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  4. Document 57

57. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, April 13, 1958.

SUBJECT

  • Indonesia

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Reinhardt
  • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
  • Lord Hood, British Minister

The Secretary told Sir Harold about the meeting Saturday with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Allen Dulles and others on Indonesia.1 He said there had been agreement on some immediate action, but to be performed only if it could be kept covert. He said there had also been agreement on the preparation of measures of a more overt character in line with his view that we should explore more intensively the possibility of getting into a position when we could act more overtly in this situation. Three possibilities presented themselves for study:

1.
Recognition of a state of belligerency. This action would presumably be dependent on the government’s failing for the time being in driving the opposition into the mountains.
2.
The secession from the Indonesian Republic of Sumatra which we would then recognize and perhaps guarantee its independence. This action would be similar to the events in Panama which led to its recognition by Theodore Roosevelt. Unfortunately, the rebels so far had shown interest only in being the Government of Indonesia but if Sumatra were under anti-Sukarno control it would enjoy economic domination in the whole area. The Secretary observed that the original concept in the United Nations had been that Indonesia should be a loose confederation of the independent states. Perhaps this original idea could be explored.
3.
The possibility that there would be so much damage to the U.S. property that U.S. troops would have to be sent in. This would of course be a departure from standard practice and would require a procedure designed to accomplish the result under a cover which would be acceptable to the opposition as having adequate justification.

The Secretary said he hoped the British would undertake to study the foregoing possible lines of action. The meeting yesterday had come [Page 100] to the conclusion that covert action would not be adequate under the circumstances and that no political solution was possible unless we had plans and the determination to go farther. We thought Rob Scott’s2 suggestion of doing something with Nasution was doubtful. We would not exclude the possibility of going to Sukarno and giving him the opportunity to change his line but we must have the determination to act if he proved unwilling. It was conceivable that Sukarno might agree to set up a government with such elements as Hatta and then having gotten rid of the rebels revert to the status quo ante. In any event we did not think there was any possibility of a political solution unless it was backed by the determination to do something.

Sir Harold thought there were two approaches: one was to help the opposition and the other was to try to open up chinks on the government side. This was the rationale that had led to Scott’s suggestion.

The Secretary said we believed we should do nothing overt unless it was linked with political action and for the present time, therefore, we had to limit ourselves to covert action. He did not want to give the impression that we had decided on any of the three possibilities he had outlined but we were studying them and he did want to talk with Sir Harold about them in a few days. Sir Harold observed that London was very doubtful that the plan for recognition of belligerent rights would work. It might, However, logically follow after possibility 2 or 3 outlined by the Secretary.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/4–1358. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt.↩
  2. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, a meeting regarding Indonesia was held at 4 p.m., Saturday, April 12. The following were listed as participants at the meeting in addition to the Secretary of State: Burke, Irwin, Robertson, and Cumming. The meeting was held at Dulles’ house. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Dulles Appointment Book 1958–59) No record of this meeting has been found.↩
  3. Sir Robert H. Scott, U.K. Commissioner General in Southeast Asia.↩