71. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Indonesian Problems

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands
  • Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands
  • The Secretary
  • EUR—Mr. Elbrick
  • WE— Mr. Cameron
  • Ambassador Philip Young

Following a discussion of the French-North African problem, Ambassador Van Roijen commented that this situation was another confirmation of his conclusion that extreme nationalism and communism were the two greatest dangers to the Western Alliance. Foreign Minister Luns said that these two dangers in combination were highlighted in the persons of both Nasser and Sukarno. Ambassador Van Roijen said that in his view Sukarno was probably worse than Nasser since Sukarno dealt with the communists not only in the international field but also used their support domestically, whereas Nasser apparently confined his dealings with them to the international sphere. At this point Foreign Minister Luns commented that it appeared that the United States was going to have Sukarno on its hands in Indonesia since the dissident movement had all but completely collapsed. The Secretary said that it [Page 123] seemed to be the way things were going, adding that the rebels at no time had shown any inclination to fight.

The Foreign Minister then said that as far as the Netherlands was concerned the problem of Indonesia had become one of preventing its take-over by the communists. Dutch citizens were moving out of Indonesia rapidly and the Dutch had gradually accommodated themselves to the fact that their economic holdings and interests were lost. Dutch possessions such as plantations and warehouses had already begun to deteriorate substantially and under Indonesian management or lack thereof they could be expected to deteriorate further. The impact on the Indonesian economy was severe since economic relations with the Netherlands accounted for approximately 50% of the Indonesian national income (these relations amount to only 3% of the Dutch national income). There were, of course, the Foreign Minister said, certain residual problems and he cited in this connection the problems of Indonesian refugees in the Netherlands. The Foreign Minister commented that both he and the Secretary would probably miss the problem of Dutch-Indonesian relations since he had had many occasions to discuss it with the Secretary in the past.

The Secretary then asked the Foreign Minister for his views on West New Guinea. Foreign Minister Luns said that he had intended to mention West New Guinea to the Secretary because he thought that there was a potential development in that area which should be carefully watched. Sukarno after successfully defeating the dissidents might undertake military action against West New Guinea. Foreign Minister Luns said that Sukarno might be impelled into such a venture by the communists or might undertake it to divert attention from internal problems in Indonesia. The Dutch Government had no evidence at the present time that Sukarno intended such a move. Foreign Minister Luns said, however, that he wished to raise it because he thought it was a possibility which we should keep in mind. The Secretary asked about the state of Dutch defenses in the area. The Foreign Minister said that for the time being they had sufficient military forces in West New Guinea to take care of any attack. He mentioned the following components: 2 new destroyers, 1 old destroyer, auxiliary naval craft, 2,000 Royal Dutch Marines, 24 fighter planes (not jets) and 18 amphibious planes. Foreign Minister Luns then said that recent Indonesian purchases of jet planes did give him concern and this would be increased when Indonesian pilots had completed the necessary flight training. The Secretary suggested that this might not be too far away since Indonesian pilots were currently being trained in Egypt and Czechoslovakia. He added, however, that jet planes did not seem to him the type of equipment which could be used either against the dissident movement in the outer islands or against West New Guinea. He assumed that Sukarno wanted these [Page 124] planes since they had come to be considered the modern dictator’s symbol of power.

The Secretary asked whether there was any unrest within West New Guinea. Foreign Minister Luns replied that there was none and that the natives cooperated fully with the local administration. He said that they were able to deal easily with very minor attempts at infiltration of one or two agitators at a time. Luns explained that the natives either apprehended and reported these agitators to the local administration or they ate the agitators. He said there was only one variation to this latter practice and that existed among the more Christianized natives who would only eat fishermen on Fridays.

The Secretary reverted to the serious internal problems which exist in Indonesia and said that the United States might decide that it was in its interest to provide Indonesia with a small amount of assistance. He explained that this would give the United States an opportunity to retain some influence on the Indonesian situation by giving the Indonesians the impression that they could play both sides. Foreign Minister Luns commented that if the United States did decide to give Indonesia some aid he hoped that the Indonesians would be reminded of their international obligations. Ambassador Van Roijen asked what kind of things we had in mind furnishing the Indonesians. The Secretary replied that we were thinking about releasing some rice to them. This request, he explained, had been on our books for some time and in view of the local serious food situation it might be desirable to go ahead and supply Indonesia with a small amount of rice. In response to a question, the Secretary said that we did not have the intention of furnishing military assistance to Indonesia.1

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–2458. Confidential Drafted by Cameron.
  2. In telegram 3101, April 25, the Department authorized the Embassy to negotiate a new P.L. 480 agreement with Indonesia, which would provide Indonesia with approximately $5.5 million of rice. (Ibid., 411.56D41/4–358) A previous P.L. 480 agreement with Indonesia was effected by an exchange of notes in Djakarta on March 2 and 5, 1956; for text see 7 UST 361.