Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, August 1, 1960, 6 p.m.

287. CINCPAC FOR POLAD. More acute phase confrontation between PKI and Indonesian Government inevitable within next months, Foreign Minister Subandrio predicted during my call this morning. Recent action by army in arresting and interrogating PKI leaders had been taken with Sukarno’s specific approval, and repercussions of such action bound continue, Subandrio said.

PKI was divided into two schools of thought, one believed objectives could best be realized by giving lip service to Sukarno, other was convinced time had come to oppose Sukarno openly. Latter group had prevailed in issuance of statement attacking government.

Sukarno was Marxist but no Communist and PKI hopes of bringing him into Communist camp had been dashed by recent events, Subandrio explained. Communists continued to fish in troubled waters, Subandrio said. Only area in which they had been successful was stirring up Sukarno’s suspicions that US objective was to get rid of him. (Embassy telegram 3616)¹

Sukarno had been practically convinced that (1) failure President Eisenhower to visit Indonesia; (2) trip of Karel Doorman; (3) attacks on him in US publications; and (4) Admiral Burke’s Hollandia statement were all part of package and tied in with much advertised coup d’état which never came off. Sukarno believed even if State Department had not been advised of Karel Doorman adventure that Pentagon had given advance nod of approval.

Subandrio inquired how my interview with Sukarno went Sunday (Embassy telegram 283)² and asked me whether I had been able to convince the President that his suspicions were unjustified. I replied frankly that I did not know; but that President was most cordial throughout and appeared to accept points I had made. I went over same ground then reviewed our support program with Subandrio and asked him how President could think we were gunning for him when we were supporting his government to this extent. I emphasized situation was quite different today from that prior to adoption 1945 Constitution in that this was now Sukarno’s government. Were US unwilling support Sukarno we would have withdrawn our support at time he took over complete responsibility for government. I again denied that US had been consulted in connection with Karel Doorman plans and said I was certain that Subandrio’s own consultations in Washington must have led him to conviction this was true. As for Admiral Burke’s statement, Foreign Minister who had seen full text must realize this was slip of tongue which occasionally happens to all of us and did not represent US intention to establish base in West New Guinea.

Subandrio in agreeing said he hoped that I would make these same points when I next saw Sukarno.

I asked what Subandrio thought President had in mind in wanting to have serious talk prior to August 17. Foreign Minister laughed, said presumably Sukarno wanted to warn me of all the terrible things he might say in his independence day speech. Turning serious, he said he did not know but that it could be on the subject of West Irian. Pressures were beginning to mount and Sukarno might well have something new to say on this subject. The movement of Karel Doorman to West New Guinea had aroused flare of Indonesian nationalism and demands for action were well-nigh irresistible. What action would be taken he could not say as no decisions had been made.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 798.00/8–160. Confidential. Also sent to CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 3616, June 18, Henderson summarized a conversation he had that day with Subandrio, during which the Foreign Minister noted that President Sukarno continued to have the feeling, “rightly or wrongly,” that the United States was seeking to change the regime in Indonesia and wanted to remove him from power. Subandrio stated that although he attempted to reason with Sukarno, pointing out that the United States was only concerned that Sukarno might take Indonesia to the Communist side, the President clung to the belief that the United States was working against him. (Ibid., 611.98/6–1860) See Supplement.
2. In telegram 283, August 1, Jones summarized a half–hour courtesy visit that he had with Sukarno on Sunday morning, July 31. Jones assured the Indonesian President that the American people were showing considerably greater interest and understanding of Indonesia’s problems. He also pointed out that, regardless of the results of the upcoming national election in the United States, there would be no fundamental change in U.S. policies or attitudes toward Asia in general or Indonesia in particular. (Ibid., 611.98/8–160) See Supplement.