70. Editorial Note
On April 24 at the 363d meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles opened his intelligence briefing with a discussion of developments in Indonesia:
“The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that dissident resistance on Sumatra had practically collapsed in the course of the last week. There seemed to be no willingness to fight on the part of the dissident forces on the island, and the dissident leaders had been unable to provide their soldiers with any idea of why they were fighting. It was a very strange war, because each side was penetrated by the other, and each knew in detail the forthcoming moves of the other. Our people there had had a very frustrating time. While it was impossible to judge what the capabilities of the dissidents for guerrilla operations might prove to be, Mr. Dulles doubted whether very much could be expected on the basis of past performance. Meanwhile, the Central Government was mounting an attack on the dissidents in the Celebes, and Lt. Col. Sumual and his troops seemed to have somewhat more fight in them than had the dissident forces on Sumatra. Nevertheless, Mr. Dulles doubted if they [Page 122] could hold out long. Accordingly, we were pretty close to the end of organized dissident resistance to Djakarta. As for Sukarno’s future course of action, this was extremely difficult to estimate.
“The President said it looked to him as though we might well have to mount an operation against Sumatra if Communism appeared about to take over.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, April 25; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)