207. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting0
[Here follow a list of 31 participants and discussion of item 1, India-Pakistan.]
2. Republic of Korea Force Level Reductions
Mr. Robertson opened the discussion by saying that he agreed with General Lemnitzer on the need to maintain the strength of forces in Korea. However, in view of the reduction of funds available for the support of the Korean Government, there is no alternative except to reduce their forces. The Government of Korea presently expends 71% of its resources on defense. There is no way in which the Korean Government can take up the burden resulting from the decreasing availability of U.S. support. The strengthening of U.S. forces in Korea by the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]1 the pentomic divisions is intended to [Page 430] offset the reduction in ROK troop levels. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the current negotiations with the Republic of Korea have been handicapped by confusion as to whether the reductions of Korean strength were to be computed on the basis of the authorized strength or the actual strength of the Korean forces.
General Lemnitzer reviewed the NSC decision of last August,2 and subsequent negotiations, and stated that in his opinion the rules of the negotiation had been changed. During the ensuing discussion there was general agreement that there had been a misunderstanding as to the reductions to be effected and that there had been no clear agreement as to the level of forces to be supported as a result of the negotiation. Mr. Robertson emphasized that either the Korean forces must be reduced or we must get additional funds.
In response to a question from Mr. Murphy, General Lemnitzer said that he considered that it would be quite risky to talk brutally frankly with the Koreans at this time. General Lemnitzer suggested that if a reduction of 61,000 had not represented an adequate reduction, then we must inform the ROK’s not what the amount of reduction must be but what troop level we will support.
Mr. Robertson emphasized that the crucial question is how much money will be saved. He pointed out that, although Korea needs economic aid, the level of assistance must be reduced. There have been suggestions that grant assistance be further curtailed and Korea be required to look to the development loan fund for its assistance. Such a suggestion flies in face of the obvious inability of the Korean Government to service such a loan. If adequate assistance is not forthcoming, inflationary forces will tear the economy apart.
It was agreed that the JCS would examine a draft Defense (ISA) message3 with which the Department is prepared to concur. This message proposes that the U.S. adopt the actual strength figures of the ROK forces, as of June 1957, as the basis for continuing negotiations with the ROK for a reduction of 60,000 men.
[Here follows discussion of items 3–6.]
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. The meeting was held at the Pentagon.↩
- A special staff note prepared in the White House on January 16, and seen by President Eisenhower, drew upon information from the Department of Defense and noted that, in addition to the introduction to Korea by the Army of the Honest John rocket and the 280 mm gun, [text not declassified] the Air Force Chief of Staff had advised the JCS of his plans to deploy to Korea the 588th Tactical Missile Group equipped with Matador missiles [text not declassified]. Deployment was scheduled to begin during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1958. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries) See Supplement.↩
- On August 8, 1957, the NSC considered and adopted NSC 5702/2, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea;” for text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, Part 2, pp. 489–500. The memorandum of discussion at the 334th NSC meeting on August 8 at which this paper was approved is ibid., pp. 480–489.↩
- Not found.↩