98. Telegram From the Army Attaché in Indonesia (Cole) to the Department of the Army0
CX 161. Reference: Embtel 4230.1 After discussing, in general terms, context of Deptels 3300 and 33012 with Lt. Colonel Sukendro, authorized spokesman for General Nasution, ARMA is convinced that GOI will not accept any terms involving direct or indirect negotiations with current rebel regime. This is predicated on fact that GOI is now confronted with 4 major problems which must be settled in order listed. First, GOI and army strongly believe that US could use influence to eliminate or reduce outside air and other logistical support to rebels as previously reported. This intervention by so-called “soldiers of fortune” has upset timetable for GOI plans to solve rebel problem, reorganize cabinet favorable to US, and initiation of actions to control PKI influence. Also, Sukendro states that intervention has created adverse public opinion against GOI owing to failure to properly explain matter or take positive action to stop this practice. Second, Sukendro states that GOI policy envisions crushing Menado rebels, probably before taking effective steps toward solving latter two problems. Sukendro strongly indicated that GOI was capable of quick defeat of [garble] foreign support to rebels. Otherwise, he believes this problem will be time consuming and may force GOI to accept active Soviet bloc assistance. Third, Sukendro [Page 178] emphasized that GOI plans to bring about changes in cabinet had progressed to point which would permit early completion of move. This, according to source, must be timed so as to take place concurrently or after Menado rebels are defeated, to eliminate possibility of unfavorable reaction from Indonesian public, rebels and PKI. Source realizes that PKI will react but believes GOI forces capable of handling situation. Sukendro mentioned that Sultan of Djogjakarta was definitely included in new cabinet. Fourth, Sukendro stated that army realized PKI threat and indicated that after solving first two problems and receipt of US assistance would be in position to initiate further actions to control such activities. Comment: In solving these problems, ARMA feels that if foreign assistance is eliminated, GOI could defeat Menado rebels quickly without outside assistance. Sukendro stated that assistance would be needed to ensure successful implementation of last two problems. Signed Cole.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1558. Secret; Niact. Sent to the Department of the Army for the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Air Force Chief for Intelligence and repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text.↩
- Document 97.↩
- Documents 92 and 93.↩