61. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Dulles 0
TELEPHONE CALL FROM ALLEN DULLES
AWD said Goodpaster called indicating the Boss’ deep interest particularly re use of American personnel. AWD told him about the meeting and suggested G might want to be present.1 The meeting is to discuss that problem. The Sec thought the meeting Sunday covered it.2 AWD said there is a question or two raised by Stump since then. The Sec said he knows of one—more? AWD does not know. AWD said to G it is getting beyond his charter. Things are under consideration but nothing finally decided on that point and AWD imagines that is what they are going to discuss subject to the See’s and the Boss’ approval. The Sec said he was talking with Herter and Robertson. AWD thought the Sec might want to discuss it—the handling of it etc. Then he said we are reaching the hour of decision and little time will be left to do that so as to have the impact on what is happening. The Sec assumed what Stump raised could be done covert. AWD and the Sec agreed he indicated doubt on that. The Sec said if he raises the question, he (who is stout-hearted) feels there is doubt. AWD said he is on the spot. AWD mentioned some inconsistency. AWD said we can just have the meeting and have it ad referendum to the Sec and the Boss. The Sec said if you decide no, he would [Page 109] not think there need be any referendum. AWD said he would raise points about other types of American personnel—not employed by us. The Sec said if the Pres is going to take it up, he would like to be in on the discussion. The Sec said he thinks the important thing is to try to develop some of the lines he raised Sunday—find a political basis to do it overt rather than get caught covert. The Sec said the only thing now is to study it. If there is a possibility of action along this line, then discuss with the Pres, and if he thinks it worth pursuing then get word to these people we are giving consideration to it and if they survive the first assault then they could look forward to something. If the Executive thinks there is a possibility see if these people are willing to accept it especially with the Sumatran thing which seems to have the greatest degree of possibility.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.↩
- Reference is to a meeting with the President that was scheduled for later that day; see Document 62.↩
- Possibly a reference to the meeting between Dulles and Caccia on April 13; see Document 57.↩