROK offer of 60,000 reduction be reconsidered and accepted and that overall ceiling to be supported by U.S. during US FY 1959 be established at 660,000. Since actual strength maintained by ROK within ceiling of 720,000 was, as pointed out in DEF 933850,³ considerably below authorized, it is also probable that actual strength maintained within new ceiling would in practice be comparably smaller, thus reduction desired of 60,000 in actual strength would be approached if not actually reached.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/1–958. Secret. Also sent to the Department of the Army for OSD and ISA and repeated to CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and the Embassy in Seoul. Ambassador Dowling was in Washington for home leave and consultations.
1. T. Eliot Weil.
2. The Korean memorandum responded to memoranda transmitted to the Republic of Korea on December 16 and 28, 1957. These memoranda, both entitled “Reorganization of the ROK Armed Foreces” are in Department of State, FE/NA Files: Lot 60 D 680, Reduction of Forces (Korean). The initial Korean response to the U.S. positions in the two memoranda was summarized in UK 977635 from CINCUNC to the Department of Defense, December 18, 1957 (for text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, Part 2, pp. 527–528), and in UK 977659, December 30, 1957 (see ibid., pp. 535–536).
3. See footnote 1, Document 204.