Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

151. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, March 27, 1960, noon.

3108. CINCPAC and HICOM for POLADs. Embtel 2879.¹ Deterioration of intra-LDP situation which followed outburst of factionalism early this month centering around treaty issue (reftel) has been noticeably arrested in past few days.

Improvement began when Ishibashi, under pressure from LDP leadership and business leaders, decided to adopt “wait and see” attitude on treaty (G–459).²Yoshida–Sato–Ikeda meeting (Embtel 2994)³ was substantial help toward unifying party ranks. Miki’s statements on return to Japan introduced welcome air of common sense into party’s handling of treaty issue (Embtels 2994, 3012).⁴ While Kono’s motives do not bear scrutiny, his support of treaty following meeting with Kishi (Embtel 3097)⁵ has at any rate removed this source of worry to government. Matsumura’s continued grumbling contrasts badly with forthright stand of colleague Miki.

As Funada told Ambassador this week, it is increasingly expected that current Diet can complete action on treaty without need for extension (Embtel 3085).⁶ Provided government confronted with no unusual problems and commits no major blunders⁷ in handling treaty from here on, Kishi and LDP should be in good condition to face major test when vote on treaty is taken in Lower House sometime after middle of April.

Throughout remainder of Diet session Kishi must also plan against difficult future problems with regard to his avowed desire to stand again for LDP presidency next January. As things look now, prospects are good that he will receive backing of all the mainstream forces, including Ikeda (Yoshida, Embtel 3077).⁸ Anti-mainstream leaders are of course seeking to force him out of office and eagerly seize on slightest indication he may be slipping (they are particularly hopeful about Kono’s rumor that Kishi may retire after treaty passes Diet–Embtel 3097). Under circumstances, Kishi must move cautiously and deftly.

One of most critical problems ahead is projected revamping of cabinet and party posts after treaty passes Diet. A cabinet and party leadership incorporating all LDP factions would demonstrate very high degree of control over party by Prime Minister. Because such a solution would also strengthen Kishi personally, it is doubtful that all of his LDP rivals will consent to participate. Result may well be that Kishi will make only minor changes in composition of cabinet and party leadership in belief that no alternative arrangement offers more practicable combination under present balance of factional forces and ambitions. Whatever he does, Kishi will be criticized by his rivals and the press as too domineering, too weak, or only interested in securing his own future. There are no signs yet that Kishi is any less confident of his ability to control the situation.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.21/3–2760. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC, HICOM, Naha, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagoya, Sapparo, Fukuoka, and COMUS/Japan.
1. Telegram 2879 from Tokyo, March 8, reported on LDP factionalism. (Ibid., 794.2/3–860)
2. Airgram G–459 from Tokyo, March 17, reported that former Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi had been trying to use the treaty issue to recover his political fortune. (Ibid., 794.00/3–1760)
3. Telegram 2994 from Tokyo, March 16, stated that although Diet debate on treaty ratification had made no progress, Miki had endorsed treaty ratification in a statement made on his return from a trip to Africa. (Ibid., 794.2/3–1660)
4. Telegram 3012 from Tokyo, March 18, reported on a meeting between Kishi and Miki during which Miki expressed support, though with some reservations, for speedy treaty ratification. (Ibid., 794.2/3–1860)
5. The reference is not clear as number 3097 was not used.
6. In telegram 3085 from Tokyo, March 24, MacArthur reported on his meeting with Funada on Japanese political alignment in relation to treaty ratification and Funada’s optimistic appraisal of the situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.2/3–2460)
7. In the early stage of Diet discussions the Japanese Government had encountered difficulties in the discussion of questions on the geographic area denoted by the term “Far East,” as well as in the debate on the power of the lower house to revise and amend treaties negotiated by the executive branch of government.
8. In telegram 3077 from Tokyo, March 24, MacArthur reported on his private meeting with Yoshida on March 23 to discuss the domestic political situation affecting treaty ratification. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.2/3–2460)